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 In countries ruled by a single party for a long period of time, how does political 
opposition to the ruling party grow? In this dissertation, I study the growth in support for the 
Democratic Alliance (DA) party, which is the largest opposition party in South Africa. South 
Africa is a case of democratic dominant party rule, a party system in which fair but 
uncompetitive elections are held. I argue that opposition party growth in dominant party systems 
is explained by the strategies that opposition parties adopt in local government and the factors 
that shape political competition in local politics. I argue that opposition parties can use time 
spent in local government to expand beyond their base by delivering services effectively and 
outperforming the ruling party. I also argue that performance in subnational political office helps 
opposition parties build a reputation for good governance, which is appealing to ruling party 
ii. 
	supporters who are looking for an alternative. Finally, I argue that opposition parties use 
candidate nominations for local elections as a means to appeal to constituents that are vital to the 
ruling party’s coalition.  
 I find that where the DA is the incumbent party, improvements in household access to 
basic services such as piped water and proper sanitation are associated with increased support for 
the party. I also find that when DA-run wards perform better than their neighboring ANC 
counterparts, support for the DA in the neighboring ward increases in the next election. Next, I 
examine whether the DA’s reputation for good governance convinces ANC partisans to support 
the party. I find that the DA’s reputation as an anti-corruption party is a stronger predictor of 
vote choice than attitudes toward the DA mayor in the cities of Johannesburg and Nelson 
Mandela Bay.  Finally, I examine the changes over time in the DA’s nomination of local 
government candidates in Eastern Cape, Gauteng, and Western Cape provinces in all local 
government elections (2000 – 2016). I find that while the DA has been successful at increasing 
the representation of black candidates in its candidate pool, these candidates are not winning 
elections or seats at the same rate as the white candidates who reflect the party’s voter base.  	
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
 
 Over the past several decades the transition to democracy in countries throughout the 
world ushered in nominal political reform. In some of these countries, the adoption of formal 
democratic procedures like elections did not lead to expected outcomes, such as alternation in 
power. In democratic dominant party systems, where free and fair elections are held, a single 
political party repeatedly wins national elections. Dominant parties have a monopoly on state 
resources, enjoy support from societal elites, and have a broad coalition of voters. Given the 
overwhelming advantages that these parties enjoy in the political arena, any electoral defeat they 
face is a significant event. What explains opposition party growth in a dominant party system?  
 In this dissertation, I study this puzzle in the case of South Africa’s dominant party 
system, which has been ruled by the African National Congress (ANC) party since 1994. Since 
the transition to democracy, the ANC enjoys considerable support from black voters. The legacy 
of Apartheid on South Africa’s political system is such that political party bases are identified 
with particular racial groups. The ANC capitalizes on this political history and its identification 
with the black liberation struggle by branding the main opposition party, the Democratic 
Alliance (DA), as a white party that is detached from the needs of black voters. The party also 
uses racial framing to delegitimize black African parties. The reality remains though that no 
political party in South African can win elections without substantial support from the black 
community. However, does the ANC have an ironclad hold on the black electorate?  Survey data 
shows that nearly half of black voters are independents and not attached to ethnic parties 
	2 
(Schultz-Herzenberg 2007). In Round 6 of the Afrobarometer (year 2015), 44.5% of black 
respondents believe that the opposition represents a viable alternative to the ruling party.1 In 
addition, in local elections, there is considerable variation in the level of support that the ANC 
receives. How much of this variation is explained by racial factors? And when does the racial 
voting logic break down? Indicative of a growing partisan realignment in South Africa at the 
local level, results from the most recent local government elections show the emergence of  “two 
parallel party systems” (Scheiner 2006) with the ANC enjoying solid support in rural areas and 
its dominance eroded (or lost) in urban centers. Why do opposition parties perform better among 
the urban electorate? This dissertation will examine how opposition parties appeal to non-core 
voters and why and under what conditions members of the dominant party’s traditional electoral 
base support the opposition.  
 Studying electoral behavior in dominant party systems is important, particularly in Africa 
where this regime type is abundant. While the prominent theories on dominant party survival and 
decline originate from Mexico and Japan, there are few systematic studies of opposition party 
growth under dominant party rule in Africa. My dissertation focuses on the important role of 
local elections in the democratization process. Many African countries have experienced 
increasing levels of political and fiscal decentralization, yet it is not clear how these 
developments alter the dynamics between ruling parties and the opposition. In addition, despite 
the large literature on national elections and voting behavior in Africa, there is less focus on the 
local nature of party-voter linkages and how it relates to broader changes in party competition. 
By studying opposition behavior at the local level in dominant party systems, this dissertation 
can shed light on the possibilities for full democratization. Finally, in the context of either 
																																																								
1 Figure based on author’s calculation. See Question 64 in Afrobarometer Round 6 
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dominant party regimes or competitive democracies, opposition parties in Africa tend to receive 
most support in urban areas. South Africa is already a highly urbanized society, however, other 
countries in Africa are now urbanizing at a fast rate. It is thought that urbanization fosters greater 
democratization of the political arena, as urban electorates tend to be more informed and eager to 
hold governments accountable, given their tendency to be more educated and wealthier than their 
rural counterparts. Increased urbanization has also led to major problems for governments that 
are already under stress. The burgeoning population of cities, the high visibility of inequality, 
underemployment, and service delivery problems lead to routine protests and the proliferation of 
crime. These socio-demographic and political developments in urban areas present an 
opportunity for opposition parties that have mostly been shut out of a national political presence 
to mobilize voters who are disaffected by the ruling party. My dissertation sheds light on how 
opposition governance of cities contributes to electoral competition.  
1.1 What are Dominant Party Democracies? 	
 Sartori (1976) defines a dominant party system as one in which party alternation does not 
occur for at least three consecutive elections. In countries that have a majoritarian system, 
dominant parties hold an absolute majority of seats in national office, although Sartori relaxes 
this threshold for countries that do not operate under the absolute majority rule. The initial 
formation of dominant parties often follows a traumatic event such as a revolution or war 
(Gilliomee & Simkins 1999). For example, the ANC in South Africa came to power after fifty 
years of Apartheid. As the party of liberation, the ANC has won every national election since the 
transition to democracy with solid majorities. Another example is Namibia, where the South 
West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) came to power in 1990 after a long struggle for 
independence from South Africa, and has dominated post-independence elections since. In 
	4 
Botswana, the Botswana Development Party (BDP) came to power following its independence 
from British colonial rule.   
 Africa has a significant history of single-party rule in non-democratic settings. Following 
independence from colonial rule, countries such as Ghana, Tanzania, Senegal, and Kenya all had 
single-party states in which one party was allowed to participate in the electoral process. In the 
present day, dominant parties are also the most common type of party system in sub-Saharan 
Africa. However, only three are considered "stable" democracies by Freedom House standards 
(Doorenspleet & Nizjink 2013). Africa’s three democratic dominant parties are in Botswana, 
Namibia, and South Africa. The Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), which has governed 
Botswana since independence in 1966, is the longest-ruling dominant party on the continent. 
Comparatively speaking, although democratic dominant party rule is rare, this party system has 
and continues to exist in diverse parts of the world. Classic examples of democratic dominant 
party rule include Japan's Liberal Democratic Party; Sweden's Social Democratic Party; the 
Labour Party in Israel; and Italy's Christian Democrats.  
 In the literature on dominant party typologies, a distinction is sometimes made between 
hegemonic (i.e. autocratic) and democratic dominant parties. A hegemonic dominant party 
system is one in which a single-party dominates three or more consecutive elections, and 
repressive measures are used to sideline the opposition. This party system is also referred to as 
hybrid regimes (Diamond 2002) or competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky & Way 2010). On the 
other hand, in democratic dominant party systems repression is minimal to absent. Although 
repression is a distinct strategy used by single-party authoritarian regimes to disempower the 
opposition, several of the theories on opposition behavior in hegemonic parties may apply in 
their democratic counterparts. 
	5 
1.2 The Argument 	
 Most of the existing studies on opposition parties in dominant party systems focus on 
national elections, and while national government is a visible and important political arena in 
many developing countries, the lack of attention to patterns of party support in local elections 
overlooks the political consequences of important trends in the developing world such as 
decentralization, which devolves greater administrative authority to local governments. The 
result of greater decentralization is that politically salient issues such as service delivery are 
increasingly localized, and parties can be held accountable for poor performance in local 
government. I argue that local politics is an important site of change in dominant party systems 
because more than the national arena, subnational political office gives opposition parties unique 
opportunities to establish and expand their bases of support.  
 I argue that local elections and local government provide a meaningful opportunity for 
opposition parties to erode the electoral support of the ruling party in two ways. First, winning 
elections at the local level and controlling local councils or cities allows the opposition to gain 
experience in government and to develop a track record for good governance. Due to the ruling 
party’s incumbency advantage, opposition parties in this type of party system lack a record of 
holding political office, particularly at the national level. This creates a situation in which voters 
are uncertain whether the opposition would represent a viable alternative to the ruling party if 
they were to come to power. Local government officials represent the face of the party at the 
local level, and voters are most likely to turn to them when service delivery breaks down. In such 
a context, opposition parties stand to benefit from cultivating a reputation for running local 
governments that deliver services well, and for eschewing corruption. Once parties have served 
several terms in local office, voters have more information about the opposition’s capability to 
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govern. Given the wide variation in access to basic services in many developing countries, by 
developing a reputation for good governance at the local level, opposition parties can attract 
voters who are disillusioned with the ruling party’s performance in office. This mobilization 
strategy offers a way for opposition parties (in racially or ethnically polarized societies) to 
overcome the tactics used by the ruling party to delegitimize its challengers, and to make inroads 
into communities that would otherwise be unlikely to join their coalition. 
 The second way that I argue that local elections help erode dominant party rule is that the 
nomination of local candidates who come from the ruling party’s traditional constituencies is a 
way for the opposition to appeal to ruling party supporters. In South Africa’s dominant party 
system, voter uncertainty about supporting the DA is further complicated by the political salience 
of race. Due to its Apartheid-era origins, many black voters see the DA as a party for whites. 
While the extent of racial voting in local elections has not been extensively studied in the 
literature, the fact that the DA earns a larger vote share in local elections (compared to the 
national) indicates that more black voters are willing to support the party at the local level. 
Previous studies show that voters in South Africa care about the racial image that parties project 
(Ferree 2010). Given the racialised nature of politics in the country, voters are sensitive to 
whether parties are racially inclusive or exclusive. One way for parties to demonstrate their racial 
credentials is to ensure that their party lists are racially balanced and diverse. Local elections 
present even more of an imperative for parties to diversify their party lists because local 
representatives are more proximate to voters. Voters are more likely to interact with local 
officials than members of Parliament.   
1.3 Explanations for Opposition Failure   	
 Several studies on opposition weakness in dominant party systems focus on the resource 
	7 
asymmetries between the incumbent party and its challengers (Greene 2007; Magaloni 2006; 
Scheiner 2006). Greene’s (2007) resource theory of single-party dominance holds that incumbent 
parties’ control over the state economy allows them to outspend their rivals on political 
campaigns, to develop a strong party apparatus, and to distribute patronage to voters. The 
incumbent’s overwhelming resource advantage makes it costly for voters and activists to support 
the opposition. The ruling party makes it costly for opposition party formation by denying them 
access to existing party networks and through coercion or intimidation. Based on the logic of the 
median voter and Downs’ (1957) theory of party electoral strategy, the only type of individuals 
and groups motivated to join the opposition in this type of political environment will be 
ideologically extreme. Consequentially, opposition parties are pushed to become niche-oriented, 
while the incumbent occupies the ideological center. Parts of Greene’s theory of incumbent 
resource advantage are applicable to South Africa, particularly the fact that the ANC has a strong 
degree of control over the public sector, and has very close relations with state-owned business 
and corporations (Beresford 2015; Lodge 2014). However, Greene’s macroeconomic perspective 
minimizes the role of local politics in bringing about larger political changes in the Mexican 
political system. Also, the ideological factors that are central to his theory do not translate as well 
to the African continent, where electorates are generally non-ideological and parties mobilize 
voters based on shared ethnic ties or are centered on prominent personalities.  
 Scheiner (2006) argues that a combination of three factors explains why opposition parties 
in Japan were unable to unseat the LDP for so long: clientelism, fiscal centralization, and 
electoral rules that gave disproportionate influence to rural districts where clientelism is most 
rife. According to Scheiner Japan’s centralized fiscal structure gave the ruling party discretion 
over government spending, thus allowing it to engage in clientelistic practices that were out of 
	8 
reach for opposition parties. Additionally, Japan’s electoral system made it difficult for 
opposition parties to compete with the LDP in the rural areas, which were most dependent on 
clientelist policies such as agriculture subsidies. Scheiner shows that the confluence of 
clientelism, fiscal centralization and institutional protection for ruling party politicians crippled 
the opposition’s ability to develop support at the local level and to field strong candidates. In 
turn, the Japanese opposition’s inability to compete with the LDP led to their failure to secure 
national-level office.  
 Scheiner’s argument rests on the fact that Japan’s centralized fiscal structure makes it 
difficult for opposition parties to develop bases of support at the local level. Generally, 
opposition party building at the local level is most conducive in a fiscally decentralized political 
system, where local governments are empowered with the control over the collection of taxation 
at the sub-national level. So long as local governments are dependent on the central government 
for revenue generation and distribution, opposition parties cannot feasibly create independent 
bases of support at the local level. My project examines how opposition parties in decentralized 
political environments take advantage of the structural factors that make their presence in local 
government possible.  
 One implication of Scheiner’s argument is that Japan developed a “parallel party system”: 
the LDP dominated the rural electorate while there was greater competition in the urban areas 
(Scheiner 2006, 156). He shows that the urban/rural divide reflects the fact that rural voters 
dependent the most on the LDP’s patronage largess, while the urban voters became increasingly 
disaffected by Japan’s clientelist system. Urban voters who rejected clientelist policies such as 
subsidies and agricultural protection were more likely to support the opposition (173). Scheiner’s 
analysis of the “parallel party system” is instructive for understanding the variation in support for 
	9 
the ANC. South Africa has undergone rapid urbanization, with over 60% of the population living 
in urban areas. This means that the ruling party must adopt different strategies to mobilize 
supporters in different parts of the country. It also means that the performance of opposition 
parties in office, who have considerably fewer resources to compete in rural areas, might be a 
more meaningful source of information for urban voters. Trends in other parts of Africa also 
indicate a “rural bias” and the increasing disconnect between urban and rural voters in support 
for incumbent parties (Harding 2012; Koter 2013; Conroy-Krutz 2009).  
1.3.1 Explanations for Opposition Weakness in South Africa: Social Cleavages  	
 Since the first post-Apartheid election in 1994, there have been long-standing fears that the 
ANC would turn into a dominant party (Gilliomee 1998; Horowitz 1991). A dominant 
explanation for ANC hegemony posited by scholars of South African politics is the racial census 
narrative. Ethnic census elections result when voters support parties along ethnic lines, resulting 
in ethnic bloc voting. Ferree (2011) and others (MacDonald 2015) show that the ANC uses racial 
appeals during elections and manipulates the racial composition of its party lists to compete with 
other parties for African voters, who make up the largest ethnic bloc. The ANC’s racial 
campaign rhetoric allows it to stigmatize the DA (and the NPP before it) as the “white party”, 
thereby delegitimizing it in the eyes of black voters who may otherwise consider supporting 
them. In addition, the ANC uses its image as the party of liberation from Apartheid to 
marginalize African parties, who pose the most serious threat for competition over black voters.  
 There are several limitations to the ethnic census argument. First, it focuses primarily on 
national elections.	There is considerable subnational variation in support for the ruling party, and 
it is not clear that mobilizing voters along racial lines is an effective strategy for winning local 
elections. While the racial legacy of Apartheid has left an undeniable footprint on post-Apartheid 
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politics, the impact of race may be more nuanced in different contexts. Studies show that the 
ANC’s racial appeals are less effective at earning votes at the local level (Holmes & Shoup 
2013), and that the demographics of the environment where voters live better determine ANC 
support than racial identity (McLaughlin 2007). Second, this explanation only focuses on the 
ANC’s campaigning behavior during the election season. Given the growing body of evidence 
elsewhere in Africa showing that the political performance of incumbents matters as much (if not 
more) than ethnic voting, we need to better understand how voters factor the ANC’s performance 
in office into their voting calculus. While racial appeals might be most effective in mobilizing 
the ANC’s core supporters, there are other parts of the electorate whose opinion of parties may 
be shaped by other factors.   
1.4 Explanations for Opposition Success  	
 Studies on politics in competitive authoritarian party systems focus on two factors that 
contribute to opposition growth: defections from the ruling party and opposition coalitions.  
 To begin with, dominant parties gain their hegemonic status due to their ability to 
incorporate a broad range of interest groups (Reuter 2017). Managing a diverse coalition of party 
members and voters over time, however, is not easy. Elite defections from the ruling party is a 
major signal that the party’s power is eroding. Prominent party leaders leave the party during 
times of economic crisis (Reuter & Gandhi 2011) when the incumbent’s fortunes are weakened, 
and when they feel that their grievances have been neglected (Brownlee 2007). The decision to 
split with the ruling party can also be prompted by institutional changes that give elites an 
incentive to seek opportunities outside the party (Garrido de Sierra 2013).  And when party elites 
do leave the party, they often take with them blocs of voters that are important to the dominant 
party’s coalition.  
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 Although prominent political elites have parted ways with the ANC in the past, so far the 
trend hasn’t posed a grave threat to the ruling party. A recent example is Julius Malema’s 
departure from the ANC following his fall out with former president Jacob Zuma. Malema went 
on to form the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) party in 2013. The 2016 election was the first 
municipal elections the EFF contested and it earned 8% of the vote share, with its strongest 
showing in Limpopo and Northwest provinces. While breakaway parties publically highlight 
factional disputes inside the ruling party, defections alone are not sufficient to create party 
competition at the local level. 
 The other important source of competitive elections in a dominant party system comes 
from outside the party. The development of coalitions among opposition parties and candidates is 
a strategy that can challenge the dominant party in both national elections and at the subnational 
level. Opposition unity in a party system dominated by a single-party, however, can be difficult 
for several reasons. Individually, opposition parties often lack independent financial resources to 
challenge the incumbent. This problem is greatly magnified in countries where the incumbent 
has strong ties to business elites. The likelihood of opposition coalitions forming is highest in 
countries that experience liberalizing financial reforms, where the incumbent’s monopoly over 
access to capital is weakened (Arriola 2012). Another problem for opposition coordination in a 
dominant party system is that opposition parties tend to be on the extremes of the political 
spectrum, relative to the ruling party and each other. (Greene 2007). In the case of Mexico 
during the PRI’s reign, opposition parties were mainly built by ideologically oriented activists 
and candidates, which resulted in niche parties that could only appeal to only a narrow segment 
of the electorate. This was in contrast to the dominant PRI, which occupied the center of the 
ideological spectrum. In addition, the niche opposition parties that did form tend to be extreme 
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relative to one another, with some on the far left and others on the far right. While these parties 
may have disparate political ideologies, there are overarching concerns that unify them, such as 
grievances against the ruling party’s corruption. Previous studies show that the creation of viable 
opposition coalitions contributed to incumbent turnover in several competitive authoritarian 
regimes (Donno 2013; Howard & Roesseler 2006). Even at the subnational level, the formation 
of opposition coalitions is a strategy for taking control of cities once ruled by the incumbent 
party (Langfield 2014).  
 Although opposition coordination and unity is important for the defeat of dominant parties 
at the ballot box, the success of pre-electoral coalitions in local government elections in South 
Africa is mixed (Langfield 2014). This reality is further complicated by the fact that the main 
opposition parties – the DA and EFF –  are on opposite ends of the political ideological 
spectrum. Party elites do not agree on a common political vision for the country, and while 
certain opposition parties form post-election coalition governments in some metropolitan cities, 
it remains uncertain if they will make the compromises needed to form a united bloc against the 
ANC. 
1.5 Why South Africa? 	
 There are several features of elections in South Africa and the South African state that 
make it a good case to study the evolution of dominant party systems. First, by studying local 
elections in South Africa, it is possible to identify how opposition party support grows over time. 
Since its transition to democracy, South Africa has held local government elections in 2000, 
2006, 2011, and 2016. During this period, although the ANC has enjoyed overwhelming support 
in national elections, the party has not been dominant in every province or municipality in local 
elections. For instance, the DA has experienced substantial growth in electoral support from 
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parts of the country outside the Western Cape province since the 2000 election. Some of the 
cities and municipalities now under DA control were formerly controlled by the ANC. But, 
because the majority of municipalities and cities started out under ANC control, it is possible to 
explain why some local governments experienced party alternation during this period of time 
while others did not. 
 It should be noted, however, that during the post-democratization era, not all local 
governments started out under ANC control. Certain patterns of party competition in local 
government are connected to the legacy of Apartheid. Following the end of Apartheid, the 
National Party (NP) remained dominant in the Western Cape in the 2000 local government 
election (Seekings 2005). With the dissolution of the NP, the newly formed Democratic Alliance 
created its base in the province, and eventually managed to dominate city and municipal councils 
in Western Cape province following the 2006 election (Langfield 2014). Similarly, KwaZulu-
Natal province has been under the majority control of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). This is a 
result of decades of Zulu nationalism and struggle against the ANC-led central government by 
Zulu elites.   
 The second reason for studying elections in South Africa is that the country has a 
decentralized political system, where the three levels of government (national, provincial, and 
municipal) perform different functions. The central function of local government is the provision 
of basic services and assisting with the implementation of local development projects. 
Municipalities are tasked with providing basic services such as water, sanitation, refuse 
collection, and electricity. These basic services are particularly necessary for low-income 
residents who otherwise cannot afford these services on their own.  Other public services such as 
education and healthcare are the domains of the central and provincial government. 
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 In terms of its political structure, there are three categories of local government, 
determined by population size. Category A municipalities are the metropolitan municipalities, 
which are eight of the country’s largest cities, where the majority of the population resides, and 
which contribute the most to the country’s GDP. Areas that fall outside of metro areas are 
classified as Category B municipalities (referred to as local municipalities). The final category is 
district municipalities (Category C), which are made up of local municipalities that fall into one 
district. District municipalities coordinate development and service delivery for the whole area 
and are responsible for administrating rural areas.  
 In the electoral arena, both metro and local municipalities elect representatives using the 
same electoral rules. South Africa has a mixed electoral system at the local level. Half of the 
representatives in metro and local municipalities are elected by proportional representation. The 
other half are elected from electoral wards in plurality elections. Resultantly, there are two types 
of representatives in local government - ward councilors and PR councilors. Ward councilors are 
representatives of their ward constituents in a given municipality. It is their duty to be in direct 
communication with residents and to address service delivery issues. PR councilors act as at-
large representatives, and are deployed throughout the municipality to represent their party. 
 Regarding fiscal matters, the central government is responsible for transferring funds to 
provinces and municipalities, while municipalities are also required to raise their own sources of 
revenue. Municipalities generate their revenue primarily through property taxes and through 
household payment for public utilities. Although municipalities with wealthier constituents are 
likely to raise more revenue than those with poorer constituents, the fiscal responsibility of 
municipalities in a federal system means that the performance of the party in office matters for 
the financial health of municipalities and cities. In other cases of dominant party rule, the central 
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government has tight control over fiscal transfers, meaning that politicians in the periphery are 
highly dependent on the central government for resources (Scheiner 2006). Highly centralized 
political systems make it more difficult for opposition parties to create and cultivate their own 
bases of local support.  
 Despite greater fiscal autonomy for local government, the legacy of Apartheid, and the 
racial inequality that it set in motion continue to plague municipalities that do not have a strong 
tax base. This means that during the early 1990s many black and coloured2 households did not 
have access to most basic services. On the other hand, historically white-governed areas during 
Apartheid continue to enjoy a considerably better quality of life. Since the ANC came into 
office, great strides have been made to provide access to basic services to poor households. Yet, 
many households still suffer from service delivery shortages, and lack of infrastructure such as 
good roads and electricity grids.  
 Besides the persistence of structural disparities created under Apartheid, another reason 
municipalities underperform stems from the actions of local officials elected to office. Four 
rounds of local government elections have occurred since the end of Apartheid, and during this 
time the majority of municipalities were governed by the ANC. Government audit reports show 
that many municipalities in the country do not receive clean audits (Makwetu 2016). The money 
transferred from the central government to municipalities is either unaccounted for or misspent. 
In addition, many municipalities lack qualified personnel who can communicate with 
constituents.  
 In sum, while it is important to acknowledge the persistence of structural inequalities in 
South Africa, the performance of parties in local government also matters for the quality of life 																																																								2	Coloured is a racial category that non-South African readers may not be familiar with. It refers 
to a racial group that has mixed racial ancestry, and thus cannot be categorized as black or white.		
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citizens experience.  
1.6 Democratic Alliance Origins and Evolution 
 
 The Democratic Alliance (DA) party has its roots in the Apartheid era, when it was 
founded in 1959 as the Progressive Party (PP). The PP party was a vocal critic of Apartheid 
policies, and from 1961 to 1974 its sole representative in the parliament was Helen Suzman, a 
stronger defender of human rights (Giliomee 2006). In 1989 the PP3 became the Democratic 
Party (DP) following a merger with other liberal parties. Despite having an overwhelmingly 
white base, the DP struggled to get electoral support. The party’s liberal policies made it district 
from the ruling National Party (NP), which had been the architect of Apartheid and Afrikaner 
nationalism. The DP only managed to earn 20 percent of the vote in 1989 (racially restricted) 
general election. Much of the DP’s low support levels during this time resulted from the fact that 
NP began to move toward the ideological center by introducing a series of policy reforms in the 
early 1990s. NP President FW de Klerk released Nelson Mandela and announced the unbanning 
of the ANC. The NP also embraced liberal democracy and moved away from its whites-only 
party membership to membership for all races.) The NP’s shift toward the ideological center 
narrowed the political space available to the DP. As a result, in the first democratic election in 
1994, the DP party only won 7 percent of seats in the parliament.    
 Following the transition to democracy, the DP, alongside other white parties, sought to 
re-orient their political trajectory. The new political order meant that these parties, which had 
traditionally received the support of white voters, had to determine how to present themselves to 
the new electorate, which was based on universal suffrage. DA leader Tony Leon acknowledged 
that “South African liberalism entered the post-Apartheid era with a sense of 																																																								3	In	1977	the PP was renamed the Progressive Federal Party (PFP)	
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disorientation…under Apartheid [it] didn’t really need a map. It was anti-Apartheid; it opposed 
the National Party’s authoritarian state and the tyranny that upheld it (Leon 2006, 38).” In the 
lead up to the 1994 election, the ANC was poised to make large gains, and the DP struggled to 
figure out how to calibrate its message. In this election, the campaigns of both the ANC and NP 
(by then the New National Party) were heavily racialised. However, the DP mainly stayed away 
from addressing racial issues (Ferree 2010, 80). Instead, the party presumed that the best strategy 
for winning support in the nonwhite community was to focus on portraying itself as a liberal 
voice, and emphasizing its history fighting Apartheid. The decision to run a non-racial campaign 
was later blamed by party officials for its poor showing in the 1994 election when the party 
earned 1.7 percent of the national vote. In comparison, the NP received 20.4 percent of the vote 
(seven seats compared to 82 seats for the NP).  
 For the 1999 election, the DP reversed its non-racial campaigning strategy and decided to 
focus on persuading white voters (especially Afrikaans speakers) from the NP and other minority 
voters such as coloureds and Indians. The DP’s campaign slogan of “Fight Back,” was a racially 
coded attempt to unite white voters around reversing the democratic gains made since 1994 and 
restoring white minority rule. Through its aggressive campaign, the DP sought to make itself a 
representative of non-black South Africans who felt alienated by the ANC’s nationalist discourse 
(Southern 2011). The party’s central message in 1999 was that the interests of ethnic minority 
groups needed to be adequately addressed and that only by bringing minority groups under the 
umbrella of a single-party could their interests be effectively safeguarded. The party promised to 
fight back against crime, and against policies affecting minorities, such as affirmative action – all 
policies which particularly resonated with white and Indian voters (Jolobe 2009). The DP’s 
racialised discourse was further enhanced by the rise of other concerns such as soaring crime 
	18 
rates, the situation of white farmers and land ownership in Zimbabwe, and the disenchantment 
many whites felt toward the ANC’s new pro-equity employment policies (Southern 2011). The 
party’s new political formula appeared to pay off as its vote share increased from 1.7 percent in 
1994 to 9.6 percent in 1999. The right-ward shift helped the DP consolidate support among its 
white middle-class English speaking base and among white Afrikaners who had abandoned the 
NP. Despite these electoral gains, the DP’s campaign strategy alienated nonwhite voters.   
 In 2000, the DP formed an alliance with the New National Party and changed its name to 
the Democratic Alliance (DA) party.4 Along with a new name, the party also changed its logo. 
Before its logo was orange, white and blue – colors associated with Apartheid and resented by 
the black community. Now the party’s logo was yellow and blue with a bright sun in the middle. 
While the party had focused most of its efforts in the 1999 election on capturing the white vote, 
in 2004 it shifted some of its focus to black voters. To this end, the party held many political 
rallies in black areas, party leaders made several visits to black townships, and it launched its 
party manifesto in Soweto – a black township in Johannesburg. It was also at this time that the 
DA began placing an emphasis on diversifying its representatives. The party placed more black 
and coloured individuals on its posters, and during major rallies, DA leader Tony Leon 
frequently surrounded himself with nonwhite DA candidates (Ferree 2010, 150). The DA’s effort 
to revamp its image as a multi-racial party was further accelerated in 2007 when Leon stood 
down as party leader and was replaced by Hellen Zille. Zille had served as mayor of Cape Town 
from 2006 to 2009, and her mission was to transform the DA from being a party of opposition to 
a party of governance, which would focus on developing a reputation for good governance.  
																																																								4	The alliance was short-lived, with the NNP leaving the alliance in 2001	
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 In the 2009 and 2014 national elections the DA continued to project itself as a multi-
racial and inclusive party. In both campaigns the party featured on its posters and ads various 
patriotic symbols such as the South African flag, images of multi-racial groups of individuals, 
and included all 11 national languages on its campaign ads (Southern 2011, 287). The election 
campaigns also involved the use of songs and chants from the Apartheid era, as well as 
references to anti-Apartheid figures such as Nelson Mandela and Mahatma Gandhi. The party 
also worked to change the racial composition of its leadership, as more black candidates were 
placed higher on party lists for parliament. In addition, the campaign messages of 2009 and 2014 
broadened to focus on policies such as poverty eradication, education, health, fighting 
corruption, and job creation (Mottiar 2015). For instance, in its 2014 manifesto, the DA focused 
on pro-poor issues, claiming that 76 percent of Western Cape province’s budget was spent in 
poor communities (Democratic Alliance 2014). The party also claimed that the province had the 
lowest unemployment rate in the country, and the highest levels of access to basic provisions 
such as piped water, electricity, and toilet facilities (Democratic Alliance 2014).  
 While the DA’s vote share increased in both the 2009 and 2014 elections, the party still 
struggles to attract a substantial portion of the black vote in national elections.  
1.7 Plan of the Dissertation 	
 The dissertation has three empirical chapters, and below I discuss the objective of each 
chapter, the data I use, and the results. The first empirical chapter, Chapter 2, establishes whether 
support for the DA increases when access to basic services improve in the places where the party 
is the incumbent. Is service delivery an effective way for the DA to earn support in local 
elections? In this chapter, I created a panel dataset that consists of merged census and electoral 
data at the ward level, which is the lowest electoral unit in the country. I also test the alternative 
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argument that support for opposition parties diffuses spatially. I find that in wards where the DA 
is the incumbent party, support for the party grows as access to basic services such as piped 
water and proper sanitation improves. I also find that when DA-run wards perform better than 
their neighboring ANC counterparts, support for the DA in the neighboring ward increases in the 
next election. This result holds even after taking into consideration the unequal levels of 
development left behind by the legacy of Apartheid. I find little evidence in favor of diffusion 
explanations.  
 Next, in Chapter 3, I examine candidate nomination for local government as the second 
facet of opposition party building at the local level. In this chapter, I created a unique dataset of 
over 10,000 candidates the DA nominated in all four local government elections (2000-2016) in 
the Western Cape, Eastern Cape, and Gauteng provinces. I provide a descriptive overview of the 
evolution of the racial and ethnic characteristics of the candidates that the party nominated in 
each province. Although there is some variation across the provinces, I find that while the DA 
nominated mainly white candidates in the early elections, over time black candidates have 
become the majority of nominees. I also assess the rate at which candidates from the different 
racial groups win ward elections, or are nominated to proportional representation (PR) list 
positions where they have a strong chance of winning a seat. In each province I find that white 
candidates are more likely to win ward elections and occupy winnable PR list positions. While 
the number of black candidates who win seats has increased under the PR list system, the 
number of nonwhite candidates winning ward seats has grown slowly. Finally, in this chapter, I 
also examine the role of the size of racial groups in determining the type of candidates that 
parties nominate. The logic is that parties nominate candidates who can mobilize the largest bloc 
of voters in a given ward. In the case of South Africa, do parties nominate candidates from the 
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largest racial group? Also, how does the DA nominate candidates in anticipation to the ANC’s 
choice? I use data collected on the racial background of both DA and ANC candidates in 
competitive ward elections. I find that both the ANC and DA nominate candidates from the 
largest racial group in a ward, and are more likely to win a competitive ward they do so.  
 In Chapter 4, I turn to the question of whether the DA’s governance of cities translates 
into votes. Has the DA’s presence in local government and in cities helped the party earn a 
reputation for good governance? In this chapter, I examine the concept of party credibility as a 
determinant of support for the opposition. Specifically, I examine the extent to which ANC 
partisans view the DA as having the best reputation at fighting corruption in city government. In 
South Africa, the excesses and corruption of ANC elites and local government officials are 
widely publicized. Opposition parties capitalize on these instances of malfeasance by 
highlighting them in press releases and by frequently lodging legal injunctions against the ANC. 
In one instance, the DA mayor of Pretoria, Solly Msimanga, uncovered that a large portion of 
public money was siphoned away from the city’s public coffers under the previous ANC-led city 
administration.5 Corruption is a political issue that the ANC’s base is sensitive to (Russell 2015), 
and by drawing attention to and sanctioning the ruling party’s mismanagement of local 
government, opposition parties can establish good governance credentials. In this chapter I also 
examine the extent to which the DA’s electoral fortunes are based on the personalities of its 
mayors. I use data collected from an original remote survey of residents in the cities of 
Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay to test both hypotheses. I find that in both cities, the 
party’s reputation is a stronger determinant of vote choice than attitudes toward the mayor.  
																																																								5	27 July 2017, News 24	
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 I summarize the main findings in Chapter 5, and discuss the possibilities of political 
change in South Africa in the future. The final chapter, Chapter 6, addresses the external validity 
of the argument by looking at additional cases in Africa in which opposition parties used their 
control of cities to win elections at the national level or to expand to other parts of the country.  
 This project contributes to a growing body of literature in African politics showing that 
the performance evaluation of political parties matters in voting behavior (Hoffman & Long 
2013; Youde 2005; Arriola 2003; Ishiyma 2010). For example, Weghorst & Lindberg (2011) 
show that swing voters in Ghana are more motivated to cast a vote for the opposition based on 
retrospective evaluations of the economy than on clientelistic promises. This study also builds on 
but is different from work by Thachil (2011) who shows that elite parties in India use the 
provision of private non-state services as an electoral strategy to appeal to poor voters. South 
Africa’s Democratic Alliance (DA) faces a similar dilemma as upper-caste parties in India, as 
they must devise strategies to court the support of non-traditional constituents, while not 
alienating their elite base. However, while Thachil (2011) shows that the distribution of private 
services are the key to winning over swing voters, I argue that the delivery of public services in 
local government is a strategy opposition parties use to attract voters away from the ruling party.   
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 CHAPTER 2   
Service Delivery, Performance, and Building Local Support 
 
 In South Africa local government is supposed to be the sphere of government most 
responsive to the citizenry. Yet, since the introduction of the first democratic municipal elections 
in 2000, the ANC’s uneven record of service delivery in many parts of the country remains a 
contentious issue, especially for the vast majority of South Africans who are working class or 
poor. While widespread unrest over service delivery has not led to dramatic shifts in the ANC’s 
support base (Booysen 2007), opposition parties are particularly eager to define themselves as 
capable of good governance at the local level.  
 In this chapter I examine the impact of basic service delivery on the growth of the 
Democratic Alliance party in local government elections from 2000 to 2016. For the DA, good 
governance of cities and municipalities is central to its party brand. During campaign seasons, 
and between elections, party elites repeatedly tout the DA’s record of service delivery in cities 
throughout the country (Maimane 2017). The “Cape Town model” of governance is often 
highlighted by the party as its blueprint for the rest of the country. In the most recent 2016 local 
government election, support for the DA grew in several of the country’s major metropolitan 
centers. Of the eight large metros, the ANC only won an outright majority in three of them.  
 In addition to the service delivery hypothesis I test several alternative explanations of 
opposition growth in local elections. Previous studies on subnational elections in competitive 
authoritarian party systems argue that support for opposition parties diffuses spatially (Hiskey & 
Canache 2005; Lucardi 2016). Spatial theories of opposition growth hold that opposition 
victories in one locality make it likely that neighboring areas will also support the opposition in 
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the future. By showing that the ruling party can be defeated, opposition victories in local 
elections can initiate a contagion effect.  The process of diffusion can occur either horizontally or 
vertically. Horizontal diffusion occurs when an opposition victory in one electoral district results 
in subsequent victories in the neighboring electoral districts. A special case of horizontal 
diffusion is learning, which holds that proximity to large cities, where opposition victories tend 
to originate due to factors such as an urbanized electorate, facilitates the diffusion of support for 
the opposition in nearby districts. Finally, diffusion also occurs vertically, when opposition 
victories in higher political office lead to victories in electoral units down below.  
 To test the service delivery argument and spatial explanations I construct a panel dataset 
that spans all four local government elections and consists of census, spatial and electoral data 
collected at the smallest electoral unit (the ward). I find that where the DA is the incumbent 
party, improvements in access to basic services such as piped water, garbage collection, and 
flush toilets are associated with an increase in the party’s vote share. In addition to traditional 
measures of basic service delivery, I also find that when DA-run wards outperform ANC-run 
wards, support for the DA in surrounding wards increases. Next, I find support for the horizontal 
diffusion through learning hypothesis – support for the DA increases in wards that are more 
proximate to large cities. Opposition victories in larger cities provide a visible platform that 
creates a ripple effect in neighboring areas.  
 The results for the vertical and horizontal diffusion hypotheses are unsupported. I do not 
find strong support for the vertical diffusion hypothesis. And, contrary to the theoretical 
expectations of the horizontal diffusion hypothesis, support for the DA in a future election 
decreases in a ward surrounded by wards that were previously won by the party. This finding 
suggests that local support for the opposition does not appear to diffuse horizontally in the case 
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of South Africa, and I discuss why this might be the case. 
 The finding that service delivery increases support for the DA is in line with studies from 
other parts of the world showing that opposition parties with stigmatized party identities 
successfully earn the support of swing voters by delivering desired public services. For instance, 
India’s BJP and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt won support from swing voters by cultivating 
reputations as effective service providers, despite having exclusive party identities centered on 
Hindu nationalism (Thachil 2011) and Islamism (Brooke 2017), respectively. In the case of 
South Africa, given the polarizing nature of racial divisions, it would seem that service delivery 
in local government would be an insignificant predictor of opposition support. However, while 
scholars of South Africa recognize that good governance at the local level might be a way for the 
DA to overcome its image problem with black voters (Ferree 2010; Langfield 2014), it is only 
recently that this argument has come under empirical scrutiny. 
2.1 Performance Evaluation and Opposition Growth in Africa 
 
 Although the extant literature on voting behavior in Africa provides evidence that voters do 
engage in sophisticated evaluations of socio-economic conditions when deciding to cast a ballot, 
few studies link performance evaluations with support for opposition parties. Do performance 
evaluations matter when voters decide to support opposition parties?  
 Weghorst and Lindberg (2011) find that swing voters in Ghana vote for the opposition not 
due to clientelistic offers, but based on retrospective evaluations of the incumbent party’s ability 
to deliver public goods. According to Weghorst and Lindberg (2013), even in a “patronage 
democracy” such as Ghana, the most effective strategy for opposition parties to win over 
persuadable voters is to provide collective goods in the form of development.  In addition, 
Arriola (2003) finds that although ethno-regional identities are important predictors of opposition 
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party support in Ethiopia, local economic conditions also matter.  
 Recent studies on opposition party success in Africa focus on the strategy of 
ethnopopulism. Ethnopopulism represents the fusion of ethnic and populist appeals as an 
explanation for how opposition parties gain support. Resnick (2012) defines populism as a 
strategy “characterized by an anti-elitist discourse, a policy message oriented around social 
inclusion, and a charismatic leader who professes an affinity with the under class (1352).” 
Combining election data from Zambia’s 2008 election and census data, Cheeseman and 
Hinfelaar (2010) show that while the opposition leader Michael Sata used a populist (non-ethnic) 
strategy to build a multi-ethnic coalition of support in urban areas, in the country-side he 
deployed ethnic appeals to mobilize the party’s Bemba-speaking base. Resnick’s study (2012) 
builds on Cheeseman and Hinfelaar’s (2010) finding by conducting a survey of urban voters in 
Zambia to find out why urban voters are more likely to support opposition parties in Africa. She 
finds that urban voters in Zambia overwhelmingly supported the main opposition party in 2006 
and 2008 due to the party’s use of campaign rhetoric that focused on job creation and service 
delivery, rather than voter’s sociotropic evaluations, ethnic identity, or clientelism. Although 
opposition campaign rhetoric is useful to study, in this study I use objective indicators to observe 
the political consequences of opposition performance in local government.  
 In addition to public goods, providing private non-state services is also a strategy 
opposition parties use to persuade otherwise out-of-reach voters. A body of literature emanating 
mostly from the Middle East and South East Asia focuses on the political impact of non-state 
service provision by political parties (Thachil 2011; Brook 2017; Hamayotsu 2011). Thachil 
(2011) shows that the elite upper-caste BJP in India provides private service provision to 
mobilize support from poor lower-cast voters. The BJP performs better in districts with dense 
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service networks than in those without them. Furthermore, Thachil finds that the BJP’s service 
activities even had a positive effect on non-beneficiary’s perceptions about the party. Similarly, 
in Egypt, Brook (2017) finds that the Muslim Brotherhood’s provision of health care services 
influences citizens to vote for the party’s candidate. Taken together, these studies show that 
opposition parties can use basic service delivery as a way to build a reputation for good 
governance, and to persuade swing voters.  
2.1.1 The Argument: Local Government and Opposition Growth   
 
 In a dominant party system, voters lack information about how opposition parties would 
perform if they were in government. The ability of opposition parties to overcome this 
information barrier is based on two factors. First, they have to win elections in local office, and 
then expand their base of support by winning more offices. As previous studies show, opposition 
parties have an easier time winning office in big metropolitan cities (Resnick 2012; Magaloni 
2006). The lower barrier to entry for opposition parties in urban centers is often a result of 
factors such as the decreased prevalence of clientelism (compared to rural areas, where the ruling 
party dominates), and demographic factors that are favorable to the opposition - opposition 
supporters may be wealthier, and more educated. Once the opposition consolidates support from 
its core constituents, its ability to govern major cities or provinces is a visible source of 
information for swing voters throughout the country that the ruling party is not invincible.  
 After an opposition party secures some seats in local office, its ability to attract swing 
voters depends on presenting itself as a viable alternative to the ruling party. If the ruling party 
has a reputation of being corrupt, one way challengers can counter this narrative is by earning a 
reputation for good governance. Performance in local government is especially important in 
societies where the delivery of basic services is uneven, and the demand for public goods such as 
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piped water, garbage collection, and sanitation is high. Yet, in order to earn credit for 
improvements in basic services, the public goods any party delivers have to be attributable to the 
party. Attribution is a key assumption of the electoral accountability theory because if 
performance evaluation does impact voting behavior, voters have to be able to link 
improvements in service delivery to the incumbent party (Harding 2015). In many African 
countries, while public goods such as education and healthcare are often the domains of the 
national government, at the local level, local parties and politicians play an important role in 
basic service delivery. Local officials are responsible for delivering basic services that impact 
daily life, and as a result, mismanagement of local government is particularly damaging to the 
ruling party’s image among voters. Local government officials represent the face of the party at 
the local level, and voters are most likely to turn to them when service delivery breaks down. In 
such a context, opposition parties stand to benefit from cultivating a reputation for running local 
governments that deliver services well, and for eschewing corruption. 
 I argue that one strategy that facilitates opposition growth in a dominant party system is 
good governance at the local level. Due to the ruling party’s incumbency advantage, opposition 
parties in this type of party system lack a record of holding political office, particularly at the 
national level. This creates a situation in which voters are uncertain whether the opposition 
would represent a viable alternative to the ruling party. I argue that good governance of cities 
and municipalities strengthens support for opposition parties in a dominant party system when 
the ruling party has a reputation for corruption and mismanagement of local government. 
 In South Africa, the excesses and corruption of ANC elites and local government officials 
are widely publicized. Opposition parties capitalize on these instances of malfeasance by 
highlighting them in press releases and by frequently lodging legal injunctions against the ANC. 
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In one instance, the DA mayor of Pretoria, Solly Msimanga, uncovered that a large portion of 
public money was siphoned away from the city’s public coffers under the previous ANC-led city 
administration.6 Corruption is a political issue that the ANC’s base is sensitive to (Russell 2015), 
and by drawing attention to and sanctioning the ruling party’s mismanagement of local 
government, opposition parties can establish good governance credentials.      
 Not only do opposition parties have to denounce the ruling party’s corruption, but they 
also have to rid corrupt officials from their ranks. Following a bitter public battle, the DA 
recently expelled former Cape Town mayor Patricia de Lille from the party after information 
surfaced that she was mismanaging municipal resources. Public disavowals of corrupt behavior, 
especially from co-partisans, show voters that opposition parties take good governance seriously.  
 In this chapter I examine whether the DA is rewarded with re-election for delivering 
basic services that local government is responsible for – piped water, garbage collection, and 
proper sanitation.  I test the following hypothesis: 𝐻!. Service Delivery. In places where the DA is the incumbent party, the increased provision of 
basic services will increase support for the party.  
 
 In addition to analyzing the delivery of basic services, it also matters how well the DA 
performs relative to the ruling party. Residents in one location are likely to notice how the 
quality of life in their area compares to that of surrounding areas. And given the visible role of 
ward councilors, it is likely that many residents attribute the problems and success of their ward 
to the party in charge. The DA may be more likely to earn support in a ward if the residents 
notice that the neighboring DA-run wards are better off than the ones under ANC control. For a 
given ward w, in election year time t, the Overperformance hypothesis is the following:   𝐻!. Overperformance. The electoral performance of the DA in ward w at time t will be better if 																																																								6	27 July 2017, News 24	
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the share of wards neighboring w that are run by the DA performed better than neighboring 
ANC-run wards since t – 1. 
2.1.2 Diffusion and Opposition Growth  
 
 An alternative explanation of opposition growth identified by the literature on the erosion 
of dominant party rule is the role of spatial diffusion. Studies of other dominant party regimes 
show that opposition victories at the local level followed a diffusion pattern – the opposition’s 
victory in one electoral unit led to successive victories in neighboring areas (Hiskey & Canache 
2005; Lucardi 2016). Theories of diffusion have been applied in a variety of contexts to explain 
wide-ranging phenomenon such as the spread of democracy (Star 1991; Cederman & Gleditsch 
2004; Kopstein & Reily 2000), the spread of war (Most & Star 1980), the increased 
representation of women in political office (Gilardi 2015), and the adoption of technological 
innovations or policies (Berry & Berry 1990).  
 Diffusion can occur in two directions: horizontal or vertical. Horizontal diffusion is when 
opposition victory in one subnational office (for instance the municipality) allows the party to 
increase its electoral support in neighboring electoral units. In addition, horizontal diffusion can 
be strengthened through the mechanism of Learning. Diffusion through learning occurs when the 
early adoption of a practice (in this case opposition party support) by an influential actor or unit 
leads to the spread of that practice among others. In dominant party regimes, voters suffer from 
an information asymmetry; having been ruled by a single party for a long period of time, they 
have little knowledge or experience about the opposition’s capacity to govern. In this political 
environment, opposition victories in one locality demonstrate to voters in the surrounding area 
that the ruling party is not invincible, and that the opposition is capable of winning office. The 
adoption of the innovation, especially by a highly visible, influential, and proximate actor serves 
as a source of information that would otherwise be less significant if the actor were less 
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influential.  In the case of subnational politics, large cities are highly influential political units. 
Opposition victories and governance of cities has the potential to create ripple effects because 
city politics receive more media coverage, which is transmitted to the rest of the country. 
 Another form of diffusion is Vertical diffusion, which occurs when the opposition’s 
capture of higher political office results in future victories in lower level subnational electoral 
units that fall within the boundaries of the higher-level office. Fiscal resources are generally 
allocated at higher levels of political office (such as districts, municipalities, or provinces), and 
for opposition parties who are often starved of economic resources, the power to allocate 
resources puts them in a position to set their own service delivery agenda. Opposition success in 
higher-level office can lead to a top-down effect on lower subnational offices. In the case of 
South Africa, the higher-level office that I focus on is the municipality, which is the electoral 
unit that wards fall under.  
 For a given ward w, in election year time t, the alternative hypothesis that I test are the 
following: 𝐻!. Horizontal diffusion. The electoral performance of the DA in ward w at time t will be better 
if the DA already governs some of w’s neighbors since t – 1. 
 𝐻!. Vertical diffusion. The electoral performance of the DA in ward w at time t will be better if 
the DA already governs the municipality were w is located since t – 1. 
 
 𝐻!. Learning. The electoral performance of the DA in ward w at time t will be better if w is 
located near large and urbanized municipalities that the DA controls since t – 1.  
  
2.2 The Politics of Service Delivery In South Africa 
 
 The central function of local government is the provision of basic services and assisting 
with the implementation of local development projects. Municipalities are tasked with providing 
basic services such as water, sanitation, refuse collection, and electricity. While municipalities do 
charge fees for these services, since December 2000, government policy requires that 
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municipalities provide a small amount of water (6 kiloliters) and electricity (50 kilowatts) to each 
household per month for free (Cameron 2014). These basic services are particularly necessary 
for low-income residents who otherwise cannot afford these services on their own.  Higher order 
public services such as education and healthcare are the domains of the central and provincial 
government.  
 Despite greater fiscal autonomy for local government, the legacy of Apartheid, and the 
racial inequality it set in motion continue to plague municipalities that do not have a strong tax 
base. This means that during the early 1990s many black and coloured households did not have 
access to many basic services. On the other hand, historically white-governed areas during 
apartheid continue to enjoy a considerably better quality of life. Since the ANC came into office, 
great strides have been made to provide access to basic services to poor households. Yet, many 
households still suffer from service delivery shortages, and lack of infrastructure such as good 
roads and electricity grids.  
 Besides the persistence of structural disparities created under apartheid, another reason 
municipalities underperform has to do with the actions of local officials elected to office. Four 
local government elections have occurred since the end of apartheid, and during this time the 
majority of municipalities have been governed by the ANC. Government audit reports show that 
the majority of municipalities in the country do not receive clean audits (Makwetu 2016). Much 
money transferred from the central government to municipalities is either unaccounted for or 
misspent. In addition, many municipalities lack qualified personnel who can communicate with 
constituents.  
 As a result of inadequate service delivery, protests occur with frequency throughout the 
country. Service-delivery related protests are the second most common type of protests in South 
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Africa (behind labor related protests).7 But, rather than punish the ruling party at the polls, voters 
use protest as a way to signal discontent with service delivery while continuing to support the 
ANC (Booysen 2007). One way the ANC responds to local discontent with service delivery is 
through its process of nominating local government councilors. South Africa’s electoral system 
is heavily party-centric, meaning that parties control the nomination process for local (and 
national) office. Wegner (2016) shows that the ANC does not re-nominate local government 
councilors who perform poorly on service delivery. Also, the party takes into consideration 
popular support for local candidates during the re-nomination process.   
2.3 Political Distortions in Service Delivery?  
  
 Despite the many pro-poor policies it has implemented since coming into office, is there 
reason to expect that the ANC engages in political manipulation of government resources? A 
common feature of other dominant party systems is that the central government funnels 
resources toward places where its core supporters live, and punishes defectors with less public 
goods or pork (Magaloni 2006; Scheiner 2006; Blaydes 2010).  
 While government policy maintains that central government transfers to municipalities are 
allocated using a needs-based formula, there is some evidence that the ANC manipulates 
resources for political purposes. Kroth (2014) uses panel data over the period 1995-2010 to 
identify the existence of a political budget cycle in South Africa. She finds that the ANC 
provides more intergovernmental transfers to provinces where it faces less political competition. 
From this study, the distribution of central government transfers appears to follow a core voter 
logic.   
 For the provision of basic services such as water, garbage collection, and electricity, there 																																																								
7 15 June 2016, Sowetan  
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is not much systematic evidence to suggest the presence of political interference. However, there 
is anecdotal evidence that the ANC intentionally distributes (or withholds) some services right 
before election time in certain municipalities. For instance, the DA claimed that the ANC timed 
the distribution of government-built houses8 to residents of Ekurhuleni metro right before the 
2016 election as a ploy to get votes for its mayoral candidate.9 In the competitive province of 
Kwazulu-Natal, there was an explosive expose before the 2016 election showing an internal 
memo circulating in the ANC provincial branch in which party leaders ordered councilors to shut 
off the water taps in the drought-stricken Pietermaritzburg municipality.10 The memo then 
instructed members to send in water tankers to show that the party appears to be delivering 
water. It is possible that these reports may be isolated incidents. However, Afrobarometer data 
show that this form of quid-pro-quo exchange is not common during South African elections 
(Jensen & Justesen 2014).  
2.4 Data 
 
 The dataset that I use in this chapter consists of merged census, electoral, and spatial data. 
The unit of observation is the ward. Although the data contains information from all four local 
government elections, I only use data from the 2000 election to determine which party is the 
incumbent in a ward.11  Thus, in actuality, the panel data has three waves – the 2006, 2011, and 
2016 local government elections. The total number of ward-year observations is 13,176.  
 The electoral, census, and spatial data come from a variety of sources. I obtained the 
electoral data from the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), which is the official body that 																																																								8	These houses are built under the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP), which is a 
massive government-led scheme to build houses for the poor.			
9 22 July 2016, The Star 
10 12 June 2016, Sunday Times 11	The 2000 election is the first local government election. I use this election year to determine a 
party’s incumbent status in the 2006 election, and so forth		
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manages elections in South Africa. Raw census data and geospatial census data were obtained 
from Statistics South Africa (Stats SA). The electoral boundary data was obtained from South 
Africa’s Demarcation Board, which is the official government body in charge of making 
boundary changes.  
 When using local level election and population data in South Africa, the challenge that 
arises is that ward and municipal boundaries are redistricted before local elections every five 
years. This makes it difficult to observe changes over time in a single unit. Thus, in order to 
make accurate observations of changes within electoral units over time, I implement a technique 
that involves retroactively fitting previous ward and municipal boundaries into the country’s 
2016 electoral geography (Kroth et al. 2016; De Kadt & Lieberman 2017). This process involves 
taking the smallest unit of census data (the Small Area Layer) and electoral data (the polling 
station) and spatially fitting them into the 2016 ward and municipal geography. The result is four 
election years of data that have the same number of wards and municipalities as the 2016 
election (4,392 wards and 213 municipalities). The alignment of old boundaries into the 2016 
electoral geography makes it possible to observe changes within a municipality or ward, and to 
compare units across different elections. For a detailed explanation on how the data are 
constructed see Appendix 2.1. 
2.4.1 Dependent Variable 
 
 Table 2.1 provides a summary of all variables in this analysis. The dependent variable is 
the DA’s ward vote share in each election. The party’s vote share in the entire universe of ward-
year observations ranges from a low of 0% to a high of 98%, with the mean vote share being 
14%. In the wards where it is the incumbent party, the party’s mean vote share is 66%. I also  
create a dummy variable of the party’s vote share. A value of 1 for the vote share is a ward that 
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the party won (where it received a plurality of the vote share), and a value of 0 is for wards that 
the party lost. 
2.4.2 Performance 
 
 I measure the performance explanatory variable in two ways. The first measure of  
performance is access to basic services - Water, Refuse, and Flush Toilets. All three variables 
come from the census. Since democratization, census data in South Africa was collected in 1996, 
2001, and 2011. I match each election year with the closest available census year data. For the 
2006 election year I use the 2001 census, and for the 2006 and 2011 elections I use data from the 
2011 census. Censuses are collected every decade, and the only other source of basic service data 
is the Community Survey, which is a nationally representative household survey that collects 
information that is identical to the census. Unfortunately, the Community Survey only collects a  
respondent’s location information at the municipal level, so it cannot be used in this ward panel.   
I operationalize access to basic services as the change in the proportion of households in 
a ward that have access to piped water, refuse collection, and flush toilets. The plots in Figures 
2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 show the change in the proportion of households in a ward that experience 
routine garbage collection, flush toilets, and piped water, respectively, in South Africa from 2001 
to 2011. The solid line is for the year 2001, and the dashed line is for 2011. The x-axis represents  
the proportion of households with access to each service per ward.  Overall, the density plots 
show that there have been discernable improvements in the number of households with access to 
these basic services. The distribution of the change in household access to refuse collection and 
flush toilets look mostly similar, as they both have a bimodal pattern – there are some wards that 
have good access to basic services, and others where the majority of households do not have any 
access. This pattern reflects the deep level of inequality in South Africa, meaning that some 
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Table 2.1 Summary Statistics of Variables 
 
 Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
 Copartisan neighbors (large) 13,176 0.168 0.374 0 1 
Copartisan_Municipality 13,176 0.071 0.257 0 1 
Previous_election voteshare 13,176 0.162 0.240 0.000 0.981 
Copartisan Neighbors 13,176 0.147 0.264 0 1 
Copartisan Neighbors (dummy) 13,176 0.337 0.473 0 1 
Overperformance 13,176 -0.114 0.288 -1.000 1.000 
Ward population 13,176 10,015.600 7,955.503 3.026 80,532.550 
Black population 13,176 0.592 0.403 0.005 1.000 
Coloured population 13,176 0.146 0.198 0.000 0.980 
Indian population 13,176 0.215 0.294 0.000 0.966 
White population 13,176 0.103 0.156 0.000 0.940 
Access to refuse collection 13,176 0.362 0.381 0.000 0.999 
Access to proper toilets 13,176 0.325 0.375 0.000 0.999 
Access to piped water 13,176 0.262 0.303 0.001 0.995 
DA incumbent ward 13,176 0.144 0.351 0 1 
DA ward vote share 13,176 0.168 0.243 0.000 0.981 
DA won ward (dummy) 13,176 0.148 0.355 0 1 
1994 ward development level 13,176 0.322 0.381 0.000 1.000 
  
wards are very wealth and others are extremely poor. However, access to proper sanitation has 
improved more than any of the other public goods, as indicated by the larger gap between the 
two time periods on the right side of the density plot on Figure 2.2. Finally, the distribution of 
the change in household access to piped water in Figure 2.3 indicates considerable improvement. 
There are fewer wards with households that have no access to piped water inside their home in  
2011 than there were in 2001, and the number of wards where the proportion of households with 
piped water reaches 100% has increased during this time period.  
 The second measure of performance is a spatial measure. I define Overperformance as 
the performance of neighboring DA-run wards relative to that of neighboring ANC-governed 
ones. Because data for basic services comes from census data that are collected in ten year 
intervals, instead, I use nightlight data emissions to measure Overformance. Nightlight 
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Figure 2.1 Change in Household Access to Refuse Collection in a Ward (2000-2011) 
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Figure 2.2 Change in Household Access to Flush Toilets in a Ward (2000-2011) 
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Figure 2.3 Change in Household Access to Piped Water in a Ward (2000-2011) 
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data measure the radiance density of light sources emitted from Earth based on gridded maps of 
the world where each 30 arc-second pixel (~ 0.86 square kilometers at the Equator) is 
represented by an integer ranging between 0 and 63. This digital number measures the amount of 
luminosity captured by the satellite sensor.12 Nightlight data are considered a valid proxy for 
economic development (Chen & Nordhaus 2010; Henderson et a. 2012), and in South Africa 
they track well with census measures such as household access to electricity, piped water, and 
garbage collection (Kroth 2014). The nightlight data are from the DMSP-OLS satellite, which 
began collecting annual data starting in 1992 and ended in 2013. I match nightlight data from 
2006 and 2011 to the 2006 and 2011 election years. Because data collection for the satellite 
ended in 2013, I use the 2013 nightlight data for the 2016 election.  
To construct the Overperformance variable, for a given ward w, I take the difference 
between the average value of nightlight among neighboring wards governed by the DA and those 
governed by the ANC. Because the variable is based on a difference, the values can be either 
positive or negative. Positive values indicate that neighboring DA wards are governed better, and 
negative values indicate that neighboring ANC wards are governed better.  
 The variable that I use to measure the horizontal diffusion hypothesis is Copartisan 
neighbors, which is the proportion of ward w’s neighbors that were governed by the DA at the 
moment of election t. More specifically, these wards must have been captured by the DA at t-1. 
In spatial terms, neighboring wards are those that share a physical border (queen continuity). The 
maximum value of Copartisan neighbors is 1, meaning that all of ward w’s neighbors were 
governed by the DA, and a minimum value of 0 indicates that no DA-run wards border w.  
																																																								12	A digital number of 0 means that a pixel is unlit, while 63 indicates that the luminosity is so 
bright that no information can be ascertained from the censor. While this value is rare in the data, 
it tends to occur in large cities.		
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The next variable, Copartisan neighbors (large), measures the learning hypothesis, and is 
defined as the proportion of copartisan wards located in large municipalities that are located 
within a 100km radius of ward w. Large municipalities are those which have a population of 
over 100,000 based on 2011 census numbers. The final explanatory variable, Copartisan 
municipality measures the vertical diffusion hypothesis. Copartisan municipality is a dummy 
variable that takes on the value of 1 if the DA controlled the municipal government that ward w 
is in at the time of the election. In the entire data, 940 DA-led wards (out of the total 13,176 
ward-election year observations) were in DA controlled municipalities.    
2.5 Empirical Strategy 
 
 In this section I analyze two models. The first model examines the basic service delivery 
hypothesis alone, and is expressed as the following: ΔVoteShare!" =  Δ𝜆! +  𝛽!Δ𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒!" +  𝛽!ΔHouseholdRace   + 𝛽!Δ1994𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒!" +  𝛽!Δ𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑊𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛!" +  Δ𝜀!" (1) 
 
where w represents a given ward, and t is the panel year. The change in the DA’s ward vote share 
is the dependent variable. The coefficient 𝛽! represents the service delivery variables, which are 
operationalized as the change in the proportion of households in each municipality with access to 
flush toilets, refuse collection, and piped water from 2001 to 2011. To take into consideration the 
fact that local governments were unevenly developed after the transition to democracy because 
of the legacy of Apartheid, I include a baseline measure of ward development. I use 1994-level 
nightlight emission data as a proxy for development from the DMSP-OLS data. I selected the 
year 1994 because this is the year that the transition to democracy occurred and the ANC came 
to power. This cutoff year provides a snapshot of the level of development across wards in the 
aftermath of the Apartheid era.  Including a baseline measure of ward economic development 
allows us to control for the possibility that a positive change in access to basic services between 
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2006 and 2016 is due not to historic advantages but to party performance. 
 The remaining covariates in the model are the change in the proportion of households in a  
ward that are black, coloured and white (Indian/Asian is the reference category), and the log 
change in the ward population. To estimate the relationship between service delivery and support 
for the DA in the 2016 election, I ran an ordinary least squares regression.  
 Second, to test the spatial hypotheses, I estimate an OLS model with fixed effects that 
takes on the following form: 𝑦!" =  𝛽𝐗!" +  𝐂!" + 𝜇! +  𝛿! +  𝜀!" (2) 
 
where 𝑦!" is the outcome variable that measures the DA’s electoral performance in ward w in 
year t – either the party’s  ward vote share or a dummy variable indicating whether the party won 
the ward.  Next, 𝐗!" is vector representing the main explanatory variables, and 𝐂!" are the 
following control variables: the party’s incumbency status and its previous vote share in the 
previous election. Finally, 𝜇!  and  𝛿! are ward and year fixed effects.  
2.6 Results  
 
 In wards and municipalities where the DA is the incumbent, do improvements in service  
delivery help the party grow support at the local level? Table 2.2 presents three separate models 
for each basic service (flush toilets, refuse collection, and piped water). First, the positive 
direction of the coefficients on all of the service delivery variables (refuse, toilet and water) 
variables indicates that improvements in service delivery are positively associated with an 
increase in the DA’s vote share. However, only the toilet and water coefficients have an effect on 
the party’s electoral performance, meaning that as the proportion of households with access to 
proper sanitation and piped water in DA-run wards increased from the 2000 election to the 2016 
election, the party’s vote share also grew. There is no detectable effect of increased access to   
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Table 2.2 Service Delivery Models (2000-2016)  
 
 
 Dependent variable: 
  
 DA Ward Vote Share 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Refuse 0.027   
 (0.018)   
    Toilet  0.087
***  
  (0.020)  
    Water   0.236
*** 
   (0.021) 
    Black -0.148*** -0.227*** -0.372*** 
 (0.032) (0.033) (0.030) 
    Coloured 0.262*** 0.186*** 0.008 
 (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) 
    White 0.597*** 0.514*** 0.290*** 
 (0.031) (0.032) (0.034) 
    1994 Development  Level 0.105*** 0.094*** 0.084*** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) 
    Ward population (log) 0.038*** 0.035*** 0.026*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
    Constant -0.011 0.046 0.200*** 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.041) 
     Observations 1,892 1,892 1,892 
R2 0.537 0.541 0.566 
Adjusted R2 0.536 0.540 0.565 
F Statistic (df = 6; 1885) 364.429*** 370.797*** 410.149*** 
 Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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routine garbage collection on the party’s vote share, as Model 3 in Table 2.2 shows.  
 For substantive interpretation I select the average value of the change in the proportion of 
households with access to both proper sanitation and piped water, and assess how much the DA’s 
ward vote share increased over the years. The average change in the proportion of households 
with access to flush toilets was 0.05 (or 5%). In a ward where the proportion of households with 
access to proper sanitation increased by 5%, the DA’s ward vote share increased by 0.4%. The 
average change in the proportion of households with access to piped water was 12%, and this 
was associated with a 3% increase in the DA’s ward vote share.  
 The coefficients on the remaining covariates of the service delivery models adhere to 
theoretical expectations, indicating that the fit of the model is strong. The coefficient on the 
proportion of households in a ward that are black is negative, which confirms the expectation 
that the DA is likely to earn less support in areas that are predominantly black. On the other 
hand, the positive coefficients on the coloured and white population variables show that support 
for the party increases in a ward as the proportion of coloured and white households in a ward 
also increases. This also adheres to our expectations, since white and coloured voters are more 
likely to support the party than blacks. Next, while the sign on the covariate for baseline ward 
development is positively associated with support for the DA, the fact that the positive 
relationship between service delivery and the party’s vote share endures despite the inclusion of 
this covariate suggests that initial development levels may not be correlated with subsequent 
service delivery levels. Finally, the population of a ward, which is proxy for the level of 
urbanization, is positively associated with support for the DA. The sign on this covariate 
confirms the general principal that opposition parties tend to receive more support in urbanized 
areas. 
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 Overall, the results from the service delivery hypothesis indicate that service delivery in 
local government helps grow support for the DA at the local level. While the relationship 
between service delivery and electoral support only exists for certain basic services such as 
improvements to proper sanitation and piped water, the substantive impact of the delivery of 
these services on electoral support for the DA suggests that a meaningful relationship exists 
between service delivery and opposition growth at the local level.   
 Next, Table 2.3 presents the results for the spatial hypotheses. Model 1 in Table 2.3 shows 
the results for the Overperformance hypothesis when the dependent variable is the DA’s vote 
share. Model 2 in Table 2.3 is the same model, but the dependent variable is a dummy variable 
for wards won by the DA. First, the coefficient on the Overperformance variable in Model 1 is 
positive, indicating that as the proportion of DA-run wards surrounding ward w perform better 
than neighboring ANC-wards, the DA’s vote share in ward w increases in the following election. 
This finding suggests that not only do changes in the level of basic service delivery matter for the 
growth in support for the DA, but also for the party’s performance relative to that of the ruling 
party. Model 2 in Table 2.3 shows the results when the dependent variable is whether the DA 
was the winning party in a ward. Although there is no statistically detectable effect of  
Overperformance on the probability that the DA wins a ward, the sign on the coefficient remains 
positive.  
 What about the other spatial factors that are thought to explain opposition growth? 
Continuing on Model 1 of Table 2.3, the Copartisan Neighbors coefficient is negative, which 
indicates that, contrary to the expected effect, an increase in the share of DA-run neighbors 
leading up to election year t is associated with decreased support for the DA in the election. It 
appears to be that the horizontal diffusion hypothesis does not carry to the case of South Africa, 
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Table 2.3 DA Overperformance Models (2000-2016)   
 
 
 Dependent variable: 
  
 DA Vote Share DA Winner 
 (1) (2) 
 DA Overperformance 0.053*** 0.004 
 (0.007) (0.015) 
   Copartisan Neighbors -0.028*** -0.029 
 (0.008) (0.018) 
   Copartisan Municipality 0.0001 0.020 
 (0.006) (0.012) 
   Copartisan Neighbors (large) 0.239*** 0.026 
 (0.038) (0.082) 
   DA Incumbent 0.030*** -0.114*** 
 (0.006) (0.012) 
   Previous Voteshare -0.077*** 0.106*** 
 (0.013) (0.027) 
    Observations 13,176 13,176 
R2 0.020 0.011 
Adjusted R2 -0.471 -0.485 
F Statistic (df = 6; 8778) 29.622*** 15.929*** 
 Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
at least not in the direction that the theory predicts. Next, support for the Copartisan 
Municipality hypothesis is weak. While the coefficient on the Copartisan Municipality variable 
in Model 1 is positive, the effect is not statistically meaningful. Although the positive direction 
of the coefficient suggests that vertical diffusion is a possible explanation of the DA’s growth in 
local election, we cannot draw a meaningful conclusion from this result.  
 Next, Model 1 of Table 2.3 shows a strong and positive effect on the Copartisan 
Neighbor (large) coefficient. The DA’s vote share in a ward increases the more that it shares 
borders with wards that are located near big cities. This finding provides evidence in support of 
the learning hypothesis, which holds that horizontal diffusion is facilitated by proximity to large 
cities, where the activites of opposition parties are likely to be more visible and influential.  
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 Finally, to examine whether the results of the Overperformance model is sensitive to how 
performance is defined and measured, Models 1-3 in Table 2.4 show the results from Table 2.3, 
but using the service delivery variables instead. As before, the water, refuse, and toilet 
coefficients are entered in separate models. The positive direction on the service delivery 
coefficients in Table 2.4 confirm the results from the previous analysis, which showed that 
increased access to basic service delivery improves the DA’s future electoral results. Also, the 
service delivery  variables have a stronger effect on the party’s vote share than any of the spatial 
hypotheses variables.   
 In sum, the findings from this analysis indicate that basic service delivery alone is not a 
sufficient measure of performance. A party’s local performance record, relative to that of the 
ruling party, matters for its electoral success in neighboring areas.   
2.7 Conclusion 
 
 Local politics are important for the evolution away from a dominant party system. In this 
chapter I have argued that service delivery at the local level contributes to the growth of the 
Democratic Alliance in local government. Where it is the incumbent party, improvements in 
access to proper sanitation and piped water increase the party’s vote share. In addition, when 
DA-run wards outperform ANC-run ones, support for the party increases in neighboring wards. 
By showing voters it can govern effectively, the DA give voters information about their capacity 
to be a viable alternative to the ruling party. These findings add empirical evidence to the real-
world campaigning strategies of the DA, which emphasizes local service delivery as a central 
plank in the party’s platform. During election campaigns, the party frequently appeals to voters 
on the basis of its service delivery achievements. Municipalities in the DA-dominated Western 
Cape receive clean audit reports for efficient service delivery and the transparent management of 
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Table 2.4 Service Delivery Variables in Spatial Model 
 
 
 Dependent variable: 
  
 DA Vote Share 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Refuse 0.110***   
 (0.002)   
    Toilet  0.113
***  
  (0.002)  
    Water   0.163
*** 
   (0.003) 
    Copartisan Neighbors -0.009 -0.007 -0.005 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
    Copartisan Municipality -0.0004 0.002 0.007 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
    Copartisan neighbors (large) 0.039 0.034 -0.006 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.032) 
    DA Incumbent 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.020*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
    Previous Vote share 0.017 0.014 0.038*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
     Observations 13,176 13,176 13,176 
R2 0.236 0.240 0.316 
Adjusted R2 -0.147 -0.140 -0.026 
F Statistic (df = 6; 8778) 451.092*** 462.750*** 676.534*** 
 Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
municipal funds (Makwetu 2016). In a highly urban country, where the poorest citizens lack 
proper access to basic services, good governance at the local level will remain a relevant factor 
in explaining the growth in support for the DA in elections to come. 
 In this chapter I also assessed the relevance of spatial theories of opposition growth in 
South Africa. I found that the DA gets more support in wards that are located closer to large 
cities where the party previously won. This finding is consistent with the argument that 
opposition victories in large urban centers facilitate the diffusion of opposition support through 
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the mechanism of learning because cities are a visible and influential source of information 
opposition parties. Next, I found that support for the DA in local elections does not diffuse 
horizontally – an increase in the share of copartisan neighbors at the time of election t 
corresponds with a decline in support for the party. Finally, I found no evidence in support of the 
vertical diffusion hypothesis, which states that opposition control of higher political office can 
lead to lower-level victories in future elections, the effect is not strong. The party that controls 
municipal government, whether through an outright majority or as the senior partner in a 
coalition determines the allocation of resources and the effectiveness of service delivery. 
Controlling municipalities helps parties credibly claim credit for service delivery improvements. 
While the direction of the effect of the Copartisan municipality variable is positive, its impact on 
the DA’s vote share is overshadowed by the other factors, such as the party’s performance in 
local government.  
 Do voters reward opposition parties for performing well in local government?  In Chapter 4 
I examine how voter evaluations of the DA’s performance in city government impacts the party’s 
electoral fortunes in cities outside of its Western Cape stronghold. In that chapter I use original 
survey data to further test the performance hypotheses that I developed in this chapter.  
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Appendix 2.1 Construction of the Electoral and Census Dataset 
 
The process of building the panel data involved the use of GIS technology. To 
geospatially fit older census and election data into the 2016 geography I had to obtain a) 
geospatial data (i.e. shape files), and b) raw census and electoral data. The process required that I 
communicate with three government offices in South Africa. First, I obtained shape files for the 
2016 ward and municipal boundaries from South Africa’s Demarcation Board, which is the 
official body in charge of boundary changes. Next, I obtained census shape files from the 
geospatial data specialist at Statistics South Africa (Stats SA), which is the government body that 
carries out the census. While I had to fit the 2001 census into the 2016 boundaries in order to 
create a panel, Stat’s SA made publically available on its website the 2011 census data already 
fitted into the 2016 geography. This meant that only the 2001 census data had to be aligned with 
the 2016 boundaries. The geospatial data for South Africa’s census has several layers of 
aggregation. The lowest level is the Enumeration Area, and the second lowest level is the Small 
Area Layer. The Small Area Layer was the level used to fit the census data into the 2016 ward 
and municipal boundaries.  Finally, I obtained the election shape files from the geospatial data 
specialist at South Africa’s electoral commission (IEC). The electoral commission makes 
election data available down to the polling station level. Party vote shares were aggregated at the 
polling station level and fitted into the 2016 ward boundaries.  Finally, I obtained raw census and 
electoral data from Stat’s SA and the IEC, respectively, which I used to match with the 
geospatial data. 
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CHAPTER 3   
Local Candidate Nominations, Group Size, and Opposition 
Support 
 
 The process of selecting the candidates who will participate in elections is an important 
aspect of the development of any political party. For opposition parties that exist in a political 
system that disadvantages them at every turn, the choice of candidates who will represent the 
party can determine the extent to which the party can grow beyond its base. Opposition parties 
face tremendous hurdles both in recruiting candidates and retaining them. The ruling party offers 
candidates greater access to state resources, which candidates use to enrich themselves or to 
distribute patronage to constituents (Scheiner 2006; Van de Walle 2007; Rakner & Van de Walle 
2009). And because opposition parties tend to control fewer seats, potential candidates can be 
dissuaded by the fact that even if they join the party, their likelihood of getting a seat will be 
considerably less than if they join the ruling party. The smaller size of the party impacts its 
ability to attract and retain quality candidates (Ferree 2010). 
 Analyzing the candidate nomination decisions of opposition parties is important for several 
reasons. First, the candidates who a party chooses to run provide insight into the type of 
communities that it seeks to persuade or mobilize. In contexts where group identity is an 
important feature of party competition, elections are less about choosing among different policy 
positions as they are about convincing voters which candidate or party is capable of credibly 
providing goods in the future (Chandra 2004; Posner 2005). The nomination of co-ethnic 
candidates is a way parties reassure voters from a certain ethnic group that the party will 
represent their interests. In a dominant party context, opposition parties may be associated with a 
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particular ethnic group and struggle to expand the party beyond its core supporters. By 
diversifying its candidate lists, the opposition shows that it is capable of attracting candidates 
from groups that are outside of its traditional base. The placement of diverse candidates, 
especially in prominent positions, sends a clear signal to persuadable voters that the party can 
represent their interests too. In the long run, this strategy is a powerful way of bringing about 
change in the party’s image (Ferree 2010). In addition to the type of candidates parties nominate, 
where they nominate them also matters. The demographic and electoral environment where 
parties nominate candidates gives insight into the places that they think candidates will have the 
most electoral impact. While parties want to nominate candidates in places where they think they 
can win (Ishiyama 2009), they can also strategically nominate candidates in places that they are 
seeking to make inroads into.  
  In this chapter, I analyze the candidate nomination decisions of the Democratic Alliance 
party in local government elections. While most studies of the DA’s candidate nominations focus 
exclusively on national elections (Ferree 2010; MacDonald 2015), I examine local elections, 
where vastly more seats are contested. Outside of a few studies that focus on candidate selection 
in intra-party primaries (Ichino & Nathan 2012), the candidate selection process in local 
elections in Africa is little understood. Using a largely descriptive approach, I examine the 
evolution in the candidates selected to run for the DA, and those who eventually won. I use data 
on the racial and ethnic backgrounds of over 10,000 local government candidates who the DA 
nominated in Eastern Cape, Gauteng, and Western Cape in all local government elections (2000 
– 2016). Studying nomination patterns in individual provinces has the advantage of taking into 
consideration the various historical and political contexts that shape opposition parties’ ability to 
take root in various provinces. 
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 To probe deeper into the logic underlying the DA’s candidate nomination processes, I also 
examine the extent to which the party nominates candidates who can mobilize the largest bloc of 
voters. Given the centrality of race in South Africa, racial cleavages are also salient in local 
elections. I expect that the DA not only takes into consideration the sizes of racial groups in a 
particular district, but also the likely nomination decisions of rival parties. In this part of the 
chapter, I examine the correspondence between group size and the candidates who both the DA 
and ANC nominate in competitive ward elections.  
 I find that, similar to the trends in national elections, the candidate pool for local DA 
candidates has diversified rapidly over time. The general trend in each province is that while the 
party relied primarily on white candidates in the earliest local government elections, the number 
of black and coloured candidates increased significantly in subsequent election cycles. The 
ethnic composition of white candidates is also indicative of changes in the party’s image. 
Following the end of Apartheid, the DA (then known as the Democratic Party) made a 
considerable effort to incorporate Afrikaners into the party, and the local nominations data show 
that Afrikaner whites are represented as much (if not more) than their English counterparts in the 
candidate pool. I also find that white candidates are more likely to win ward elections and be 
placed in “winnable” positions in party lists. This pattern persists even in the Western Cape 
province, which is the DA’s stronghold. White candidates, who come from the party’s core white 
constituency, are more likely to be placed in electorally safe districts compared to non-white 
candidates. I also find that group size plays an important role in the types of candidates who both 
the DA and ANC nominate. Most often, parties are likely to nominate candidates from the 
largest racial group, but, the next most common pattern is to nominate candidates from the 
second largest racial group. This finding suggests that image change is not the only objective that 
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the DA seeks to achieve in elections, but that the party responds strategically to the local 
demographic environment.     
3.1 Parties and Candidate Nomination Decisions  	
 There is a vast literature on the factors that impact the candidate nomination process. Here  
I focus on two determinants: the quality of the candidate and the electoral characteristics of 
districts.  
3.1.1 Candidate Experience 	
 An important characteristic of a candidate who is capable of winning elections is their 
political or professional experience. Experience is often based on how long they have served in a 
particular office or the number of different positions they held previously (Jacobson 1990; 
Krasno & Green 1988). In some contexts, political experience is considered an indicator for a 
candidate’s potential to bring public goods or development to their area. Voters are attracted to 
candidates who have spent more time in public service, as this is a signal of their potential to 
deliver clientelistic benefits (Scheiner 2006). In the African context, in most countries a lot of 
political power is concentrated in the executive, however, members of parliament also enjoy 
considerable discretion over the allocation of public goods (Asunka 2014).  Politicians who 
cultivate careers in the national legislature (or cabinet portfolios) have access to more resources 
that they can channel to local constituents. The status of being an incumbent politician is also 
another indicator of experience. Especially in countries where voters look to politicians for 
access to patronage, incumbent candidates, by virtue of more time spent in government, are 
likely to have access to more resources than newcomers. In addition to the time a candidate spent 
in politics, another marker of experience in African elections is whether the candidate has ties to 
the business community. Candidates who were businessmen before entering politics have 
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independent sources of finance, which makes them valuable resources for political parties 
(Arriola et al. 2018). Given how expensive political campaigns are in many African countries, 
this logic underlies the recent rise in the number of MPs with backgrounds in business (Koter 
2017).  
 Local elections are a particularly important venue for parties to develop a talented pool of 
candidates who can compete in national elections. While serving in local elections is typically a 
springboard for higher levels of office, in some developing countries, parties may also recruit 
politicians who previously served in national government to run in local government. These 
candidates are particularly valuable for opposition parties who need to fill their ranks with 
reliable and disciplined party officials who are less likely to defect to other parties. 
3.1.2 District Characteristics 	
 In addition to the type of candidates a party nominates, it also has to consider where to 
nominate them. The two important factors that parties take into consideration are the 
demographic makeup of a district and the electoral environment (Ishiyama 2009 & 1998; Clem 
& Craumer 1995).  Parties nominate candidates to electoral districts where they expect the 
candidates will be able to earn more political support. In Africa, ethnic or regional affiliations are 
important bases for party formation and also play important roles in candidate nominations 
(Elischer 2013; Ichino & Nathan 2012; Ferree 2010). According to this logic, if parties want to 
maximize their electoral support they should nominate candidates who are representative of the 
politically influential ethnic groups that live in a given electoral district. In Single Member 
District races, this means that a party is likely to nominate a candidate who is a member of the 
largest ethnic group. In proportional representation elections, the party is likely to place 
candidates from locally dominant ethnic groups at the top of its list.  
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3.1.3 The Argument 	
 In South Africa, race generally plays an important role in the candidate selection process, 
and having a candidate pool that is reflective of the population is especially important in local 
elections. I argue that the nomination of racially representative local government candidates is a 
way that the DA grows support in local elections. I also argue that the party nominates 
candidates who can appeal to the largest group in a local constituency. Below I explain why a 
diverse candidate pool is important at the local level, and why taking group size into 
consideration helps parties win elections.   
 Local government councilors are the face of the party that voters are more likely to 
encounter in day-to-day life. Voters need reassurances that the individuals elected to local 
government will deliver public goods, and while they are more likely to trust a copartisan 
councilor will do so (Carlson 2016), black voters (especially those who have supported the ANC 
in the past) may be more likely to trust a DA councilor who is black. Due to a shared legacy of 
discrimination, black voters may be more convinced that a black DA councilor will be more 
responsive to their interests than a white DA councilor. A recent study found that local 
government councilors in South Africa are more responsive to co-ethnics (McClendon 2016). 
black and white councilors were more responsive to the service delivery requests from members 
of their own racial group. While the ANC has an advantage over the DA in recruiting and 
retaining black candidates, by nominating black candidates as ward councilors (and putting them 
in winnable positions on PR lists) the DA can compete with the ANC for support from the black 
electorate. This logic also follows for other communities that are important for the DA to 
persuade, such as the coloured and Indian communities, which are sometimes a swing vote in 
many parts of the country.  
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   While diversifying candidate pool is a concrete way for the DA to convince voters that it 
is not a “white party”, it is not enough to recruit diverse candidates if they are not going to win 
seats or ward elections. A credible signal that the party embraces a multi-racial image is to place 
non-white candidates in “winnable” list positions and in ward elections that are safe districts for 
the party.  
 Second, I argue that the sizes of social groups in a given district are important in 
nomination decisions. Logically, parties should seek to nominate candidates who can appeal to 
the largest number of people. To illustrate the point, imagine that the ANC and DA are 
competing in a ward that is 60% black, 30% coloured, and 10% white. This hypothetical ward 
tends to elect the ANC candidate. It makes sense for each party to nominate a candidate from the 
largest group. However, it is also possible for the DA, knowing that the ANC will likely 
nominate a black candidate, to nominate a coloured candidate. By nominating a candidate from 
the second largest racial group, the party puts itself in the position to mobilize coloured voters, in 
addition to the likely support it will receive from the white community, and any support it can 
peel off the black vote. The logic underlying the group size argument is that the nomination of a 
diverse set of candidates can be effective insofar as the relevant communities are mobilized.  
3.2 Democratic Alliance Candidate Nomination Procedures 	
 To what extent is the DA directly involved in selecting candidates, and can the outcomes 
be attributed to the party’s strategy? Candidates for both PR and ward positions are nominated at 
the branch level. The branch is the lowest organ of the party in South Africa. Branches overlap 
with wards, which are the smallest electoral unit. The DA tries to have one branch in every ward, 
although there are some wards where a branch is not likely to exist. This is often the case in parts 
of the country where the party does not have any electoral support, such as the rural areas. 
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Nominations at the branch level ensure that candidates are well known by local community 
members. The party initiates the candidate nomination process by posting recruitment 
advertisements in newspapers around the country in the year prior to a local government 
election.13  Interested candidates do not have to be DA members at the time they apply, but, they 
do have to share the party’s vision and have a proven track record of community leadership.14 
They are only required to join the party if they stand for election. Candidates who apply are then 
interviewed individually by an electoral college comprised of delegates elected by the party 
branch.15 The final list is approved by the party’s provincial leadership, which can overrule 
decisions made by the branch by moving candidates up or down the party list, or selecting a 
different ward candidate. Nominations for local government elections are fiercely contested. In 
the 2011 election there were 5,000 applicants countrywide for the DA slate, 16 and only 1,663 
eventually won nominations as ward or PR councilors. Every election year disputes arise 
between the candidates selected by the branch and the decisions made by the national party, 
however, generally speaking, the party respects the candidates chosen by the community.  
 While the DA’s candidate nominations process appears to be decentralized, the party’s 
national structures finalize the lists of candidates who are nominated. Thus, the outcomes from 
the nomination process can be attributed to the goals and strategies that the party seeks to 
achieve. 
3.3 Data 	
 The dataset that I use in this chapter is a compilation of the demographic characteristics of 
all the local government candidates the Democratic Alliance nominated in Western Cape, 																																																								
13 25 March 2011, Cape Times 
14 13 January 2010, Daily Dispatch 
15 25 March 2011, Cape Times	
16 25 March 2011, Cape Times 
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Eastern Cape, and Gauteng provinces. The analysis focuses on these three provinces for several 
reasons. First, the DA has made the most electoral gains in these provinces compared to the other 
ones. Despite focusing only on cases where the outcome of interest (support for the DA) is 
present, there is still significant variation in the rate at which the DA wins and loses local 
elections in these provinces. Second, and more fundamentally, in comparison these three 
provinces provide variation in party strength, which gives us greater analytical leverage in 
understanding the outcome of interest – support for the DA in local elections. Western Cape 
province is a stronghold for the DA. Examining candidate nomination decisions in a context 
where the DA does not face a great risk of losing elections allows us to determine whether the 
party’s objective of diversifying its local representatives is a genuine policy or if the party uses 
its dominant political position to satisfy its core white constituents. Gauteng province has 
become increasingly competitive over time for both the DA and ANC. In the latest 2016 local 
government election the ANC received 46% of the vote share, while the DA earned 37%. If the 
diversification of its candidate pool is an effective strategy to win local elections, it should be 
most consequential in a competitive political environment. Finally, Eastern Cape province is 
ANC heartland. The province is heavily rural and populated mainly by the Xhosa community. 
Despite the unfavorable province-wide demographics, the DA has mainly made inroads in the 
urban areas. Selecting this province sheds light on how the DA mobilizes voters in ANC 
strongholds. Specifically, ethnic identity, particularly among black communities, plays a more 
significant role in this province. It is interesting to see to what extent the DA can mobilize 
candidates from the Xhosa community, which has been a core ANC constituency.  
 The dataset contains the racial, ethnic, and gender identity of every candidate that was 
nominated in the three provinces. It should be noted that in an ideal situation the electoral 
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commission would ask candidates before elections to self report their race and ethnicity. In the 
absence of this information, I hired a coder to use the names of candidates to ascertain what 
racial and ethnic group they likely belong to.  A professional South African translator coded this 
information using the following process. The coder was first given a list of the first and last 
names of the candidates. In terms of race, generally speaking, the first and last names of South 
Africans are racially distinct. For instance, the surname “Botha” is more likely to belong to a 
white South African of Afrikaner descent, while the surname “Buthelezi” is likely a black South 
African of Zulu descent. In addition, the surname “Singh” is most likely an Indian surname. One 
issue with coding race is determining the difference between white Afrikaans-speaking 
candidates and coloured candidates. A large segment of the coloured community speaks 
Afrikaans and they carry Afrikaans surnames. If the coder was unsure whether an Afrikaans 
sounding name belonged to a coloured or white candidate, I instructed them to Google the 
candidate’s name and to find an official photo of them in order to determine their race.17 Online 
photos are not universally available for all local candidates. Unlike candidates for Parliament, 
local government candidates receive less media attention. In the event that the coder was unable 
to determine whether an Afrikaans sounding name belonged to a white or coloured candidate, 
they had the option of labeling the candidate as “race uncertain.” The coder was able to identify 
the likely racial background for the vast majority of candidates, and only a few were labeled as 
“uncertain”. The intention behind this activity was to ensure that the demographic information 
was obtained for as many candidates as possible, and with as much certainty as possible. Of 
course, there is room for human error in a coding exercise. To minimize the error, in a future 
expansion of this project, I will hire a different coder, and compare the results of each coder in 																																																								17	This procedure was repeated for all candidates who the coder was unsure of which racial or 
ethnic group they belonged to.		
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order to establish the reliability and consistency of the results.  
 To identify candidate ethnicity, the coder again used the first and last name of candidates to 
determine which linguistic group the candidate likely belongs to: Xhosa speaking, Zulu 
speaking, Afrikaans speaking, or English speaking. Throughout the chapter I refer to candidate 
ethnicity using the ethnic group attached to the language they likely speak (for instance I refer to 
a Xhosa candidate as opposed to Xhosa speaking). However, keep in mind that the ethnicity of 
the candidate is based on the likely ethno-linguistic group they belong to.  I instructed the coder 
to only code politically relevant ethno-linguistic groups, which is defined as ethnic groups that 
are significant participants in the competition over the country’s economic policies (Posner 
2004). In the case of South Africa the politically relevant ethnic groups are Xhosa, Zulu, 
Afrikaner, and English. These groups also tend to be larger in size, compared to the minority 
ethnic groups, and thus their electoral support is politically consequential for parties earn. If the 
candidate belongs to a non-politically relevant ethnic group, the coder had the option to identify 
them as “other” and write in the name of the group.  
 To provide a descriptive overview of how the racial and ethnic characteristics of the 
candidates who the party nominates has evolved over time, I collected data for all four local 
government elections (2000, 2006, 2011, and 2016). This resulted in a candidate profile for over 
10,000 candidates.  
 The data analysis is structured as follows. I first present a descriptive overview of 
candidate nominations in each province separately. For each province, I provide historical 
context on party competition in the early post-Apartheid national elections. Developments in 
national elections often set the tone for local government elections (which only began in 2000), 
and this brief overview also examines the factors that make provinces more or less competitive 
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for the DA. I then use data from newspaper archives of local government election campaigns to 
examine the DA’s discourse around candidate pool diversity in local elections. Next, I present 
the data on the racial composition of candidates in all election years (2000 – 2016). I also 
examine the rates in which various candidates win ward elections, and the percentage that 
occupy “winnable” positions on the party lists. The final part of the analysis presents the results 
for the group size argument  
 There are some limitations to the data that I use in this chapter. The sample is limited to 
nominated candidates, and does not include the entire universe of potential candidates who 
applied to run on the DA’s slate. This means that we do not know about the alternative 
candidates who the party could have selected. Although this information would strengthen the 
inferences made based on the statistical models, it is not feasible to obtain. The candidate 
nomination data I use in this chapter are publically available information, and despite this 
limitation, it is still possible to learn about the considerations that the party makes in selecting 
candidates. 
3.4 Eastern Cape Province 	
 Eastern Cape has always been a difficult province for the Democratic Alliance to gain 
traction in. One of the major factors that make it difficult for the DA to grow is the 
demographics. Blacks are the dominant racial group in the province (86%), and the Xhosa ethnic 
group, which is a core constituency of the ANC, is the largest ethnic group (at 79% of the 
population). In addition, the province is heavily rural, with two-thirds of the population living in 
rural areas (a reversal of the national average which is 63% urban) (Census 2011). The 
dominance of the rural electorate puts opposition parties at a disadvantage.  
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 Despite the demographic and geographic factors that work in favor of the ANC in Eastern 
Cape province, it took significant effort for the party to maintain the support of voters in this 
province following the first post-transition election in 1994. As disappointment and anger set in 
following the ruling party’s failed promises from 1994, the 1999 election was the first test of the 
ANC’s hegemony in Eastern Cape. This was the only province where the ANC faced a threat 
from a rival African party (Ferree 2010). The United Democratic Movement (UDM) formed in 
1997, and threatened the ANC’s presence in communities located in the Transkei, an area in 
Eastern Cape province that was a former Bantustan (black homeland) under apartheid (Ferree 
2010; 84). The party was led by Bantu Holomisa, who rallied working class people that were 
unhappy with the bureaucratic reforms ushered in by the ANC after the party took office in 1994, 
and traditional leaders who felt their powers curtailed by the local government reforms 
introduced by the ANC.  Losing the support of working class voters would jeopardize the ANC’s 
hegemony in urban centers such as Port Elizabeth and Buffalo City. And the ANC needed the 
support of traditional leaders in the rural parts of the province because they held significant sway 
over rural African voters. To blunt the widespread dissatisfaction that the UDM was capitalizing 
on in these key parts of the electorate, in the 1999 election the ANC vigorously campaigned 
door-to-door in the urban townships and shantytowns (Ferree 2010; 85). In the rural areas the 
party deployed prominent politicians such as Mandela to persuade local chiefs to continue 
supporting the ANC (Ferree 2010; 85-86). These mobilization efforts by the ruling party 
succeeded in securing the ANC’s political hegemony in the province, and neutralized the threat 
posed by the UDM.  In the 1999 election the ANC earned 74% of the vote in the province, while 
the UDM received 13%. In subsequent elections the UDM ceased being a political threat to the 
ANC, and the party has not faced a serious African rival in the province since then.  
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 Support for the DA in national elections in the Eastern Cape has grown slowly. The 
Democratic Party (as the DA was formerly known) earned 1.2% of the provincial vote in 1994, 
6.4% in 1999, 10% in 2004, and 10% in 2009, and 16% in 2014. In local government elections 
the party has earned similar levels of support. In the 2000 election the party earned 10.4% of the 
vote, 7.6% in 2006, 14.8% in 2011, and 17% in 2016. Despite the slow progress of the party 
province-wide, party officials concentrate most of their effort in boosting support in metropolitan 
areas such as Port Elizabeth and Buffalo City. Given the larger number of candidates who parties 
can nominate in local elections (compared to the national), the DA’s strategy to make its party 
lists racially and ethnically representative is most clearly apparent in local elections.  
 The 2000 election was the first local government election in the post-Apartheid era. As in 
the national elections, race was going to play a prominent role in election campaigns.  At this 
early stage however, the DA was realistic about it chances of attracting the black vote.18 With a 
sizeable white community in the city of Port Elizabeth (15%), the largest city in the province, the 
party focused most of its efforts on mobilizing white voters in the suburbs. While it did make an 
effort to attract voters in the predominantly black townships of the city, it was clear that a 
considerable hurdle was the popularity of the ANC in these areas. The ANC’s organizing efforts 
in the region during the apartheid-era, especially through civic organizations such as the Port 
Elizabeth Black Civic Organization, made it difficult for other parties to compete for votes in the 
townships.19 Where the DA did campaign in the townships, the party made door-to-door contact 
with potential voters and put up campaign posters. The DA tailored its campaign message to the 
different communities it sought to attract. In the predominantly white suburbs the party talked 
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about opposition to unfair tax rats, while in the black communities the themes focused on 
fighting crime and AIDS.20   
   Despite the challenges the party faced in mobilizing the black vote in the 2000 election, it 
was clear to the party leadership that they were going to need to diversify their party lists. The 
DA provincial chairman Athol Trollip insisted that the party represented “all people” in the 
province and promised that the composition of the party lists would reflect this.21 Similarly, 
before the election the DA’s election campaign manager Bobby Stevenson guaranteed that the 
party would field a well-balanced slate of candidates in the Nelson Mandela Bay metropole.22 
 In the 2006 election DA leaders were still vocalizing about the party’s commitment to 
diversify its party lists in the Eastern Cape province. Provincial leaders frequently claimed that 
the party had candidate lists that were more gender balanced and racially representative than 
other parties.23 Tony Leon, the party’s national leader spoke about a “transformed party” that 
placed “very significant numbers” of black, Indian, and coloured candidates in more electable 
positions than ever before.24 While emphasizing its diversification efforts, party leaders were 
always quick to point out that changes to demographic composition of its lists were not due to 
the implementation of any racial quota.25 The deflection away from quotas served two purposes. 
First, it was meant to contrast the DA with the ANC, which uses gender quotas to enhance the 
representation of women on its lists. Second, by claiming that the DA achieves diverse lists in 
the absence of quotas the party tries to reassure its white base that positions in local government 
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are not going to undeserving candidates. The message is that the DA will not sacrifice quality for 
the sake of diversity.  
 In the 2011 election, the DA again placed most of its efforts in gaining control of the Port 
Elizabeth metropole. This imperative was renewed by the results of the preceding 2009 national 
election in the city, where the combined vote share of the leading opposition parties was almost 
enough to form a coalition. The DA, COPE, ACDP, Freedom Front Plus, and the Independent 
Democrats took 48% of the vote share. A minimum of 51% is necessary for a party or coalition 
to take control of the metro. To this end, DA party leaders made a significant push to wrestle the 
metro away from the ANC in the 2011 local election. The new DA leader, Helen Zille visited the 
metro five times in one week at times.26  The party also made significant outreach to the coloured 
areas of Port Elizabeth, where the community makes up 23% of the city’s population. The major 
policy concerns for the coloured community are crime and unemployment, and Zille promised 
residents several reforms should a DA-led coalition emerge, including the formation of a 
dedicated police force and an end to the ANC’s cadre deployment scheme, where the ANC sends 
party members to take up government posts throughout the country.27   
 The DA’s efforts to mobilize voters in Port Elizabeth city in the 2011 election appeared 
to pay off, although the results of the election were not enough to secure a coalition. The ANC 
went from controlling 81 seats in the city after the 2006 election to 63 seats in 2011 (the city 
council has 120 members). And the DA’s representation in the metro jumped from 30 seats in 
2006 to 48 in 2011. It was only by the 2016 election when the party received enough votes to 
secure a coalition. In this election, the DA earned 57 of the 120 council seats in the Nelson  
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Mandela Bay metro, and with the help of the EFF (which received 6 seats) and was able to form 
a coalition.  
 What is the racial distribution of candidates who the DA has fielded in Eastern Cape 
province? The results from analyzing the candidate nominations data show that the in the early 
local elections the party was slow to nominate non-white candidates, but that this changed 
quickly over time. Figure 3.1 shows the racial affiliation of the ward candidates who the party 
nominated from 2000 to 2016. In the 2000 election whites were the largest group that the party  
nominated, making up 43% of the candidate pool. As expected, the majority of white candidates 
(67%) were nominated in the province’s major metropolitan cities of East Rand, Port Elizabeth, 
and Buffalo City. Given that the DA nominated fewer ward candidates in the 2000 election than 
any other year, it is possible that at this early stage the DA did not have the capability to recruit 
non-white candidates at the same rate as whites. And since the party mainly had a presence in 
urban areas (given the presence of a sizeable white community), it also makes sense that the 
largest share of candidates who it did nominate came from the cities.  
 By the 2006 election, black candidates displaced whites as the largest group the party 
nominated by the DA. 42% of the candidates nominated in this election were black, compared to 
33% of whites. The dominance of black nominees repeated in the 2011 and 2016 elections. The 
2016 election is significant in the sense that the number of white candidates the party nominated 
declined, instead of increasing steadily from the previous election. The number of white 
candidates dropped from 150 in 2011 to 85 in 2016. By this election black candidates made up 
79% of the candidate pool, which is close to reaching the 86% of the population that is black in 
the province.  
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Figure 3.1 Eastern Cape Province. DA Ward Candidate Racial Affiliation (2000-2016) by 
Percentage  
 
 
 
 What about other racial groups? The number of Indian candidates nominated in Eastern 
Cape has always remained minimal, which probably reflects the fact that the size of the Indian  
community in this province is small. On the other hand, the party has made a noticeable effort to 
recruit coloured candidates, who represent a community that often functions as a swing vote, 
particularly in the metros. Coloured candidates formed 19% of the candidate pool in both the 
2000 and 2006 elections, however, their numbers declined to 10% and 7% in the 2011 and 2016 
elections respectively. The coloured community is 8% of the population in the province, so 
although they have been represented in the candidate pool in proportion to or greater than their 
numbers in the population, it is clear that the DA has focused on increasing the number of black 
candidates in this province.  
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  The evolution of the ethnic makeup of the DA’s ward nominees in Eastern Cape 
province parallels the changes in the racial composition of the candidate pool. Table 3.1 is a 
breakdown of the nominated candidates, according to the four largest ethnic groups. As in the 
racial composition data, in the 2000 election, white ethnic groups were represented more than 
any other ethnic group. However by the 2006 election, Xhosa candidates made up the largest 
share of the candidate pool, and their numbers doubled in the 2011 election. By 2016, Xhosa DA 
candidates made up 76% of candidate pool, closely appropriating the actual population of the 
Xhosa ethnic group in the province, which is 79%. The Xhosa ethnic group is the largest black  
ethnic group in the province. Very few other black ethnic groups are present in province, as 
reflected by the small number of Zulu candidates nominated.  
 At what rate do DA ward candidates from the various races win their elections in Eastern 
Cape? It should be kept in mind that the DA wins few wards every election year in this province. 
In 2000 the party won 39 out of 236 total wards. In 2006 the party won 30 out of 364 wards. In 
2011 the party won 58 out of 555. And in 2016 the party won 56 out of 704 wards. The fact that 
the party wins few wards in this province definitely has implications for the type of candidates it 
can afford to nominate. I return to this issue later. Figure 3.2 shows the percentage of candidates 
belonging to each racial group that won ward elections in every election year. The pattern that 
emerges is that although the party has increased the percentage of black ward nominees, it does 
not win many wards when it does so. For instance, in both the 2000 and 2006 elections not one 
of the black candidates nominated won a ward seat. The results for the 2011 and 2016 elections 
are not much different; expect that the imbalance between the number of blacks nominated and 
those actually winning wards seats is starker because of the larger pool of black nominees. One 
out of 327 black DA candidates won a ward seat in 2011, and only 5 out of 550 won ward  
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Table 3.1 Eastern Cape Province. DA Ward Candidate Ethnicity (2006-2016) in Raw Numbers 
 
 2000 2006 2011 2016 Total 
Xhosa 70 139 304 532 1,045 
Zulu 3 0 16 1 20 
Afrikaans 
speaking 
78 75 99 59 311 
English 86 136 126 72 420 
Other 0 8 4 27 39 
Uncertain 0 6 6 7 19 
Total 237 364 555 698 1,854 
Note: Afrikaans speaking combines both white and coloured Afrikaans speaking candidates 
 
elections in 2016. On the other hand, the party wins more ward seats when it is represented by 
white and coloured candidates. For instance, in 2000, in the 39 wards that the party won that 
year, white candidates won 27 of them (69%). Coloured candidates win ward elections at a lower 
rate than whites, but more frequently than blacks. Out of the 53 coloured candidates nominated 
in 2016, 17 won their ward election. The fact that black ward nominees are not winning their 
ward seats most likely suggests that the party is not nominating black candidates in ward 
elections that are safe for the DA. Instead, they are more likely to be nominated in areas that are 
strongholds for other parties, where the DA knows that it does not have a strong chance of 
winning, but nonetheless nominates candidates in order to show that the party has a presence in 
the area. To examine the possibility that white candidates are more likely to be nominated to safe 
districts, I ran a logistic regression to analyze the relationship between the nomination of a white 
candidate and a safe DA ward. A safe ward is defined as a ward where the DA received 60% or 
more of the vote share in the previous election. After controlling for the population of whites in a 
ward, the incumbent status of the DA candidate, and ward population, in Eastern Cape province 
there is a negative association between the decision to nominate a white candidate and 
nomination to safe wards (𝛽 = -0.132, p > 0.05).  White candidates are less likely to be  
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Figure 3.2 Eastern Cape Province. DA Ward Election Wins, by Candidate Racial Affiliation in 
Percentages 
 
 
 
 
nominated to safe wards. The size of the effect on the safe ward coefficient, however, is not 
substantively significant. Instead, the coefficients on the size of the white population (𝛽 = 5.269, 
p < 0.001) and incumbent status (𝛽 = 1.287, p < 0.001) variables are positive and strongly 
associated with the decision to nominate a white candidate. While the size of the local white 
population is the largest determinant in the decision to nominate white candidates, in general, the 
size of the local white population overlaps with the DA’s electoral performance. Heavily white 
areas are more likely to be DA strongholds in the first place. The logisitic analysis also shows 
that white candidate are more likely to be nominated if they are incumbents, suggesting that 
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political experience is a valuable factor for the DA. To summarize, in Eastern Cape province, the 
concentration of the white vote ensures that white ward candidates are more likely to be 
nominated and to win ward elections. This finding compliments the results from the descriptive 
analysis, which shows that the white candidates who the party nominates have a greater chance 
of winning than blacks.  
 Next, I turn to the analysis of PR candidates who the DA nominated in Eastern Cape 
province. Figure 3.3 shows the racial makeup of the PR candidates. A trend similar to the ward 
nominees exists here as well. Whites made up the largest percentage of nominees in the 2000 
election, but this was quickly reversed in 2006, when the percent of black PR candidates 
increased considerably. How likely are these candidates to be placed on a list position that likely  
guarantees them a seat in the municipal council? When parties construct their PR lists, the higher 
a candidate is placed on a list, the greater chance they have at winning a seat. Occupying a 
winnable list position depends on the party’s performance in a municipality in the previous 
election. If a party earned 50% of the PR vote share in the previous election, in the next election 
if their list has 10 positions, they can expect that at least the first five candidates on the list are 
likely to win a seat in the next election. In this part of the analysis I coded how likely each 
candidate is to occupy a list position that is a winnable seat for the party. Ideally, one would use 
the percentage of seats a party earned in the previous election to determine how many seats it 
could expect to win in the current election. However, municipal boundary changes occur before 
each local government election, meaning that new municipalities are formed or old ones are 
merged. Instead, I used the percentage of seats that the party earned after each election to 
retroactively determine the number of candidates on a list that it could likely expect to win or not 
win a seat.  
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Figure 3.3 Eastern Cape Province. DA PR Candidate Racial Affiliation (2000-2016) in 
Percentages  
 
 
 
 Figure 3.4 shows the percent of candidates from each racial group that occupy a winnable 
list positions. In every election before 2016, whites were considerably more likely to occupy 
winnable list positions. Although blacks make up the plurality of the candidate pool in 2000, 
2006, and 20011, they were more likely to be placed in list positions that were less winnable. 
Again, this reflects the fact that the party’s PR lists are more likely to have a larger percentage of 
black candidates nominated in municipalities that are not safe DA seats. White and coloured 
candidates, who are best positioned to represent heavily white and coloured urban communities 
are more likely to occupy winnable positions because they are nominated in areas that are DA 
safe havens. It was only in the 2016 election when a roughly equal percentage of black and white 
candidates were placed in winnable list positions. The growing percentage of black candidates in  
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Figure 3.4 Eastern Cape Province. DA Candidates in Winnable PR list Positions by Racial 
Affiliation (2000 -2016) in Percentages 
 
 
 
 
winnable PR list positions shows that black DA candidates are more likely to win election 
through the PR system than the ward system. Recall that only 5 black candidates (out of 550) 
won ward seats in the 2016 election. This stark contrast reinforces the general principle that 
small parties gain more representation under PR electoral rules than in first-past-the-post 
electoral rules.  
 While nominating a diverse slate of candidates sends a strong signal to the communities 
that parties seek to persuade, getting those candidates into office is a different struggle. The 
results from the analysis of the DA’s candidate nominations in Eastern Cape province shows that 
in this province the party has stuck with a strategy of nominating the candidates from its core 
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constituency (whites) in the places that it knows it can win. While serious efforts have been 
made to diversify the pool of nominees, the DA remains slow at nominating black candidates in 
places where they will actually have a chance at getting elected. Eastern Cape province shows 
that despite the DA’s efforts at making its candidate pool more racially and ethnically 
representative, there is still considerable hesitation on the part of black voters to vote the party 
into office.  
3.5 Gauteng Province 	
 Unlike the ANC’s largely uncontested hegemony in Eastern Cape, Gauteng is a province 
where the ruling party has experienced more competition from the opposition. A distinctive 
feature of this province is that it is highly urbanized, and while blacks are the dominant racial 
group (77%), there is also a sizeable white community (at 16%). Since the early national 
elections the ANC has had difficulty cementing its dominance in this province. One factor that 
contributed to this was the fact that the ANC ignored recruiting potential voters in the white 
community. Despite the fact that many whites identified as independents in the 1999 election 
(Ferree 2010, 91), the party made little effort to campaign in the white areas and did not engage 
in much political outreach with the community. The party’s disinterest in courting the white vote 
in the province left a door open for the DA.   
 Unlike the ANC, in the 1999 national election the DA focused most of its efforts on 
recruiting middle-class whites in the province. The party focused most of its canvassing and 
campaigning efforts in the predominantly white suburbs of Johannesburg, Pretoria, and West 
Rand (Lodge 1999; Ferree 2010). However, the DA neglected making significant outreach to 
blacks in the townships of these cities.  It was only in the 2004 national election that the party 
shifted some of its focus to black voters. During this election campaign, they held major rallies in 
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the black dominated areas of the province, even launching their manifesto in Soweto, a large 
township in the city of Johannesburg. In contrast to the 1999 election, party leaders from the DA 
made highly publicized visits to the townships and campaign volunteers engaged in door-to-door 
canvassing (Ferree 2010; 112)  
 Realizing the mistake of ignoring the white vote in the 1999 general election, in the 2000 
local government election the ANC did make an effort to court white voters. In the lead up to the 
election the party staffed its constituency offices in Randfontein and Carletonville with white 
Afrikaners. 28  Furthermore, the party’s campaign message in the province emphasized 
nationalism and the recognition of ethnic rights, two issues that were of importance to the 
Afrikaner community at the time.29 The party also boasted about opening new branches in the 
predominantly white areas of Randfontein, where they never had a presence before and which 
used to be strongholds of the New National party.30  
 For the DA, although the party knew that it could not keep ignoring black voters in 
Gauteng province, in the 2000 election the party was still slow at reaching out to the black 
electorate. The party admitted to its struggle to meaningfully diversify its candidate pool in the 
province. Party leaders in Pretoria remarked that although there was a large presence of black 
candidates on the city’s PR list (41%), black candidates faced a tougher job getting elected than 
their white counterparts, who were placed in “safer” wards and higher positions on the PR list.31 
In addition, the image problems faced by the DA in the election were exacerbated by decisions 
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such as the choice to feature the party leader Tony Leon (a white English man) on most of its 
posters, while the ANC prominently featured local candidates on its posters.32  
 Conducting outreach in black and coloured communities in the province remained a 
priority in subsequent local government elections for the DA. After the 2006 election, DA chief 
executive Ryan Coetzee circulated an internal party document titled “Becoming a Party for All 
the People: A New Approach for the DA.”33 In this document Coetzee affirmed the DA’s 
intention to diversify its membership and to improve it’s messaging in black and coloured 
communities. One of the first steps would have to be removing DA leader Tony Leon, whose 
tone was seen to be offensive by many black people.34 Coetzee wrote that under the leadership of 
Helen Zille, the party would have to diversify its top leadership structures and “get rid of the 
image of the DA as a ‘white party’.” One of Zille’s ideas was to unequivocally reject far-
rightwing members whom the party had previous embraced. White nationalist members had 
helped the DA consolidate its support among some members of the Afrikaner community, 
however, the racial attitudes of these candidates at times proved to be a liability with black 
voters. 
 The transition from Leon to Zille as party leader lead to an overall softening of the DA’s 
image. However, as more black and coloured members joined the party, internal tensions 
between the diverse newcomers and the white base of the party began to appear. These internal  
fissures played out in public, particularly in provinces like Gauteng, where a sizeable white 
community exists. For instance, before the 2011 local government election there was a struggle 
over the party’s nomination for chairman of the province. Khume Ramulifho, a DA provincial 
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legislator, competed against Johannesburg councilor Cameron MacKenzie in the party’s primary 
for the position.35 Ramulifho wanted to be the first black DA member to lead the province. With  
the election underway, the voting was suspended, as the party cited administrative errors.36  
Many black DA members saw the move to abandon the voting as racially motivated, as 
Ramulifho appeared poised to win. 37  Despite denials from party leadership, Mackenzie 
eventually withdrew from the race, and Ramulifho became the DA’s candidate for the position. 
This incident is an example of how efforts for the DA to diversify have been hampered by 
members of the party’s white candidate base who feel their career aspirations jeopardized by the 
influx of new members. 
 In light of the internal problems faced by the DA, who does the party actually nominate 
in ward elections, and at what rate do candidates from different groups get elected? Figure 3.5 
shows the nomination patterns for the different racial groups in the province from 2000 to 2016. 
Starting in the 2000 election, black candidates made up half of the candidate pool (52%). This 
number increased gradually every election cycle, to a high of 64% by 2016. While the number of 
wards that the party nominates any candidate in has not changed dramatically (431 in 2000 to 
529 in 2016), the nomination of white candidates has declined gradually. Whites made up 38% 
of the candidate pool in 2000, but only 26% by 2016. For the other racial groups, their share in 
the party’s candidate pool remains small, compared to blacks and whites. The share of coloured 
candidates was the largest in 2000 at 7%, but declined to a low of 4% in 2016.  
 Since there is no majority black ethnic group Gauteng province, which ethnic groups is 
the DA recruiting candidates from? Table 3.2 shows the breakdown of candidates by the ethnic  
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Figure 3.5 Gauteng Province. DA Ward Candidate Racial Affiliation (2000-2016) in Percentages  
 
 
 
groups they belong to. Because Zulus make up 23% of the population, they are the largest ethnic 
group by plurality. However, a roughly equal percentage of the population (22%) are from   
minority black ethnic groups (such as Ndebele, Sotho and Tswana). In 2000, 20% of the 
candidates who the DA nominated in the province were Zulu, while 21% were from the Tswana 
ethnic group. While the share of Zulu candidates has declined over time, to a low of 11% in 
2016, the share of Tswana candidates rose steadily from 2000 to 2011. By 2016, the share of 
Tswana candidates dropped off to 9%. In their place, Sotho candidates were the largest black 
ethnic group represented in the 2016 election. The fluctuations in the makeup of black ethnic 
groups represented in the DA’s candidate pool may be determined by multiple factors from one 
election cycle to the next. However, the main point is that the type of black candidates who the 
DA is able to recruit in this province is considerably more diverse than any other province. 
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Table 3.2 Gauteng Province. DA Ward Candidate Ethnicity (2006-2016) in Raw Numbers 
 
 2000 2006 2011 2016 Total 
Xhosa 7 5 18 34 64 
Zulu 88 76 84 56 304 
Afrikaans 
speaking 
112 99 103 90 404 
English 92 87 101 67 347 
Other 7 13 13 32 65 
Uncertain 1 2 2 21 25 
Ndebele 2 2 1 11 16 
Pedi 11 7 11 45 74 
Sotho 13 11 22 85 131 
Tsonga 6 20 21 17 64 
Tswana 91 97 129 47 364 
Venda 1 1 1 11 14 
 431 420 506 516 1,873 
Note: Afrikaans speaking combines both white and coloured Afrikaans speaking candidates 
 
 At what rate do the ward candidates who the party nominates win their election? Figure 
3.6 shows the percentage of candidates from each racial group that won ward elections. Similar 
to the pattern in Eastern Cape, in this province white candidates are more likely to win their ward 
election than black candidates. Despite the fact that blacks made up 64% of the candidate pool in 
2016, only 16 of them won their ward election. In contrast, in the same election, whites were 
28% of the candidate pool, but 80% of them won their ward and only 20% lost. Again, these 
disparities suggest that the DA is more likely to place white candidates in ward elections that are 
safe for the party. When they do nominate black ward candidates, they are more likely to 
nominate them in wards where the candidate faces competitors from African parties that are also 
vying for the black vote. The results from a logistic regression analysis confirms these claims.  In 
Gauteng province, white candidates were more likely than others to be  nominated in safe wards 
(𝛽 = 1.284, p < 0.01), controlling for the population of whites in a ward, incumbent status, and 
ward population.   
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Figure 3.6 Gauteng Province. DA Ward Election Wins, by Candidate Racial Affiliation (2000- 
2016) in Percentages  
 
 
 
 
 
 Next, I examine the demographic backgrounds of the candidates nominated on the PR list 
in this province. Figure 3.7 shows the percentage of PR candidates from each racial group from 
2000 to 2016.  In 2000 the percentage of black and white candidates nominated was equal, with 
each group making up 43% of the candidate pool. Over subsequent elections, the share of black 
candidates becomes larger than whites. By 2016, blacks make up 62% of the candidate pool, and 
whites are 27%. The percentage of Indian and coloured candidates is again low compared to the 
other groups.  
 How many black PR candidates are placed in winnable list positions? Figure 3.8 shows 
the percentage of candidates from each racial group who are placed in winnable list positions. In  
2000, the DA could only consider 118 out of the 369 seats it contested province-wide as  
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Figure 3.7 Gauteng Province. DA PR Candidate Racial Affiliation (2000-2016) in Percentages 
 
 
winnable. In this election whites occupied 53% of winnable positions to 33% for blacks. The gap 
between white and black candidates occupying winnable list positions remained steady through 
the 2011 election. It was only in the 2016 election when this trend reversed dramatically – 50% 
of candidates in winnable PR list positions were black, while whites accounted for 40%. The 
decision to put more black PR candidates in winnable list positions does not necessarily mean 
that black candidates are displacing white ones. It reflects the fact that the party increasingly 
expects to win more seats in areas outside of its typical strongholds in the province.  
 In summary, Gauteng is a province where early on the DA was able to field a more 
representative pool of candidates. As early as the 2000 election, black candidates made up 52% 
of the candidate pool. Over time blacks have become the largest racial group of ward candidates 
who the party nominates, however, only few of them end up winning ward elections. On the  
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Figure 3.8 Gauteng Province. DA Candidates in Winnable PR list positions by Racial Affiliation 
(2000-2016) in Percentages  
 
 
 
other hand, on the PR list the party has placed an increasing number of black candidates in 
electable positions. This change likely reflects the party’s growing confidence in winning more 
seats at the municipal level. Also, it reflects the fact that it is easier for the party to get more 
black candidates elected through the PR system.  
3.6 Western Cape Province 	
 Western Cape is currently a stronghold province for the DA, but the path to reaching this 
point was not straightforward. Based on demographics, the province is more amenable to the 
party’s growth because it is the only province where black voters are not the majority. Coloureds 
are the largest racial group in this province, making up 49% of the population. Blacks are 33% of 
the population, whites are 16%, and Indians are 1%. While the demographics are considerably 
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more favorable in this province, in the past the DA (known as the DP before the 2000 merger) 
went through an evolution before it could secure a hegemony over white voters, and significant 
support in coloured communities.   
 In the 1994 national election, while both the ANC and National Party (NP) used racial 
appeals to win voters, the DP largely ignored race in its campaigns (Ferree 2010, 80). The logic 
behind the decision to downplay racial messaging was that the party believed that by staying 
neutral it could win over non-white voters based on its history of fighting apartheid. This strategy 
did not work, as the party earned only 2% of the vote in that election. Shifting away from its 
racially apolitical strategy, in the 1999 national election the DP launched a campaign mainly 
targeting white Afrikaner voters in the province. Although the party also sought to court the 
coloured and Indian vote at this early stage, the main focus was on wresting white Afrikaners 
from the NP. Noticeable changes to the party’s campaign rhetoric included an emphasis on 
issues that appeal primarily to white voters in the province – high crime and poor economic 
growth (92). The party also heavily invested in recruiting campaign surrogates from the white 
Afrikaner community who could communicate with Afrikaans speakers (93). On its party lists, 
the DP increased the representation of Afrikaans speaking whites, some of whom were absorbed 
from the NP (150). While all of these moves were aimed at getting support from the Afrikaner 
community in the province, they also served to alienate black voters. In these early national 
elections, the DP did not make a strong push to attract the black vote. In fact, moves such as the 
deployment of racially charged campaign rhetoric and the inclusion of racially divisive 
conservative whites on its party lists (93) alienated black voters.   
 By the 2004 national election the DA’s strategy of appealing to white Afrikaner voters in 
the province paid off, as the party displaced the NP as the home of Afrikaner voters. And while a 
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significant share of coloured voters support the DA in the Western Cape, in various election 
cycles the coloured community has been a swing vote (Seekings 2005), and the DA’s hegemony 
over colored voters in this province is not as assured.  
 Unlike the early national elections, support for the DA in local elections in Western Cape 
started off high. The party earned 51% of the vote in 2000. In the 20006 local election its vote 
share dropped to 39%. This decline is most likely due to the 2001 departure of the NNP as the 
DA’s alliance partner.38 The breakdown of the alliance likely led to the loss of support for the 
DA of NNP voters. However, support for the DA turned upward in the 2011 local election, as the 
party earned a vote share of 54%. Its hegemonic status in this province was cemented in 2016 
when it earned 63% of the vote.  
 While the DA put off appealing to the black community in the province during the 1994 
and 1999 elections, in the 2000 local election it sought to establish a foundation in black 
communities. The party directed most of its efforts toward persuading black voters, particularly 
among the lower middle class in the townships. The party was realistic about its chances of 
persuading the black community at this early stage, but it sought to create a foundation to build 
on in the future.39 Unlike its 1999 national campaign in the province, which emphasized issues 
that white, coloured and Indian voters cared about, in the 2000 election its messaging focused 
substantially on the needs of the poor, who are mainly black.40 
 The ANC attempted to push back against the DA’s effort to reach out to the black and 
coloured electorate in the 2000 local election by using racial appeals. The party circulated 
racially inflammatory pamphlets before the election, which highlighted incidents of racial abuse 																																																								38	The National Party (NP) changed its name to the New National Party (NNP) before the 1994 
national election		
39 13-19 October 2000, Mail & Guardian 
40 13-19 October 2000, Mail & Guardian 
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against coloured communities by a white DA councilor.41 In addition, the ANC’s provincial 
leader Embrahim Rasool devised a strategy of “African-coloured solidarity”, which was meant to 
unify these communities based on their common struggle fighting against racism and 
discrimination. The ANC also sought to exploit the recent merger between the DP and NNP as a 
means to court coloured voters. The logic was that Afrikaans-speaking coloured voters would be 
reluctant to vote for an English-speaking party leader (Tony Leon). Finally, the ANC tried to 
woo coloured voters in this election by expanding the coverage of Affirmative Action policies to 
include the coloured community, as they are the majority in the province.42  
 In the 2006 and 2011 local elections the DA continued to its policy of wooing coloured 
voters in the province. In 2010 the party merged with the Independent Democrats party, which 
was headed by Patricia de Lille, a prominent coloured politician. In the 2011 election the party 
went on to nominate de Lille as its mayoral candidate for Cape Town, and she won. Despite 
having a coloured person occupying a prominent position in the province, coloured DA members  
have had an uneasy time in the party. There are complaints from coloured party members about 
poor treatment and marginalization in the party, especially when it comes to leadership positions. 
This friction between the coloured community and the DA suggests that compared to white 
voters, the party has a less stable monopoly on coloured voters in the province. However, given 
their numeric advantage in this province, the coloured community is in a position to put more 
pressure on the DA than in any other province.  
 Turning to the data, did the nomination of a diverse slate of candidates contribute to the 
DA’s capture of Western Cape province? Figure 3.9 shows the percentage of ward candidates 
from each racial group. The results show that in the early elections (2000 and 2006) white  																																																								
41 16-17 September 2000, Weekend Sunday Argus 
42 18 June 2000, Natal Witness		
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Figure 3.9 Western Cape Province. DA Ward Candidate Racial Affiliation (2000-2016) in 
Percentages 
 
 
 
candidates were the majority in the candidate pool, and in the 2011 election they were the 
plurality. It was only in 2011 when coloured candidates were the largest group (at 41%). In this 
province coloured candidates are consistently the largest group of candidates nominated after 
whites. However, the fact that they are not yet represented in proportion to their population 
within the party lends credence to the frustrations that coloured DA members feel.  
 Another striking pattern from Figure 3.9 is the considerable underrepresentation of black 
candidates in this province. Recall that blacks make up 33% of the population in the province, 
yet, the highest share of black candidates nominated was 19% in 2011. The underrepresentation 
of candidates from the coloured and black communities in the Western Cape suggests that 
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because the DA performed very well in the 2000 election when its candidates were 
predominantly white, the party learned that it did not need to have a representative candidate 
pool to win elections in this province. In subsequent elections, as the party grew stronger in the 
province, they could afford to nominate members from their core constituency (whites) without 
suffering loses in the province.  
 How do these patterns in candidate nomination impact the DA’s ability to win ward 
elections in this province? Figure 3.10 shows the percentage of wards that candidates from each 
racial group won. The results show that compared to all other candidates, white candidates 
nominated in Western Cape province are more likely to win their ward elections. For instance in 
2016 the DA won 73% of the ward elections in the province, and of that number white 
candidates won wards 57% of the time. In the same election, coloured candidates won 37% of 
the wards, and blacks won 1%. This outcome indicates that even in Western Cape, which is 
generally a stronghold for the DA, white candidates are more likely to be nominated in ward  
seats that are safe for the party, while the coloured and black candidates are  nominated in wards 
where the DA experiences more competition from other parties. To verify this claim, I ran a 
logistic regression to assess the relationship between the nomination of white candidates in 
Western Cape province and safe DA wards (defined as a ward were the party received at least 
60% of the vote share from the previous election), controlling for the population of whites in a 
ward, candidate incumbent status, and ward population. Although the positive sign on the 
coefficient (and its statistical significance) suggests that white candidates are more likely than 
others to be nominated in safe wards (𝛽 = 1.022, p < 0.001), the effect of the relationship is not 
strong.    
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Figure 3.10 Western Cape Province. DA Ward Election Wins, by Candidate Racial Affiliation 
(2000-2016) in Percentages 
 
 
 
 
 The racial distribution of PR candidates in the province is similar in several ways to the 
ward elections. Figure 3.11 shows that like the ward candidate pool, whites were the majority, 
however, their majority eroded over subsequent elections. The percentage of colored candidates  
also stayed roughly consistent, at 30% in 2000, 34% in 2006, and 35% in 2011. It was only in the 
2016 election when the percentage of both white and coloured candidates declined with the  
increase in the number of black candidates nominated. The 6% increase in the number of black 
PR candidates from 2011 to 2016 corresponded to a decline in the number of nominees from the 
other two dominant groups. This growth in the number of black PR candidates nominated in the 
Western Cape most likely reflected the DA’s attempt to stave off the ANC’s efforts to contest its 
hegemony in this province. The ANC has explicitly stated its intention to roll back the DA’s  
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Figure 3.11 Western Cape Province. DA PR Candidate Racial Affiliation (2000-2016) in 
Percentages 
 
 
 
progress in this province. An effective strategy for the DA to thwart potential threats that the 
ANC presents in the predominantly black areas of the province is to increase the presence of 
blacks in its candidate pool. In addition to nominating more black candidates in 2016, the DA 
also placed more of them in winnable list positions. In this election, the DA could expect that 
60% of the candidates on its lists in the province were going to win a seat.  Figure 3.12 shows the 
percentage of candidates in winnable list positions in the Western Cape from 2000 to 2016. In 
both 2000 and 2006 blacks occupied 4.5% of all winnable PR list positions, but by 2016 this 
number increased to 26%. By placing more black candidates in list positions where they are 
almost assured to win a seat, the DA is signaling that it is serious about diversifying its party’s 
image not only in places where the inability to do so is politically costly, but also in its 
stronghold areas, where electoral vulnerability is not an excuse. And consistent with the results  
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Figure 3.12 Western Cape Province. DA Candidates in Winnable PR list positions by Racial 
Affiliation (2000-2016) in Percentages 
 
 
 
from the ward elections, at 40%, whites were the group that occupied the most winnable PR 
positions in this province. Coloureds also occupied a substantial percentage of winnable PR 
positions (27%), however, compared to whites they are considerably less likely to win a seat.  
 In sum, what emerges from the analysis of patterns in the DA’s candidate nominations in 
the Western Cape province is that the DA’s position as the dominant party in the province gives 
it less of an incentive to diversify its candidate pool than in other provinces. In most of the local 
elections in Western Cape, whites were the largest group in the candidate pool. Recall that as the 
only other prominent white party, the DA (then known as the DP) was the successor to the 
National Party in the Western Cape. Following the end of apartheid, the DA had the natural 
advantage at winning elections in the province, which was a former stronghold for the NP. While 
the party struggled to win decisively in the early national elections, local elections are where it 
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excelled, earning 51% of the vote share in 2000. It is not clear to what extent candidate 
nominations contributed to the party’s early strong showing in local elections. The party could 
not have earned such a vote share without support from the coloured community. Indeed, while 
the coloured community is the majority group in the province, they have been underrepresented 
in the candidate pool and the number of elected DA officials. While coloured members of the 
DA have been vocal about their marginalization in the party, it seems that other factors such as 
general antipathy toward the ANC in this province or low turnout in coloured communities 
contributed to the DA’s early local election success.  
 Another group that continues to be underrepresented in the DA’s local election candidate 
pool are blacks. It was only in the 2011 and 2016 local elections when the share of black 
candidates grew substantially. This increase in the number of black candidates nominated in this 
province is most likely an effort by the DA to protect is hegemony, in the face of ANC pressure 
to fight the party on its turf. While the percentage of black candidates nominated in this province 
will likely grow in future local elections, it most likely will not displace the percentage of white 
candidates who are nominated and win elections in this province. Because whites are the party’s 
core supporters, it can afford to reward them with political office in the province that has long 
been a party stronghold.  
3.7 Group Size and Candidate Nominations 	
 In this section I examine the extent to which the logic of candidate nomination decisions 
is driven by the characteristics of electoral districts, specifically if parties nominate candidates 
based on their ability to appeal to the largest racial group in a district. To test this argument I 
examine the nomination patterns of both the DA and ANC in all of the competitive wards in 
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Eastern Cape, Western Cape, and Gauteng provinces in the 2016 local election.43 While the vast 
majority of wards in the three provinces are dominated by either the ANC or DA, I focus on 
competitive wards because these wards, where it is more uncertain which party will win, are the 
ones where we can best study the electoral impact of the interaction between a candidate’s 
identity and group size. I define a ward as competitive if the margin of victory was 10% or less. 
In the data only 85 wards (out of 1,636) fit this criteria. And based on the 10% or less cutoff, the 
average vote margin in these wards is 5.4%.  Western Cape province had the most competitive 
wards in 2016, with 35 (out of the 85), and Eastern Cape and Gauteng provinces had 21 and 29, 
respectively. In the sample of competitive wards the largest racial groups are blacks and 
coloureds. Blacks were the largest group in 50 of wards, coloureds were the largest in 34 wards, 
and whites were the largest in 1 ward. In these three provinces it makes sense that these 
communities are heavily represented in competitive wards. The DA already has hegemony over 
the white vote. Coloured communities tend to swing between parties from election to election, 
and given the overall decline in support for the ANC by blacks, it also makes sense that 
competitive elections are more likely to exist in black majority wards than predominantly white 
wards.  
 The measure that I use is the racial background of the candidates nominated by both the 
DA and ANC in the competitive wards. In addition I matched the candidate data with 
information on the size of the racial groups (black, white, coloured, and Indian) in each ward, 
which is based on data from Census 2011. The purpose here is to determine which racial group 
in a ward is the largest, the second largest, and so on. Finally, the dataset also includes 
information on which of the parties won a ward election. 																																																								
43 I limit the analysis to only the 2016 election because this was the only year for which data on 
the ANC candidates’ backgrounds was coded.  
	95 
 I first examine the frequency in which the DA and ANC nominated a candidate from 
either the largest group, the second largest group, or other (i.e. the third or fourth). Table 3.3 
shows the intersection between how often each party nominated candidates from the largest 
racial group, the second largest, or other (the third and fourth largest racial groups). Table 3.3 
also provides information on how often either the ANC or DA won a ward election in each 
scenario.   
 First, how often do both parties nominate candidates from the largest group? Table 3.3 
shows that this was the most frequent scenario, occurring in 33% of the competitive wards. 
When this did occur, the ANC won 57% of the time. Breaking the result down by province (see 
Appendix 3.1), the DA won 60% of the competitive wards in Western Cape province when both 
it and the ANC nominated a candidate from the largest racial group. Similarly, in Eastern Cape 
the DA won 57% of the competitive wards under this scenario. It is only in Gauteng province 
when the ANC won 82% of the competitive wards in which both parties nominated a candidate 
from the largest group. Most likely the reason for this is that all of the 29 competitive wards in 
Gauteng were majority black, whereas the coloured community made up the majority in many 
wards in the other two provinces.       
 Next, when the ANC nominates a candidate from the largest group, how often does the 
DA select a nominee from the second largest group? This scenario was the second most  
common, occurring in 20% of competitive wards. The fact that the DA often nominates a 
candidate from the second largest group when the ANC nominates a candidate from the largest 
group lends support to the argument that the party nominates candidates based on their ability to 
appeal to groups that have the numbers needed to help the party win the ward. In fact, when this 
scenario did occur, the DA won more competitive ward elections than the ANC. The party won  
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Tale 3.3 Group Size, Nominees, and Wins and Loses by the DA and ANC in Competitive Wards 
 
ANC Nominates Candidate From: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DA 
Nominates 
Candidate 
From: 
 Largest group Second largest group Other 
Largest group Total instances: 28/85 
 
DA wins: 12 
ANC wins: 16 
Total instances: 5/85 
 
DA wins: 4 
ANC wins: 1 
Total instances: 4/85 
 
DA wins: 1 
ANC wins: 3 
Second largest 
group 
Total instances: 17/85 
 
DA wins: 9 
ANC wins: 8 
Total instances: 2/85 
 
DA wins:  1 
ANC wins: 1 
Total instances: 2/85 
 
DA wins: 2 
ANC wins: 0 
Other Total instances: 13/85 
 
DA wins: 6 
ANC wins: 7 
Total instances: 6/85 
 
DA wins: 5 
ANC wins: 1 
Total instances: 8/85 
 
DA wins: 1 
ANC wins: 7 
Note: Total instances refers to the number of wards in which a particular scenario occurs. In the 
2016 election there were 85 competitive wards in the all three provinces combined.  
 
53% of wards compared to 47% for the ANC. Are there certain provinces where the DA is more 
likely to nominate a candidate from the second largest group? Gauteng is the province where this 
scenario occurred most frequently, and there are several reasons why the party resorts to this 
scenario more often in this province. Since Western Cape is the DA’s stronghold, it is in a better 
position to attract candidates from the largest racial group in most wards, and would have to rely 
less often on appealing to the second largest group. Eastern Cape is an ANC stronghold, which is 
predominantly black, meaning that the DA almost always has to recruit black candidates (as  
discussed previously). But in Gauteng province, which is more racially diverse, it logical that the 
DA would nominate a candidate from the second largest group more frequently.  
 Table 3.3 also shows that when the ANC nominee came from the largest group, the DA 
nominated someone from minority groups (the 3rd and 4th largest group) in 15% of the wards. 
Comparatively speaking, this scenario occurred less often, and was more difficult for the DA to 
win. The party won only 46% of the wards where this occurs, while the ANC won 54% of the 
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time when it nominated a candidate from the largest group. The fact that the ANC won most of 
the time under this scenario reinforces the power of nominating a candidate from the largest 
racial group, who can appeal to the largest voting bloc in a ward.  
 From the standpoint of the ANC, when the DA nominated a candidate from the largest 
group, it is strategic to nominate a candidate from the second largest group. This scenario 
occurred 6% of the time. And when this did occur, the DA won 80% of the time. This finding 
again reinforces the benefit that parties derive from nominating a candidate from the largest 
group. The provincial breakdown in Appendix 3.1 shows that in every province the DA was at an 
advantage when it nominated a candidate from the largest group. The ANC’s failure to match the 
DA results in the DA winning these wards 75% of the time in Western Cape, and to winning all 
competitive wards in Gauteng.  
 In summary, this analysis shows that political parties in South Africa are most likely to 
win competitive elections when they nominate candidates from the largest group in a local 
electoral district. The logic underlying why the DA has intensively diversified its candidate pool 
is not only to convince voters that its party image has evolved, but also to field candidates who 
can compete with the ANC in earning the number of votes needed to win elections where the 
identity of the candidate matters. Although the vast majority of ward elections are not won by a 
small margin, the analysis of candidate nominations in competitive wards helps us learn to what 
extent factors such as candidate identity can make a difference.  
3.8 Conclusion 	
 In a dominant party system a major hurdle that opposition parties face is recruiting the type 
of candidates who are necessary to appeal to swing voters. In some countries, this means that the 
opposition has to recruit candidates who have the appropriate ideological credentials (Greene 
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2006). In other contexts, group identities are a central feature of political competition, and parties 
have to recruit candidates who are representative of the electorate that they need to mobilize. In 
this chapter I examined the candidate nomination strategies of the Democratic Alliance in local 
government elections. While in national elections the DA has been slow to diversify its candidate 
lists (Ferree 2010), in this chapter I find that the racial makeup of the party’s candidate pool in 
local elections has shifted rapidly over time. At present, black candidates constitute the 
overwhelming majority of DA nominees in local elections. This evolution suggests a deliberate 
strategy on the part of the party to use local government elections as a means to change the 
perception that many black voters have of it as a “white party.” This finding has an implication 
for the party’s ability to diversify its candidate lists at the national level. Nominating more black 
candidates in local elections means that more of them will get experience holding positions in 
local government, and this way the party is able to “grow” its own set of quality candidates and 
does not need to resort to poaching quality candidates from other parties.  
 The objective of this chapter was to examine the extent to which the nomination of 
representative candidates helps the DA grow in local government elections. Using data on the 
racial and ethnic affiliation of over 10,000 candidates for local office, I analyzed the patterns in 
the party’s nomination of candidates from the various racial and ethnic groups in three provinces 
where the party has made significant gains since the first post-Apartheid local government 
elections. With the exception of Gauteng province, a common trend is that in the early 2000 
election most DA candidates were white, but in subsequent elections the share of black 
candidates increased rapidly. Despite the increased representation of black candidates in the 
party, a consistent trend in all provinces is that blacks win considerably few ward elections. 
Black DA candidates are more likely to win seats from the party’s PR list. As the party has 
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earned more electoral support over the years, it has put more black candidates in winnable PR 
list positions. While the electoral system is an important factor in this development, the fact that 
few black DA ward candidates win elections suggests that the party is more likely to run white 
(and to some extent coloured) candidates in wards that are safe for the party. Even in the Western 
Cape province, which is a party stronghold, black candidates are less likely to be elected as ward 
candidates or to win seats through the PR list.  While the diversification of the party’s candidate 
pool can help it overcome its image problem with the black electorate, the fact that black 
candidates are elected at a lesser rate than whites does not help the party’s case.  
 Finally, I examined the extent to which parties nominate candidates who can appeal to 
the largest segment of the electorate. Specifically, I examined how the size of racial groups at the 
local level influences the DA’s candidate nomination decisions, and how the party reacts to the 
ANC’s choice of nominee. Focusing on competitive ward elections, I found that both the DA and 
ANC are more likely to nominate candidates from the largest racial group in a ward. And when 
the ANC nominates someone from the largest group, the DA is next most likely to select a 
candidate from the second largest group. When the DA does nominate a candidate from the 
largest group (and the ANC does not), the party is most often likely to win. These findings affirm 
the importance of ethnic group size on the ability of parties to mobilize voters in Africa.  
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Appendix 3.1 Group Size, Nominees, and Competitive Wards Won by the DA and ANC in 
each Province  
 
 
ANC Nominates Candidate from: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DA Nominates 
Candidate 
From:  
 Largest group Second largest group Other group 
Largest 
group 
WC:  
DA wins: 6/10 
ANC wins: 4/10   
EC: 
DA wins: 4/7 
ANC wins:  3/7 
GT: 
DA wins: 2/11  
ANC wins: 9/11 
WC:  
DA wins: 3/4 
ANC wins:  1/4 
EC: 
DA wins: 0/0 
ANC wins: 0/0  
GT: 
DA wins: 1/1 
ANC wins: 0/1  
WC:  
DA wins: 1/3 
ANC wins:  1/2 
EC: 
DA wins: 0/0 
ANC wins: 0/1   
GT: 
DA wins: 0/0 
ANC wins: 0/0  
 
Second 
largest 
group 
WC:  
DA wins: 1/2 
ANC wins: 1/2   
EC: 
DA wins: 2/4 
ANC wins: 2/4   
GT: 
DA wins: 6/11 
ANC wins:  5/11 
 
WC:  
DA wins: 1/2 
ANC wins:  1/2 
EC: 
DA wins:  0/0 
ANC wins:  0/0 
GT: 
DA wins: 0/0 
ANC wins: 0/0   
 
 WC:  
DA wins: 1/1 
ANC wins: 0/1  
EC: 
DA wins: 0/0 
ANC wins:0/0   
GT: 
DA wins: 1/1 
ANC wins: 0/1 
 
Other WC:  
DA wins: 4/7 
ANC wins:  3/7 
EC: 
DA wins: 0/3 
ANC wins:  3/3 
GT: 
DA wins: 2/3 
ANC wins: 1/3 
WC:  
DA wins: 2/2 
ANC wins:  0/2 
EC: 
DA wins: 1/2 
ANC wins: 1/2  
GT: 
DA wins: 2/2 
ANC wins: 0/2    
WC:  
DA wins: 0/4 
ANC wins: 4/4  
EC: 
DA wins: 1/4 
ANC wins: 3/4   
GT: 
DA wins: 0/0 
ANC wins:0/0 
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CHAPTER 4 
Voters, Party Credibility and Opposition Support  
 
 Under what condition do partisans of a ruling dominant party regime support the 
opposition? One explanation for the resilience of dominant parties (and opposition party 
weakness) is that because ruling parties have the advantage of controlling the state and its 
bureaucratic apparatus, they marshal these resources to deliver desired public goods to voters 
(Greene 2007; Magaloni 2006; Scheiner 2006). The successful delivery of economic growth by 
the ruling party creates a credibility gap - voters are convinced that the ruling party is more 
competent and credible at governing than the opposition (Morse 2018; Ong & Tim 2014). This 
results in repeated electoral victories for the ruling party, and opposition parties fail to grow. 
While this explanation is relevant in countries with political and economic systems that are 
highly centralized (Scheiner 2006; Oliver & Ostwald 2018), in federal systems such as South 
Africa, opposition parties have more presence at the local level. Regardless of the state’s political 
configuration, however, the reality remains that to grow, opposition parties must convince voters 
that they represent a credible alternative to the ruling party. I argue that at the subnational level, 
they can use their tenure in local government to demonstrate competence at governing by 
developing a reputation for managing local government well and delivering services effectively.  
 This chapter focuses on the role of party credibility as a determinant of support for the 
Democratic Alliance (DA) party. Party credibility refers to voter perceptions of a party as 
competent and trustworthy at delivering good governance. I specifically examine good 
governance within the context of anti-corruption efforts in local government. To what extent are 
the DA’s electoral fortunes dependent on reputation it developed governing at the local level? 
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Given the polarizing nature of race in South Africa, a party’s association with particular racial 
groups also matters to voters. The ruling party instrumentally evokes its legacy of resistance 
against the Apartheid regime to brand itself as the party best positioned to address black people’s 
interests, and it has been successful at framing the DA as a “white party”. I argue that the DA 
tries to overcome this image problem by developing are reputation for clean and transparent 
governance of cities. In addition to party credibility, the type of leaders representing the DA can 
also play a role in determining the extent to which ANC partisans are willing to vote for the 
party.  
 In this chapter I examine both the party credibility and mayoral leadership hypotheses 
using data from an original survey collected in cities where the DA came to power for the first 
time – Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay. I find that ANC partisans who view the DA as 
the most anti-corruption party in their city are more likely to express intentions to vote for the 
party in the future. I also find that the party’s anti-corruption reputation is a stronger determinant 
of vote choice than mayoral favorability in both Nelson Mandela Bay and Johannesburg. 
 The findings from this chapter provide evidence in favor of the largely untested assumption 
that opposition parties have to gain credibility with voters to draw support away from the ruling 
party. And because South Africa is a case of dominant party rule where racial identity plays a 
central role in politics, this chapter also sheds light on the importance of candidate characteristics 
on opposition party support. In addition, comparative subnational analysis of party competition 
in Africa is rare. Conducting a cross-city study allows us to compare how residents in different 
cities respond to the actual day-to-day policies that political parties implement. This subnational 
focus also provides insights that can compliment the findings of studies that focus solely on the 
national political landscape. 
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 The chapter is organized as follows. Section Two provides an overview of the concept of 
party credibility in the context of a dominant party system. In this section I also explain why 
party credibility helps explain increased support for the DA among black South Africans, and I 
discuss mayoral favorability as an alternative explanation. In Section Three I discuss the reason 
for selecting the cities of Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay to examine opposition support. 
In Section Four I describe the survey data that I collected. Next, I present the results of the 
analysis in Section Five, and Section Six concludes with a discussion of the implications of my 
findings for the broader field of electoral politics in Africa.   
4.1 Voters and Party Credibility in Comparative Perspective  	
 A party has a credible reputation if voters perceive it as trustworthy and competent, and if 
they are convinced that the party represents, protects, and advances their material interests. One 
of the main advantages that dominant parties have over rivals is their control over the state 
apparatus, which they use to deliver material benefits to voters. As a result, a central explanation 
in the literature on how dominant parties are maintained is that the ruling party’s ability to 
deliver goods and services on a regular basis convinces voters that they have a credible 
reputation for good governance (Morse 2018; Greene 2007; Magaloni 2006; Scheiner 2006). 
And because opposition parties lack experience in government, voters have little information to 
evaluate their competence, and thus view the opposition as suffering from a credibility gap. 
While many dominant party regimes use the state to perpetuate their rule, this strategy manifests 
in different ways depending on whether the dominant party is in charge of a high or low capacity 
state. In high capacity states such as Singapore, the ruling party’s central role in leading 
Singapore’s economic development and its record of consistently delivering highly visible public 
goods allows it to convince voters that it alone has the capability to govern well (Oliver & 
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Ostwald 2018). Lacking a comparable opportunity to use state resources to maintain voters’ 
loyalty, voters in Singapore are unconfident that the opposition could match the ruling party’s 
record. This, in turn, leads to less electoral support for the opposition. In low capacity states such 
as Mexico and Egypt, the dominant party still marshals state resources for political ends; 
however, the material benefits they distribute are less visible (Blaydes 2006) and more targeted 
(Magaloni 2006).  
 So long as voters are convinced that the ruling party is more credible, dominant party rule 
endures, and many voters remain hesitant to support opposition parties. This is especially more 
so in contexts where voter support for the opposition can lead to reprisals from the ruling party 
(Magaloni 2006; Scheiner 2006). How, then, does the opposition bridge the credibility gap? One 
way that opposition parties earn more credibility with voters is to earn experience governing. 
The underlying reason why voters are convinced that the dominant party is credible is because it 
is the only party they are used to seeing in power. Voters in such a party system do not know 
how opposition parties would perform if they were to enter office. This is particularly a problem 
in authoritarian dominant party systems, where opposition parties have a harder time winning 
office in the first place due to repressive tactics that penalize opposition activities. However, in 
less repressive dominant party regimes, where opposition parties are freer to compete and are 
able to win first elections in areas where core supporters live, the key to expanding their initial 
foothold is to develop a record for good governance. In Mexico, Lucardi (2016) shows that 
opposition parties who are successful at capturing seats in major cities are more likely to 
experience successive wins in smaller electoral units within that city. Keefer (2007) shows that 
as young democracies mature over time, they become more politically credible, meaning that 
they provide universal public goods (as opposed to targeted, clientelistic ones). Although 
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countries are the unit of observation in the Keefer (2007) study, a similar logic can apply to 
political parties. More experience in government leads to voters being convinced that opposition 
parties are credible. Where opposition parties win seats also matters for closing the credibility 
gap. Voters are more convinced about the opposition’s credibility if they win elections in major 
towns and cities. Since larger cities tend to receive more media coverage, news about the 
opposition’s governance in these places will be more likely to receive more media attention.  
4.1.1 Reputation Credibility and Opposition Support in South Africa 
  
 Unlike the commonly studied examples of dominant party rule in the literature, in South 
Africa, racial identity is an organizing principle of politics. Ferree (2010) argues that the ANC 
uses racial appeals during election campaigns to convince black voters that the DA is a “white 
party” that does not care about the interests of black people. The ruling party’s objective is to 
raise questions about the DA’s credibility in the minds of the pivotal black electorate. While 
Ferree extends her negative framing argument to explain other cases of opposition weakness, she 
also shows that the main opposition party in El Salvador was able to bridge the credibility gap 
with voters (and eventually win the presidency) by winning elections at the local level and 
showing that it is competent at delivering services. In several African countries, including 
Nigeria, Mozambique and Zambia, opposition parties used their tenure in local government to 
gain a foothold at the national level or to expand to other parts of the country. Previous studies 
also find that performance in government matters for opposition growth. Weghorst and Lindberg 
(2011) show that in Ghana opposition parties are more likely to win over swing voters by 
delivering public goods than targeted private goods.      
 In this chapter, I argue that ANC partisans are more likely to support the DA when they are 
convinced that the DA has a more credible reputation for good governance than the ruling party. 
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I argue that the development of the DA’s reputation credibility arises as a result of two factors. 
First, the party’s successful governance of major cities and its expansion throughout Western 
Cape province gives voters information that the DA is competent at governing. Unlike other 
opposition parties, the DA has steadily made progress expanding beyond its core areas of 
support. The second factor is the building of a party brand that emphasizes the DA’s past 
achievements in delivering services at the local level. Issues of good governance are a central 
feature of the DA’s party platform. The party’s association with anti-corruption and the delivery 
of basic services reinforces voters’ perceptions that the party cares about good governance. In 
this chapter I operationalize party credibility as a party’s reputation for fighting corruption in city 
government.44  
 The reputation credibility hypothesis that I test is the following:  𝐻!: ANC partisans who view the DA as the most anti-corruption party in city government will be 
more likely to vote for the party in the future.   
 
 I also examine the extent to which the DA’s electoral fortunes are dependent upon mayoral 
personalities. A politician’s background or identity is a simple source of information for voters to 
use when deciding to vote for a party. Candidate traits are particularly central to voting behavior 
in developing countries, where parties are less ideological, and voters with lower education 
levels are less able to access information about political party policy platforms. There is a well-
established literature in African politics that shows that voters tend to support co-ethnic 
candidates and parties. In an interesting experiment on voters in Benin, where the president has 
mixed ethnicity, Adida (2015) found that cueing ethnicity to each of the co-ethnic groups that the 
president belongs to led to more support for the president by each group.   
																																																								44	Throughout the chapter I use anti-corruption reputation, party reputation, and party credibility 
interchangeably		
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 In South Africa, the ANC has a clear advantage when it comes to fielding experienced 
black politicians (especially in national elections). Both white and African opposition parties 
struggle with recruiting and retaining quality candidates, and as a result, the electorate is 
unconvinced of their credibility. However, in Chapter 3 I found that over the years the DA 
steadily increased the number of black candidates in its candidate pool for local government 
elections.  While the majority of candidates the party fielded in the first local government 
election were white, by the 2016 local election black candidates made up the majority of the 
party’s nominees.  In addition to local candidates, in 2015 the party also elected Mmusi 
Maimane as its first black party leader. By appointing a black politician to such a prominent role 
in the party, the DA attempted to signal to black voters that the party is racially inclusive (Ferree 
2010). And in case voters saw Maimane’s appointment as a one-off occasion, the party 
nominated black mayors in Johannesburg and Tshwane, two cities where it won the mayorship 
after the 2016 election.   
 Models of voting behavior in South Africa show that the racial associations that voters 
make about parties play a major role in determining party support. Firstly, the placement of black 
politicians in positions of leadership allows the DA to push back against the ANC’s negative 
framing strategies, and to signal a shift in the party’s image. Second, black voters may be more 
likely to support the DA if the leadership is black because they may feel more convinced that a 
black DA politician would better serve their interests more than a white one. And from the 
vantage point of the black DA politician, even if they are a lifelong supporter of the DA, the 
experience of being black in South Africa makes it easier for them to form a bond with black 
voters over issues such as discrimination and racism. Third, black politicians may be more 
attuned to the concern of black constituents. There is a wealth of literature from developed 
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countries showing that black representatives are more responsive to the needs of black 
constituents (Broockman 2013). In South Africa, McClendon (2016) uses an experimental design 
to show that there is a racial gap in who local government councilors respond to, finding that 
black councilors are more likely to respond to messages from black constituents and that white 
councilors are more responsive to constituents from their own group. Based on these theoretical 
expectations, in this chapter I argue that the strength of the DA’s reputation in determining the 
decision by ANC partisans to support the party will vary according to the city they live. 
Specifically, I argue that the party’s reputation should be a stronger determinant of vote choice 
for ANC partisans that live in a city run by a white DA mayor. 𝐻!: For ruling party supporters living in a city run by a non co-ethnic/racial, opposition party 
reputation will be a stronger determinant of support for the opposition than attitudes toward the 
mayor 
 
4.2 Case Selection: Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay Municipalities 	
 Since the introduction of local government elections in 2000, party competition has been 
most intense in South Africa’s metropolitan cities. The fact that opposition parties earn more 
electoral support in cities is part of a broader trend in Africa (Resnick 2012; Harding 2012) and 
beyond. This chapter tests the party credibility and leadership favorability hypotheses using data 
from an original survey conducted in two cities: Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay. These 
cities were selected for two reasons. First, both cities are located outside of Western Cape 
province, which is the DA’s political base. To determine whether the party credibility hypothesis 
explains support for the DA in other parts of the country, it makes sense to test the hypothesis in 
areas where the DA is new to governing. Following the 2016 election, the DA won the largest 
number of seats in Nelson Mandela Bay and won the second largest number of seats in 
Johannesburg. The second criteria for case selection was to select cities where there is a DA 
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mayor. If the leadership favorability argument explains ANC partisan’s decision to support the 
DA, the survey sample needs to consist of respondents living in cities run by both a black and 
white DA mayor. Currently, there are three DA mayors in the country; two of them are Black 
(Herman Mashaba in Johannesburg and Solly Msimanga in Tshwane), and the other is white 
(Athol Trollip in NMB). The cities of Johannesburg and NMB fit all of these criteria.   
4.2.1 City Demographics, Service Delivery, and Party Competition   	
City of Johannesburg 
 The city of Johannesburg in Gauteng province, with a population of 4.4 million, is the most 
populous city in South Africa and a major economic hub. 63 percent of the city’s residents are 
black, followed by whites at 16 percent, coloureds at 6 percent, and Asians at 4 percent. As is a 
common reality in many South African cities, Johannesburg is highly economically unequal. 
44.4 percent of households in the city earn less than ZAR2,114 a month (USD144), while 42.2 
percent are in the high income category, earning over ZAR70,875 a month (USD4,852.74) (City 
Report 2009). Despite rampant poverty and inequality, especially for black residents, access to 
municipal services in Johannesburg is high. According to Census 2011 numbers, 91 percent of 
households have access to piped water inside of their home, 90 percent have access to hygienic 
toilets, and 90.8 percent use electricity (HSRC 2015: 44-50). Yet high levels of access to basic 
services does not necessarily mean those services are high quality. Service delivery disruptions 
and corruption, especially in the poor parts of the city, are a common occurrence and serve as the 
catalyst for many protests.   
 Voting patterns in Johannesburg indicate that support for the ANC has slowly declined 
over time. In the 2004 national election, the party earned 69 percent of the vote share. The 
party’s vote share slipped slightly to 63.2 percent in the 2009 election, and in the latest national 
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election in 2014 54 percent of registered voters supported the ANC. The party’s gradual 
downward trajectory in Johannesburg has been more pronounced in municipal elections. Starting 
from a high of 58.9 percent in 2000, the ANC’s vote share withered to below 50 percent in 2016 
(at 44.5 percent). On the other hand, support for the DA in the city has steadily increased in both 
national and local elections. The party started with a 19.2 percent vote share in the 2004 national 
election, and by the 2014 election, it earned a third of the vote share. The trend in support for the 
DA in municipal elections in Johannesburg is more erratic. The party earned a vote share of 33.5 
percent in 2000, which declined to 27 percent in 2006, and reversed upward by 7 points in 2011 
(to 34 percent). In the latest local government election in 2016, the DA’s vote share increased to 
38 percent. With the exception of the 2006 election, the general trend in support has been in an 
upward direction.     
Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality 
 Nelson Mandela Bay city (NMB), formerly called Port Elizabeth, is located in Eastern 
Cape province and has a population of 1.2 million. 60 percent of the population is black, 15 
percent are white, 24 percent coloured, and 1 percent Asian. Unlike Johannesburg, Xhosa is the 
dominant ethnic group in this city. Xhosa speakers make up 57 percent of the population 
(Community Survey 2016).  In terms of household income, the annual per capita income in 2016 
in NMB was ZAR58,800 (USD3,977), which is higher than both the national and provincial and 
per capita income levels (ZAR53,800 and ZAR37,800 respectively) (ECSECC 2017: 55). This 
statistic, however, masks a lot of inequality. White households have a per capita income of 
ZAR206,000 (USD13,933), while the average for black households was ZAR30,900 
(USD2,090) - well below the city average (ibid).    
 Coverage of basic services is also high in NMB city. 98 percent of households have access 
	111 
to piped water inside of their dwelling, 84 percent have access to electricity, 94.2 percent have 
access to proper sanitation, and 90.8 percent of households regularly have their garbage collected 
(Census 2011). With regard to economic well-being, unemployment is a major problem in the 
city. The Census 2011 finds that only 36 percent of the city’s population are employed, while the 
remaining 63.2 percent are either underemployed or unemployed.  
 Eastern Cape Province has traditionally been the ANC’s heartland, given the large size of 
the Xhosa ethnic group, which is the largest ethnic group in the party. However, support for the 
ANC in Eastern Cape has declined dramatically over the years. The ANC’s vote share in national 
elections in the province went from a high of 84.4 percent in 1994 to 49.2 percent in 2014 (IEC 
2014). This is a 35 percent drop in the party’s vote share over a twenty-year period. Similar to 
Johannesburg, support for the DA in the 2014 election started at 21 percent of the vote share. 
However, in the last national election, the DA’s vote share in NMB was substantially higher than 
in Johannesburg (40 percent compared to 30 percent). In municipal elections, the trend in support 
for the DA has also been in the upward direction. In the 2016 election, the gap between the ANC 
and DA was the narrowest ever in the city’s history. In this election, 47 percent of registered 
voters supported the ANC, and 41 percent supported the DA. Compared to Johannesburg, the 
fact that the DA has more electoral support in NMB municipality may have to do with the large 
size of the coloured community in the city (24 percent compared to 6 percent in Johannesburg). 
The coloured community is considered a swing vote in many cities in South Africa, and the DA 
heavily courts this community for votes in NMB (Prevost et al. 2014).  
4.2.2 Coalition Politics and Mayoral Elections 	
 Given the ANC’s decades-long electoral dominance at multiple levels of government, 
political coalitions are a rare phenomenon in South Africa. However, following the August 2016 
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election, three of the eight largest cities in the country ended up with a hung council - no party 
was able to earn a clear majority of seats in the council. This new political reality left many 
parties feeling uneasy. One option was for the DA to form a coalition with the Economic 
Freedom Fighters (EFF) party, a relatively new party led by Julius Malema. Formed after 
Malema broke away from the ANC in 2013, the EFF is a populist political party. Both the DA 
and EFF found it unacceptable to broach an alliance with the ANC, as they had sought to 
distance themselves as much as possible from the ruling party during the campaign. However, 
neither the DA nor EFF were eager to form coalitions with one another, as the two parties are 
ideologically incompatible. The EFF’s populist economic policies and undisciplined approach to 
politics is a turnoff for large segments of the DA’s base.  And the EFF leadership was concerned 
that if it entered into a formal coalition with the DA its supporters would view the merger as an 
endorsement of the DA’s leadership or policies. However, given its position in several cities as 
the party with the third largest number of seats, the EFF was in a position to enter into a coalition 
with either the ANC or DA. The party ended up adopting a policy of aligning with the DA (and 
other small parties) on a case-by-case basis. The rationale for entering into selective coalitions 
with the DA was that compared to the ANC, the EFF considered the DA as the “better devil” 
(Siddle 2016).  However, without a binding agreement to be a permanent coalition partner, the 
EFF’s decision created the foundations for an unstable alliance, where the party could change its 
mind at any time and it could vote against a mayor, budget decisions, or key motions put forth by 
the DA in the council.  
 Despite the tenuous nature of the alliance between the DA and EFF, the EFF’s willingness 
to enter into coalitions in select cities contributed to further loosening the ANC’s grip in the 
metros. In Nelson Mandela Bay, 116 seats were contested during the 2016 election, and the DA 
	113 
won the plurality with 57 seats. In the city of Johannesburg there were 265 seats open, and the 
DA came in second place, winning 104 seats. In South Africa, mayors are the representatives of 
large cities, and the party that earns the majority of seats in an election gets to appoint the mayor. 
If there is no party with a majority of seats, the party with the plurality of seats must form a 
coalition with smaller parties to earn a majority. Within the coalition, the party with the largest 
number of seats typically appoints the mayor.  
 In Johannesburg city, the DA formed a coalition with the EFF, and with their combined 
vote, their coalition became the majority. In this coalition, the DA’s candidate, Herman 
Mashaba, was elected mayor. Prior to his involvement in politics, Mashaba, who is from the 
Tsonga ethnic group, grew up in poverty during the Apartheid regime (Madondo 2012). He 
eventually climbed his way to success by founding the most popular hair care line in the country, 
Black Like Me, which is a multi-million dollar enterprise. He joined the DA in 2014 and 
accepted the party’s nomination as a mayoral candidate in December 2015.  
 In Nelson Mandela Bay the DA created a coalition with a number of smaller parties, as it 
did not need to rely on the EFF to earn a majority, and after the August 2016 election, Athol 
Trollip was elected mayor. Unlike Mashaba, Trollip is a longtime DA member. He has occupied 
various positions in the party, serving in both Parliament and the Eastern Cape Provincial 
legislature. Trollip was the DA’s leader in the Eastern Cape legislature from 2002 to 2017. In 
2015, the party nominated him as its candidate in Nelson Mandela Bay city. But, after serving as 
mayor for only two years, the EFF (supported by the ANC and the United Democratic 
Movement party) launched a series of no confidence votes that eventually led to Trollip’s ouster 
as mayor in August 2018.    
4.3 Data 	
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 In this chapter, I use data collected from a mobile phone survey fielded in Johannesburg 
and Nelson Mandela Bay metros during August – September 2018. The survey was administered 
by the marketing company GeoPoll, which specializes in conducting mobile phone surveys in the 
developing world. The surveys that GeoPoll conducts are opt-in surveys, in which survey 
participants in the company’s database voluntarily opt-in to take surveys in exchange for free 
mobile airtime. Through joint agreements with some of the major telecommunications 
companies in South Africa, GeoPoll has 10 million mobile phone subscribers in its database. One 
of the modes in which surveys are conducted is the SMS text message survey. The advantage of 
this mode is that any respondent can take the survey, regardless of the type of phone they own (a 
basic mobile phone or smart phone). A recent Pew report found that 91 percent of South African 
citizens have access to a cellular phone, and that half of the country uses smart phones (Silver & 
Johnson 2018). 82 percent of mobile phone users in South Africa send text messages. This 
means that most people in the country are comfortable with text messaging as a means of 
communication. The use of the SMS survey mode also means that the survey will pick up 
respondents from a lower socio-economic background, who are more likely to own inexpensive 
mobile phones. 
 Despite the promising potential of social media as a tool for recruiting survey participants, 
there are several limitations to using convenience samples collected in this manner. The first 
concern is that survey respondents will not be representative of the population they are drawn 
from. Studies using data collected from similar convenience samples, however, find that their 
survey samples closely represent the demographics of the general population (Samules & Zucco 
2014). In the case of GeoPoll, the company randomly samples its database of subscribers to 
receive survey invitations. While the outcome of this method is not a nationally representative 
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survey, it does reflect the population of users in GeoPoll’s database.   
 The survey conducted in this study was in the field from August 2nd - August 27th 2018. The 
total number of respondents in the survey was 700. Although the initial plan was to have 350 
survey respondents in both cities, the final survey contains 517 respondents from Johannesburg 
and 183 surveys from Nelson Mandela Bay. The smaller sample in NMB metro is because the 
mayor, Athol Trollip, was ousted in a vote of no confidence on August 27th 2018. Since the 
survey asks respondents in the city about the mayor, data collection was terminated on the day he 
was removed from office. Although the sample from NMB is smaller than originally planned, it 
is still large enough to conduct statistical analysis.  
 Because I am mainly interested in support for opposition parties by black South Africans, 
the survey only consists of black respondents. GeoPoll was able to obtain a black-only sample by 
creating screening questions at the beginning of the survey. Respondents who opted-in to take 
the survey were asked several demographic questions, including race. Based on their response to 
the race question, they were either permitted to take the rest of the survey, or notified that they 
had reached the end of the survey. While there is a concern that the question on race may prime 
respondents’ racial identity, it was not the first question they were asked in the screening 
questionnaire, as the question was embedded with other demographic items. 
 Besides race, there are other important demographic features of the sample. The sample 
contains a roughly equal proportion of male and female respondents. In terms of age, only 
respondents over 18 were permitted to take the survey, and the average age is 31. The other 
demographic variable collected in this survey is annual income. Respondents were asked to 
identify which income group they fall into: low (less than ZAR20,000), middle (ZAR20,000 - 
ZAR300,000), or high (above ZAR300,000). 70 percent of respondents in the sample are low 
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income, 25 percent are middle income, and 4 percent are high income. The fact that most 
respondents in the sample are from the lower end of the income distribution may be due to the 
fact that poorer people are probably more likely to want to take mobile phone surveys in 
exchange for free airtime. While poor constituents are not part of the DA’s traditional base, this 
sample of black and overwhelmingly low-income respondents supports my research design. For 
the DA to expand beyond its base of white, Indian and colored voters, it has to win support from 
not just middle class black voters, but also poor blacks, who make up a significant portion of the 
urban population. This sample provides an opportunity to test whether poor voters are 
responding to the DA’s attempt to brand itself as a party of good governance. Finally, the survey 
includes a question about which language respondents use at home. This language question was 
included to serve as a proxy for the respondent’s ethnic group, since language and ethnicity are 
closely related in South Africa. 
 I limit the data analysis to ANC partisans only. I define an ANC partisan as an individual 
who identifies closely with the ruling party. From the perspective of the DA, I refer to these 
individuals as non-core supporters. The survey item used to measure ANC partisanship is a 
question that asks respondents: “what party do you feel closest to?” 
4.3.1 Dependent Variable 	
 The main dependent variable in this study is a question on vote choice in the next local 
government election. Respondents were asked: “What party would you vote for in the next local 
government election?” Since this study is focused on support for the DA, the responses to this 
question are transformed into a dichotomous variable, with 1 indicating that the respondent 
would vote for the DA and 0 indicating a vote for another party. Figure 4.1 shows the 
distribution of responses to this question in both metros. Most respondents indicate that they  
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Figure 4.1 Future Party Vote Choice By Metro 
 
would support the ruling party. The second most popular party is the EFF, and the DA is the 
third. While this sample contains more prospective ANC and EFF voters, it is important to keep 
in mind that the DA earned the plurality of the vote share in Nelson Mandela Bay (46.71 
percent), and was the party that second place party in Johannesburg (earning 38.4 percent of the 
vote share). The results from the 2016 election indicate that the party does have real support 
among a significant portion of voters in these two cities. The reasons that the survey may not 
reflect this popularity is that there are only black respondents in the survey. Without exit poll 
data, it is not possible to disaggregate party support based on race from the election returns. 
However, data from Citizen Survey, which is a nationally representative survey that has been 
conducted monthly since 2015, contains questions about vote choice in the 2016 election. As 
Figure 4.2 shows, in the 2016 election, the DA was the second most popular party, followed by  
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Figure 4.2 Vote Choice in the 2016 Election [Citizen Survey] 
 
the EFF. This nationally representative sample accurately reflects the results of the election.  
4.3.2 Explanatory Variables 	
 The first explanatory variable measures the DA’s party reputation for good governance. 
There are a lot of different measures of good governance, and while it is ideal to ask survey 
respondents about different policy domains or public services, limitations in data collection 
meant that I could only focus on one measure of good governance.45 I focus on corruption 
because it is as an issue that is more likely to be polarizing for the ANC. Corruption scandals, 
and particularly the abuse of city resources is a highly publicized issue in the media. Corruption 
in city government is also an issue that the DA often uses to appeal to voters (Maimane 2018). 
To what extent do citizens make associate political parties with anti-corruption? I use data from 
Round 6 of the Afrobarometer which contains a question on how voters evaluate the ruling party and 																																																								45	Adding additional questions on the survey would require a larger budget for the survey.		
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the opposition on specific policy issues. The advantage to this question is that it asks voters to 
specify if the ruling party or opposition parties are more capable of handling specific issues such as  
inflation, basic healthcare, jobs, and corruption. Figure 4.3 shows that although most respondents 
view the ruling party as better than the opposition at handling all of these issues, what is interesting is 
that corruption is the only area where the opposition performs best. Whereas 41% view the ruling 
party as better able to fight corruption, 35% selected the opposition. These results indicate that 
although many voters support the ANC over the opposition on most policy issues, they are less 
confident about the ruling party being able to tackle corruption. I argue that this broader trend of 
disillusionment with the ANC’s mismanagement of government contributes to voter support for 
opposition parties at the local level, where maleficence in local government has a direct impact on 
voter’s lives. 
 I operationalize anti-corruption reputation using a survey item that asks respondents to state 
which political party they believe is the best at fighting corruption in their city. This question is  
open-ended, and respondents had to type the name of the political party they think does the best 
job fighting corruption. Open-ended questions are a more accurate reflection of respondents’ 
perceptions than closed-ended questions because respondents have to generate the answer, as 
opposed to selecting an answer from a menu of options. I use the responses to this question to  
create a dichotomous variable that takes on the value 1 if the respondent thinks the DA is the 
most anti-corruption party and 0 for other parties. 
 Figure 4.4 shows the distribution of responses to this question. Most respondents view 
the EFF as the party with the best reputation for fighting corruption. This finding is most likely a 
reflection of the EFF’s image as a populist party that is anti-status quo and critical of the ANC 
establishment. The EFF, however, is a new  party. It was founded in 2013, and although it won 
some seats in Johannesburg and NMB, the party does not have an extensive record of serving  
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Figure 4.3 Policy Evaluations of the Ruling Party and the Opposition 
 
time in local government. Although my argument holds that opposition party reputation building 
depends on the time they spend actually governing cities, the finding that the EFF is viewed as 
the most anti-corruption party suggests that reputation building can also be filtered through 
populist rhetoric. Resnick (2012) finds that populist rhetoric alone is sufficient for opposition 
parties to mobilize the urban poor. While the current iteration of this survey does not contain 
questions that could help parse the mechanism that respondents use to arrive at forming their 
party reputations (i.e. experience in office or populist rhetoric), future extensions of the project 
will account for this. 
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Figure 4.4 Which Party is the Best at Fighting Corruption? 
 
 
 
 The second explanatory variable is mayoral favorability. I operationalize favorability 
using two survey items. The first question is an open-ended question in which respondents were 
asked to write the name of the mayor of in their city. The purpose of this question was to check 
whether respondents correctly knew who the mayor of their city. In the Johannesburg sample, 64 
percent of the respondents answered Herman Mashaba correctly. In the NMB sample, 89 percent 
answered Athol Trollip correctly. The fact that the majority of respondents know the name of the 
mayor shows that they are aware of who is leading their cities. The next survey item asked 
respondents: “how much do you like/dislike the mayor of Johannesburg [NMB]?” The responses 
to this question are measured on a 5-point Likert scale. Figure 4.5 shows the distribution of 
responses to this question for both mayor Mashaba and Trollip. The distributions of both  
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Figure 4.5 Mayor’s Favorability Rating 
 
 
histograms are clearly skewed toward the higher values on the scale, indicating that both of these 
mayors are popular. It is also important to state that a significant bloc of respondents don’t have 
a strong attitude about the mayor. In Johannesburg 22 percent have neutral feelings toward the 
mayor, while 41 percent feel the same about the mayor in NMB. While there are many reasons 
why respondents would feel indifferent toward any political figure, the existence of respondents 
in this category should not impact the overall analysis. 
      Finally, I include in this analysis several demographic covariates that scholars have 
previously found to be associated with opposition support. Younger voters are more likely to 
oppose support for dominant party regimes in parts of Africa (MacDonald 2018), so I include 
age as a control variable. The next demographic factor I control for is income. Wealthier voters 
are a less stable constituency for dominant parties (Magaloni 2006; Weitz-Shapiro 2012). These 
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voters tend to be less reliant on patronage from the ruling party and will suffer less material 
consequences if they support the opposition. Wealthier voters also tend to be more educated,  
meaning that they have access to more sources of information about political party platforms. 
Finally, while there are no theoretical reasons to expect gender differences in opposition support, 
I still include gender as a covariate, which takes on the value of 1 if the respondent is female, and  
0 if they are male.   
One concern with analyzing the relationship between party performance and vote choice 
in general is that these two factors may be closely correlated. To examine the extent to which  
reverse causality may interfere with the interruption of the results (i.e. partisanship impacting 
perceptions of performance) I take several steps. First, I present a breakdown of the two relevant 
variables in my data - party reputation and vote choice, based on partisan affiliation. Are there a 
substantial number of ANC partisans in the data who view other parties as having a stronger 
reputation for good governance? If so, this would be evidence that partisanship does not strictly  
shape how respondents view their party’s reputation. Table 4.1 shows that 46% of ANC partisans 
believe that another party has a better reputation for fighting corruption. The fact that close to 
half of ANC supporters say that either the DA or EFF has a better reputation for fighting 
corruption than their own party supports the claim that partisanship does not necessarily shape 
individual’s perceptions about party credibility. Table 4.2 also shows that 45% of DA partisans 
view the ANC or EFF as the party with the better reputation. This finding may reflect the smaller 
sample of DA partisans in the data compared to ANC or EFF partisans, however, it also supports 
the argument that the relationship between partisanship and evaluations of party credibility are 
not tightly linked. The EFF is the only party where the overwhelming majority of partisans view 
the EFF as having the best reputation. Only 28% of EFF partisans view either the ANC or DA as  
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Table 4.1 Partisanship and Perceptions of Party Anti-Corruption Reputation  
 
Which party does the best job fighting corruption?  
 
Partisanship 
 ANC DA EFF  
ANC 161 47 88 296 
DA 33 78 30 141 
EFF 31 24 138 193 
Total  225 149 256 630 
Note: The figures in the table are raw numbers 
 
 
 
Table 4.2 Partisanship and Vote Choice 
 
Which party will you vote for in the next local government lection?  
 
 
Partisanship 
 
 ANC DA EFF  
ANC 218 44 44 306 
DA 41 89 12 142 
EFF 38 20 137 195 
Total  297 153 193 652 
Note: The figures in the table are raw numbers 
having a better reputation fighting corruption. This result reflects the fact that compared to the 
other parties the EFF is a relatively new party. The 2016 election was the first local government 
election the EFF participated in, thus voters have not had an extensive period of time to observe 
the EFF’s track record in government.  
 Table 4.2 shows that although partisan identification and vote choice are strongly 
correlated for supporters of each party, there are a significant number of partisans who are open 
to voting for other parties. 29% of both ANC and EFF partisans consider voting for other parties 
in the future election. The DA has the largest number of partisans (37% combined) who would  
support the ANC or EFF in a future election. The fact that more DA partisans would vote for the 
ANC (28%) than the EFF (8%) suggests that even though some black voters may be attached to 
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the DA, they are still ambivalent about the party, and hat there exists a possibility that they could 
support another party. While white, coloured, or Indian respondents are not included in this 
sample, it is likely that this results would not hold for DA partisans from these racial groups, 
which are more strongly incorporated in the DA’s base.   
 Given the somewhat loose connection between partisanship, perceptions of party 
credibility, and vote choice, I restrict the analysis of the data to ANC partisans. From a 
theoretical standpoint it also makes sense to restrict the analysis to ANC partisans since they 
represent the largest voting bloc in the country, and opposition parties have to persuade them if 
they are to expand their support. Although the design of this study cannot account for the 
potential of reverse causation, it helps lay the foundation for a follow up study that uses an 
experimental design. 
4.4 Results  	
 Table 4.3 shows the results of the analysis for the respondents living in Johannesburg. 
Note that the sample only consists of respondents who were able to correctly name the mayor of 
the city. Also, the models for the anti-corruption reputation and mayoral favorability hypotheses 
are presented separately in Columns 1 and 2. In Column 1, the coefficient on the party reputation 
variable is positive, indicating that ANC partisans who view the DA as having a better anti-
corruption reputation in city government are more likely to intend to vote for the party in the 
next election than those who view other parties as more anti-corruption. In terms of a predicted 
probabilities, For ANC partisans the chances of voting for the DA increases by 3% if they view 
the DA as the most anti-corruption party (i.e. moving from a 0 to 1 on the explanatory variable, 
holding all other variable at their means). In Column 2, the coefficient on the mayoral 
favorability coefficient is positive, indicating that ANC partisans who view the mayor Mashaba  
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Table 4.3  Johannesburg Vote Choice Model 
 
 Dependent variable: 
  
 Vote for the DA 
 (1) (2) 
 DA Anti-Corruption Party 2.661***  
 (0.695)  
   Mayoral Approval 0.006 0.246 
 (0.370) (0.316) 
   Age 0.037 0.038 
 (0.042) (0.035) 
   Female -1.211* -1.109* 
 (0.707) (0.623) 
   Income -0.112 -0.672 
 (0.682) (0.576) 
   Constant -3.229 -2.940* 
 (2.016) (1.635) 
    Observations 111 111 
Log Likelihood -34.305 -42.148 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 80.610 94.297 
 Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
more favorably are more likely to vote for the DA, however, the size of the effect is not 
statistically significant. Comparing the size of the effect on the anti-corruption coefficient and 
the mayoral favorability coefficients shows that party reputation is stronger predictor of vote 
choice than party leadership personality. The sign on the age coefficient in both models is 
positive, but not statistically significant. As mentioned previously the majority of the respondents 
in this survey are young people between the ages of 18 and 35. Generally, young voters are more 
likely to vote for the opposition in South Africa, so the sign on this coefficient does not follow 
what we would expect. On the other hand the coefficient on the female variable is negative, 
indicating that women in this sample are less likely to vote for the DA. Finally, the remaining 
covariate, income, has a negative sign. Low and middle income respondents are less likely to 
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vote for the DA, although the relationship between income and vote choice is not statistically 
significant in both models. 
 The results for respondents living in Nelson Mandela Bay municipality are presented in 
Table 4.4. Column 1 shows that ANC partisans who view the DA as the most anti-corruption 
party in city government are more likely to intend to vote for the party in 2019 than those who 
view other parties as having a better reputation on anti-corruption. The predicted probability of 
an ANC partisan voting for the DA is 27% higher if they view the party as having the most anti-  
corruption reputation. In addition, the coefficient on the anti-corruption variable is larger in 
NMB than in Johannesburg. This result is in line with 𝐻!, which predicted that party reputation 
should be a stronger driver of vote choice in NMB than in Johannesburg. The argument stated 
that the presence of a white DA mayor in NMB, which reinforces the image of the DA as a white 
party, should mean that the party’s electoral fortunes among ANC partisans are tied more to its 
reputation (and not mayoral favorability). As in the Johannesburg sample, Column 2 shows that  
the mayoral favorability variable is not statistically significant. The direction of the effect on the 
mayoral favorability coefficient is positive, meaning that ANC partisans who view mayor Trollip 
favorably are more likely to vote for the DA in the next election. For the remaining covariates. 
The sign on the age coefficient in both models is negative, but not statistically significant. The 
direction of the effect suggests that older voters in this city are less likely to vote for the DA. 
This is line with what we would expect theoretically, as older black voters are more likely to 
support the ANC. The positive coefficient on the female variable suggests that female 
respondents are more likely to vote for the DA than more respondents. Finally, the negative 
coefficient on the low income variable suggests that poorer voters are less likely to support the  
DA. This is in line with theoretical expectations, although the effect is not substantively  
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Table 4.4  Nelson Mandela Bay Vote Choice Model 
 
 Dependent variable: 
  
 Vote for the DA 
 (1) (2) 
 DA Anti-Corruption Party 3.070***  
 (0.807)  
   Mayoral Favorability 0.298 0.095 
 (0.408) (0.283) 
   Age -0.022 -0.021 
 (0.048) (0.040) 
   Female 0.268 0.198 
 (0.800) (0.638) 
   Income -0.372 -0.140 
 (0.883) (0.719) 
   Constant -2.341 -0.861 
 (2.158) (1.554) 
    Observations 60 60 
Log Likelihood -22.192 -31.113 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 56.384 72.226 
 Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
meaningful.  
4.5 Conclusion 	
 Why are some partisans of the ruling party willing to support the opposition in a dominant 
party system? Given the huge resource imbalance that exists between the ruling party and the 
opposition, opposition parties in a dominant party system have few tools at their disposal to 
attract voters away from the incumbent. One of the major obstacles that impede opposition party 
growth is that because they govern so few parts of the country, voters lack information about 
how these parties would perform if they were to gain power. Studies show that the opposition 
can overcome this information asymmetry by gaining entry into subnational office and spreading 
their victories (Lucardi 2016). While studies on opposition expansion in subnational political 
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office only indirectly link this outcome to the role of growing voter awareness about the 
competence of opposition parties in local government, this assumption is not directly tested. In 
this chapter, I find that partisans of the ruling party are willing to vote for the opposition when 
they are convinced that the opposition is more credible on issues of good governance than other 
parties (including the incumbent). Previous studies focus on the role of opposition party 
campaign promises to provide collective goods as a determinant of vote choice (Weghorst & 
Lindberg 2011). However, I show that perceptions of party credibility are a key factor in the 
decision by ruling party supporters to vote for the opposition. An underlying assumption in my 
argument is that voter’s perceptions about the DA’s competence form in the first place because 
the DA has actually spent time in office developing a positive reputation for service delivery and 
good governance. The longer time an opposition party has served in office, the more likely 
voters are to develop a perception of party credibility. In addition to finding evidence in support 
of this hypothesis, I also find that ANC partisans view the EFF as has having the best reputation 
for fighting corruption. The EFF is a new party and has not participated in as many elections as 
the DA, nor does it govern as many municipalities or wards. However, this finding does not 
necessarily contradict the argument that perceptions matter for parties being able to build a 
credible reputation. In fact, studies show that opposition parties in other parts of Africa rely on 
populist rhetoric to convince poor urban voters that they are a viable party (Resnick 2012; 
Cheeseman & Larmer 2015). Future studies should investigate the extent to which formations of 
party reputations are based on the mechanisms of political experience or populist rhetoric. 
 One critical scope condition or assumption to the theory of party credibility is that it 
applies to cases of dominant party rule where opposition parties have the chance of entering into 
local government. This argument does not carry well to countries where there are institutional 
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barriers to political decentralization. For instance, in Singapore, the ruling party has in place a 
deliberate strategy of limiting political and fiscal decentralization. As a result, opposition parties 
have a difficult time gaining entry into local office because there are fewer electoral seats to 
contest. The inability to enter local government makes it difficult for the opposition to create a 
base of support where they can expand out from. Consequently, voters in these cases of 
dominant party rule face an even greater information barrier. This lack of awareness of 
alternative models of governance in tandem with the ruling party’s impressive track record on 
delivering development makes it especially costly to support the opposition. However, my 
analysis of voters in South Africa indicates that the DA’s governance of municipalities in 
Western Cape province has helped convince some voters that they have a credible reputation. 
Future growth of the party rests on its ability to convince more voters in the ruling party coalition 
that their governance model is a credible alternative to the ANC.  
 While the party credibility argument can be extended to explain other cases of opposition 
party growth in instances of dominant party decline such as Malaysia (Abdullah 2017) and 
Mexico (Lucardi 2016), this chapter also addressed the racial dynamics of party politics that are 
specific to the South Africa case. Specifically, I addressed the extent to which mayoral 
personalities matter for determining opposition support. South Africa is a highly racialized 
society, and the DA is careful to manage its image to appear racially inclusive. In the 2016 
election the party nominated a black mayor in Johannesburg and a white mayor in Nelson 
Mandela Bay city. I examined whether attitudes toward the city mayor impacts the decision of 
ANC partisans to support the party, and I found that compared to the party’s reputation, mayoral 
favorability is not a significant predictor of vote choice in either city. Despite finding no effect 
for mayoral favorability, the fact that the DA continues to place black leaders in prominent 
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positions suggests that the diversification of its elected officials remains an important policy for 
the party 	 Another insight from this chapter is the fluidity of partisanship in South Africa. Up until 
recently, scholars considered that partisanship does not play a central role in models of voting 
behavior in Africa. It is thought that partisan voting in Africa is either very weak or that 
partisanship acts through other meaningful explanations of voting behavior, such as ethnic 
identity. In a recent study, Carlson (2015) compares objective indicators of local public goods 
quality in Uganda to voter perceptions of these services and finds that ruling party partisans in 
Uganda are more likely to overestimate the quality of public goods provided by the government, 
while opposition supporters are likely to underestimate it. While the findings from that study 
suggest that partisan allegiances in Africa are stubborn, the results from this chapter show that 
partisanship and voter perceptions of good governance in South Africa are fluid. A substantial 
portion of ANC partisans view the DA or EFF as more credible at good governance. Although 
most partisans view their party as the best performer, this finding suggests that there is room for 
parties to persuade voters and that voters are not blind loyal partisans. Future studies should 
investigate the relationship between partisanship and perceptions of party credibility in other 
contexts.  			
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CHAPTER 5   
Conclusion  	
 How do opposition parties earn support in a political system that has been dominated by a 
single party for decades? This dissertation sought to investigate this question in the context of 
Africa, where dominant parties monopolize control of the national government, parties are 
programmatically indistinguishable, and social cleavages form the basis of party competition. 
Theories of opposition party failure in a dominant party system hold that factors such as 
clientelism and fiscal centralization make it difficult for opposition parties to engage in the type 
of bottom-up party building that is necessary to effectively challenge the ruling party. In 
addition, explanations for opposition failure in South Africa point to the centrality of race in 
politics, and specifically the legacy of Apartheid, as the explanation for why the opposition has 
remained ineffectual in national elections. On the other hand, explanations of opposition success 
in this type of political environment point to factors such as elite defections from the ruling party 
and opposition coordination. I argue that both existing explanations of opposition failure and 
success are insufficient to explain the growth of opposition parties in South Africa’s dominant 
party system. Instead, this dissertation advanced an explanation for opposition growth based on 
the role of local politics. I argue that opposition parties can use time spent in local government to 
expand by delivering services effectively and outperforming the ruling party. I also argue that 
performance at the subnational level helps them earn a reputation for good governance, which is 
appealing to ruling party supporters who are looking for an alternative. Finally, I argued that 
opposition parties use nominations for local elections as an opportunity to appeal to constituents 
that are vital to the ruling party’s coalition.  
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 In Chapter 2, I examined whether service delivery in local government explains the 
growth in support for the Democratic Alliance. I constructed a panel dataset of ward elections in 
all local government elections in South Africa. I found that where the DA is the incumbent party, 
improvements in household access to basic services such as piped water and proper sanitation are 
associated with increased support for the party. I also found that when DA-run wards perform 
better than their neighboring ANC counterparts, support for the DA in the neighboring ward 
increases in the next election. These findings support the argument that performance in local 
government helps opposition parties build support. In this chapter, I also examined the relevance 
of spatial theories as explanations for opposition growth. The horizontal diffusion explanation 
holds that an opposition victory in one area is likely to lead to subsequent victories in the 
neighboring areas. Particularly in electoral authoritarian systems, an opposition victory in one 
local government gives voters in surrounding areas a signal that the ruling party can be defeated. 
In this case of South Africa, I did not find support for this hypothesis. Instead, I found that when 
the DA wins ward elections, the party is less (not more) likely to win elections in the neighboring 
wards. I argue that the high degree of political polarization in local elections explains why the 
DA’s growth does not follow a horizontal diffusion pattern. Finally, in this chapter I found that 
support for the DA in future elections is higher in wards that are located closer to big cities that 
are already under opposition control. This finding confirms that it not only matters how 
opposition parties win elections, but also where. Big cities are more visible political entities that 
attract more media attention than small towns. Opposition victories in bigger cities are more 
likely to be a source of meaningful information to voters who are uncertain about supporting the 
opposition. 
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 One of the factors that scholars argue explains the DA’s inability to appeal to larger 
segments of the black electorate in South Africa is the party’s slow pace in rebranding itself as a 
racially inclusive party. One way that parties try to convince voters that they are racially 
inclusive is by altering the racial balance of their candidate nomination lists.  Studies on national 
elections find that the DA has been slow at attracting politically experienced black candidates 
who can appeal to voters that traditionally support the ANC (Ferree 2010; MacDonald 2015). In 
Chapter 3, I examined the DA’s candidate nomination decisions in local government elections. 
In this chapter, I examined the racial makeup of candidates for the DA’s proportional 
representation lists, and for ward elections. I selected three provinces to collect this data: Eastern 
Cape, Gauteng, and Western Cape provinces. The diverse political environments in these 
provinces allow us to observe the DA’s nomination decisions in an ANC stronghold (Eastern 
Cape), competitive province (Gauteng), and in a province that is a DA stronghold (Western 
Cape). I also examine the changes in candidate nomination patterns over time, from the 2000 
local election to the 2016 local government election.  In ward elections, I find that in the early 
election years the DA tended to rely mostly on a majority white candidate pool, while black ward 
candidates made up a majority of the candidate pool by the 2016 election. Western Cape 
province is the exception – white candidates still make up the majority of the candidates that the 
party nominates. It appears that the DA rewards its white base by nominating white candidates in 
the party’s stronghold, where the risk of losing elections is lower. I find a similar story for PR 
candidate. In the early elections the DA relied primarily on white candidates, but by the 2016 
election black candidates were the majority. Again, Western Cape province is the exception, 
where by 2016 white candidates were the largest group. In addition to candidate demographics, I 
also examined the rate in which candidates from different racial groups win ward elections and 
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are placed in winnable PR list positions. I find that in all provinces, more than candidates from 
any other racial background, white candidates are more likely to win their ward elections. The 
statistical analysis shows that white candidates are more likely to be placed in wards that are safe 
for the DA, although this is not the case in all provinces. For PR candidates, I find that Gauteng 
is the only province where overtime black candidates occupy more winnable PR list positions 
than white candidates. It appears that while the DA has been successful at increasing the 
presentation of black PR and ward candidates, these candidates are not winning elections or seats 
at the same rate as candidates who reflect the party’s voter base.  Finally, in this chapter I 
examine the role of local racial demographics on the type of candidates that both the DA and 
ANC select. I find that both parties are most likely to select candidates who share the same racial 
background as the largest racial group in a ward. The party who selects the candidate from the 
largest group is more likely to win competitive ward elections. The significance of this finding is 
that local demographics also matter for determining whether parties can gather electoral support 
at the local level.  
 Do voters support the opposition on the basis of their cultivation of a reputation for good 
governance? In Chapter 4, I examined whether the DA’s reputation for good governance 
convinces ANC partisans to support the party. I selected two cities that the DA came to control 
after the 2016 local election – Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay. In this chapter, I also 
assessed the extent to which mayoral personalities impacts support for the DA in these cities. 
The party nominated a black mayor in Johannesburg and a white mayor in Nelson Mandela Bay. 
In both cities, I found that the DA’s reputation as an anti-corruption party is a stronger predictor 
of vote choice than attitudes toward the mayor. Comparative subnational studies of cities in 
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African politics are rare, and this chapter contributes to our understanding of how voters respond 
to opposition party governance of cities.  
 This project has relevance for different sets of literature, including studies on dominant 
party systems, and party politics and elections in Africa. Many prominent theories on the decline 
of dominant party rule focus on changes in large structure factors, such as macro-economic 
changes or electoral rule changes initiated by the ruling party. These accounts underestimate how 
local politics contribute to the evolution away from single-party rule.  In addition, many of the 
studies on dominant party decline do not examine the role of social cleavages in the development 
of competitive elections. This is understandable in countries such as Japan, which is ethnically 
homogenous. However, in cases of dominant party rule such as South Africa, social cleavages 
are central to party politics, and in this dissertation, I examined how both the DA and ANC 
respond to the salience of political identity in local elections.  
 Finally, this study also contributes to the broader literature on party politics and elections 
in Africa. While the dominant paradigm for understanding politics in Africa centers on the role 
of ascriptive identities, there is also a growing body of literature that examines whether 
performance matters to African voters. In this dissertation, I examined whether the performance 
of political parties and their reputation in governing at the subnational level explains voting 
behavior. This project also contributes to the literature on performance evaluations by using 
cross-city comparison as a method of analysis. Using subnational analysis to study the role of 
performance evaluations on voting behavior in Africa will enrich existing theories by providing 
the underlying context of how parties bring about administrative reforms in cities.  Future studies 
of opposition party governance in urban spaces should conduct cross-city comparisons across 
different African countries.        
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5.1 The Future of South Africa’s Party System 	
 Following the 2019 general election in South Africa, the ANC maintains control of the 
national government, with a reduced mandate. The party received 57 percent of the vote, which 
is five percentage points down from what it received in the 2014 national election, and the lowest 
vote share it received since the transition to democracy. The DA’s vote share was also reduced – 
from 22 percent in 2014 to 20 percent in the 2019 election. The only major party that grew 
support was the EFF, which earned a vote share of 10 percent, up from 6 percent in 2019.  What 
do these results signal for the future of the country’s party system? Given the downward 
trajectory of support for the ANC, it is inevitable that the party’s dominance will be diminished 
in the election years to come. There are two main paths where party system change is likely to 
emerge from in South Africa: the growth of the opposition or internal splits in the ANC.     
 The results from the 2019 election put into question whether national elections are the 
best venue for the DA to grow support. The DA’s vote share in the 2019 election suggests that 
the party still struggles to earn support at the national level. Although the party’s vote share 
declined, this decline could have occurred for many reasons, and does not necessarily mean that 
voters are deserting the DA. Forty-eight parties contested the election, and the increased 
presence of smaller parties means that each party chipped away at votes that could have 
potentially gone to the larger opposition parties. Also, the DA’s vote share could have been 
reduced by the unexpectedly strong showing of the VF-Plus party. The VF-Plus is a far-right 
Afrikaner nationalist party that earned a higher than expected vote share (from 0.9 percent in 
2014 to 2.4 percent in 2019). It is possible that voters who might have otherwise supported the 
DA broke for the VF-Plus, however, we cannot say for certain without exit poll data. 
Nonetheless, the stagnant position of the DA in national elections suggests that large parts of the 
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black electorate are still not comfortable voting for the party to run national government. A focus 
on national elections may not be the best approach for the DA to grow support. This is in line 
with previous studies, which show that opposition parties in South Africa failed electorally when 
they focused most of their resources and energy on growing support at the national level 
(Piombo 2005). When opposition parties returned to a local and municipal focus, they were able 
to expand their support (Langfield 2014).  
 If the DA continues to focus on subnational elections, where is the party most likely to 
grow at the local level? Outside of its stronghold in Western Cape province, the DA’s ability to 
expand locally will most likely be shaped by local demographics. In this regard, two of the most 
favorable provinces for the party to seek a majority in local government elections are Gauteng 
and Northern Cape provinces. Gauteng province is racially diverse, and there is a significant 
presence of the black middle class. The demographics of the Northern Cape province are similar 
to those in the Western Cape, as there are a large proportion of coloured voters. It is likely that 
demographics will restrict further growth of the DA in the more heavily rural provinces.  
 Another avenue of potential change in the party system are splits from the ANC. As it 
stands, the EFF is the main breakaway party that poses a serious threat to the ANC. The party 
was formed in 2013 after its leader Julius Malema was expelled from the ANC. The EFF was the 
only major party that gained support in the 2019 election. In hindsight, the EFF may be the first 
in a series of major defections from the ANC. The party taps into legitimate grievances felt by 
many ANC supporters. The EFF’s populist rhetoric is particularly appealing to young voters, as 
the party has a heavy presence in various student government councils in universities across the 
country. It is possible that the EFF will continue to gain more support in future national 
elections. However, with no serious opportunity to set the national agenda (the party only earned 
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44 seats in the national parliament), its opposition in national government will likely be confined 
to populist rhetoric. Thus, contesting local elections will remain an important strategy for the 
EFF to grow support.  The party will likely focus on increasing its number of local party 
branches across the country and recruiting more candidates. It remains to be seen whether the 
EFF can appeal to voters outside of the urban poor and college students. This will likely depend 
on its ability to tone down the bombastic rhetoric that its leader is famous for and to pursue an 
agenda of winning municipal elections and governing effectively.  
 Whether the decline of dominant party rule in South Africa emerges from outside or 
within the ANC, the reality is that the absence of political competition does not bode well for 
democracy. Without facing the threat of losing elections, incumbents cannot be held accountable 
by voters. The ANC has made notable achievements in improving the lives of ordinary South 
Africans. However, under its tenure, the level of income inequality has reached astronomical 
levels. The party’s failure to introduce serious economic reform that uplifts the poorest of the 
society has led to devastating consequences. While the party elite continues to reap the benefits 
of being in power, the lives of average people remain unchanged. These outcomes have led to 
widespread apathy within the ANC’s own base, as voter turnout continues to decline since 1994. 
These pressing issues only make it more imperative for the emergence of a robust opposition that 
can enact the changes that are necessary, or pressure the ANC into doing so.  
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CHAPTER 6   
Beyond South Africa: Opposition Party Governance of 
Cities in Africa  
 
 In this short afterward, I briefly discuss how opposition parties in other African countries 
used their tenure in local government to gain a foothold at the national level or to expand to other 
parts of the country. While these cases demonstrate that governance at the local level is crucial to 
future electoral success, it should be noted that the ability of opposition parties to grow in many 
parts of Africa is heavily dependent on the degree of fiscal decentralization in a country. Ruling 
parties often use their control of the central government to ensure that subnational governments 
do not become financially independent from the center. These strategies of subversion stymie the 
efforts of opposition-led cities and states to pursue a genuine reform agenda. In the cases of city 
government that I discuss below (Lagos, Nigeria; Beira, Mozambique, and Lusaka, Zambia) 
there are varying levels of central-periphery tensions over fiscal matters. Although South Africa 
is considerably more fiscally decentralized than these cases, there are still lessons that can be 
drawn from opposition party building in more restrictive environments. This chapter first details 
opposition party governance of cities in Nigeria, Mozambique, and Zambia, and then concludes 
with a discussion of the sustainability of this trend.  
6.1 Nigeria 	
 Following the death of General Sani Abacha in 1998, Nigeria began a transition away 
from military rule and held national and state elections in 1999. The opposition party Action 
Congress of Nigeria (ACN), founded by Bola Tinubu, won control of Lagos State in the 1999 
election. Lagos State is also home to the city of Lagos, which is the largest city in Africa. Under 
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Tinubu’s leadership the ACN introduced various reforms to the city’s tax collection system, 
improved the city’s waste management and mass transportation system.  
 After his election in 1999, Tinubu made reform to the tax system a priority, and began a 
review of Lagos’s tax collection process. At that time the state lacked the capacity to collect and 
monitor tax payments efficiently. City residents payed taxes in cash, and revenue officials wrote 
handwritten receipts, creating opportunities for corruption to take root. The finance ministry lost 
track of the payments that went into the state’s bank account. Big businesses evaded tax 
payments, and audits of these businesses were conducted infrequently due to a lack of qualified 
personnel who could carry out financial inspections (De Gramont 2015). 
 Tinubu introduced several reforms to the tax collection process. In place of cash 
payments, the new ministry of finance introduced electronic payments through banks (De 
Gramont 2015, 11). Taxpayers were now given electronic receipts for their payments. The city 
government hired an external consulting company to manage the payment system and to monitor 
payments in order to ensure that the revenue ended up in the state’s bank account. In addition, 
Tinubu’s administration hired private auditors who could monitor that big business were paying 
taxes. Finally, in 2005, the existing internal revenue board was compulsory retired and replaced 
with a new management team. The new revenue board, named the Lagos State Internal Revenue 
Service (LIRS), was tasked with hiring and developing qualified personnel to manage the 
revenue agency. LIRS was able to attract better qualified staff who received higher salaries and 
opportunities for professional development (Moore 2013).  
 Another challenge to tax compliance in Lagos was the lack of public awareness about 
their obligation to pay taxes and the necessity of taxes for government to function. Nigeria’s 
economy is largely oil dependent, and because oil revenues used to subsidize a lot of government 
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services under the military regime, most residents of Lagos city were not accustomed to a culture 
of taxation. So, in addition the fiscal reforms introduced by Tinubu’s administration, they also 
engaged in campaigns to raise public awareness about the necessity of paying taxes. As a result 
of the reforms, tax compliance among large companies by 2015 went up to 80 percent, up from 
30-40 percent in 2005 ((De Garment 2015, 13). The internally generated revenue of Lagos rose 
from 1.6 million USD in 1999 to 83 million USD by 2017 (Akor 2019). By 2014 over 70 percent 
of Lagos state’s budget came from state taxes and other internal sources (Adams 2015). In 
comparison, other states in the country could only raise more than 30 percent of taxes locally. 
 The second area of concern facing the city of Lagos when Tinubu became governor was 
the issue of garbage collection. Large piles of garbage used to be strewn all over the city, as there 
was no enforcement against the illegal dumping of garbage. The new city administration began 
Operation Clean Lagos, a program with the objective of upgrading landfills, monitoring private 
sector contractors responsible for waste collection, and paying staff salaries on time 
(Okoroayanwu & Sanyaolu 2010). The program also created more jobs, as thousands of street 
sweepers were employed. In 2005 the number of waste management employees in the city was 
1,4000, and this was increased to 23,000 by 2015 (De Garment 2015, 19). The increased effort to 
reform waste collection lead to visible changes in Lagos, as garbage piles were no longer 
prominent on city streets. Also, more of the city’s waste is now disposed of through official 
waste collectors rather than illegal dumping (LCOS 2013).  
 Finally, another major reform to the quality of life in Lagos city during Tinubu’s tenure 
focused on the development of an efficient public transport system. Prior to 2007, Lagos was the 
largest city in the world without a state-organized mass transit system (UN-Habitat 2014, 120). 
With financing from the World Bank, the administration introduced a bus rapid transit (BRT) 
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system, which created a special bus lane for city-owned buses. Under this program, ridership of 
buses has increased considerably (Olusina 2013), and traffic congestion has lessened.   
    In 2007 Tinubu handed over the governorship to his chief of staff Babatunde Fashola. 
Fashola focused on improving public transport, fighting crime, and improving access to public 
goods such as waste collection, piped water, electricity, and primary health and education 
(Adams 2015). Fashola was widely popular in Lagos for his efforts to reduce high crime rates, 
working to improve the city’s public transport system and infrastructure. In the 2011 election, 
Fashola was re-elected as governor with 80 percent of the vote.  
 The ACN’s achievements in service delivery, economic development, and its push 
toward fiscal independence raised tensions with the central government. The central government, 
led by the dominant People’s Democratic Party (PDP) retaliated against Lagos state by 
withholding allocations, blocking plans by the state to develop power stations and rebuild roads 
(LeVan 2018; Adams 2015). Lagos state was able to mostly resist the efforts by the federal 
government to curtail its power because of its ability to raise most of its own revenue.  
 Under Tinubu’s leadership, the ACN support expanded beyond Lagos state. The party 
was able to win support in the previously impenetrable Midwestern region, capturing Edo state 
in the 2008 election. And by 2017 the ACN won control of the presidency and won more than 
half of the state governor posts (Resnick 2019).  
6.2 Mozambique 	
 Mozambique is another country where the opposition managed to make inroads at the 
subnational level. Much of Mozambique’s post-independence history was dominated by a civil 
war between the ruling Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) party and the opposition 
Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) party. The war had lasted from 1977 to 1992. 
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Since independence, FRELIMO had turned the country into a one-party state. It was only during 
the post-war negotiations that the ruling party decided to introduce municipal elections 
(Makgelta 2010).  
 In Mozambique, the city of Beira, under the leadership of opposition member Daviz 
Simango experienced significant transformation. Simango took office in 2003 as mayor of the 
city, which is Mozambique’s fourth largest. He was only one of five opposition mayors in the 
country. Soon after Simango took office the central government responded by delaying the 
transfer of funds to his administration. The central government did not send any money to the 
city in the first six months after the election (Makgelta 2010). In reaction to the central 
government’s financial manipulation, Simango sought to push the city toward greater financial 
independence from the center, and introduced sweeping reforms to improve the city’s tax base. 
Simango introduced measures designed to prevent unplanned and wasteful spending, such as 
instructing his finance department to put the city’s revenue into an account that no one could use 
without his permission (Makgelta 2010, 4). The city leadership also introduced a system to tax 
the businesses that operated in the informal market, such as vendors who hawked products on 
city streets. New tracking mechanisms were devised to ensure that tax collectors were not 
siphoning funds from the city. Finally, the city targeted its tax collection efforts toward major 
companies such as the companies operating the city’s port facilities, which had evaded tax 
collection under the previous city government. A few years after taking office, internal city 
audits and audits by the central government’s Ministry of State Administration showed that these 
efforts had improved the city’s finances.  
 Simango also sought to increase the city’s financial independence from the state by 
seeking funding from international donors.  At first donors were hesitant to issue loans because 
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of the previous administration’s misappropriation of funds. However, a few years into his tenure, 
the EU, UN and other agencies began to disburse funds and give equipment to the city, such as 
ambulances (Makgelta 2010). 
 During Simango’s tenure, one of the most pressing issues facing the city of Beira was the 
widespread cholera epidemic. According to the World Health Organization, in 2004, there were 
up to a reported 4,880 cases of the water-borne disease in the city (Makgelta 2010). Beira is a 
port-city at the mouth of a river, and it is on a floodplain, as parts of the city lay below sea level. 
Exacerbating the problem was the issue of poor sanitation, with garbage often plugging the city’s 
canals. Many residents lacked access to toilets, which forced them to use the outdoors. And 
during the rains, polluted water would spill into the open, creating the right conditions for 
cholera to spread. To address this crisis, Simango implemented various reforms. The city bought 
more garbage trucks, and purchased drain-cleaning equipment that it had previously only rented. 
During this time the total number of garbage trucks owned by the city increased from three to 
nine (Makgelta 2010). Another problem was that families of cholera victims were abandoning 
bodies at the city mortuary because they couldn’t afford to transport them to cemeteries. 
Simango introduced a funeral transportation service in which the city provided trucks free of 
charge to transport the bodies. Finally, Beira became the site of a massive vaccination campaign, 
which was funded by donors. These interventions began to have a noticeable impact. By 2006 
the city closed its cholera treatment center for the first time in years.  
 Simango’s rising popularity in response to his achievements in the city led to tensions 
within his own party. The leadership of RENAMO refused to nominate him on the ticket for a 
second term as mayor. In response, for the 2008 election, Simango ran as an independent and 
was re-elected with 61 percent of the vote (Reaud 2012). The following year he formed his own 
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party, the Democratic Movement of Mozambique (MDM). In the municipal elections of 2013 
MDM won control of four cities. And in the 2014 general election, the party won nine seats in 
parliament.  
6.3 Zambia 	
 Finally, Zambia is a case in which opposition party gains in local elections set them up 
for later success at the national level. The opposition Patriotic Front (PF) party was founded by 
Michael Sata in 2001 after he was rejected by Frederick Chiluba as a potential presidential 
successor on the ticket of the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) party. Sata ran for 
the presidency in 2006 and campaigned on a populist anti-elitist message. Although his bid for 
the presidency was unsuccessful, his popularity translated into support for PF candidates running 
in parliamentary and local elections in 2006. The PF made significant gains in Lusaka District, 
where it won all seven constituencies and most of the local council seats (Resnick 2011, 148-
149). This led to the PF gaining control of the Lusaka City Council (LCC). The PF also won 
control of other cities in the country, particularly in the Copperbelt.  
 After the electoral gains of 2006, the PF established a committee of new councilors to 
implement new policies at the municipal level. The new local authorities would act as “parallel 
governments” and focused on reducing rates, building housing to replace shanty settlements, 
decentralizing control of bus stations, and reviewing the allocation of market spaces (Lamer & 
Fraser 2007 636). 
 Despite winning control of the LCC, the PF’s ability to implement real change in local 
government was circumscribed by the absence of genuine fiscal decentralization in Zambia. The 
LCC does not control any resources, and the central government is solely in charge of disbursing 
funding. In addition, the MDD-led central government decides how the money is spent (Resnick 
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2011, 150-151). Feuds between the central government and the city council occurred over 
various issues. For instance, during the rainy season, flooding in the city results in the risk of 
cholera outbreaks in Lusaka. The central government and PF city councilors fought over the 
disbursement of funds to the LCC for the council to install proper drainage that would lessen the 
flooding (Resnick 2011, 153-154). It was only after winning the presidency in 2011 that Sata 
was able to introduce meaningful reform at the local level (Resnick 2019). While populist 
rhetoric helped Sata and his party win local elections before, his ability to only introduce reforms 
as president shows that the ability of opposition parties to enact serious reform at the local level 
is significantly impacted by the degree of fiscal decentralization that exists in a country.   
 The cases of opposition governance of cities in Africa discussed above reinforce the 
importance of subnational politics on the development of competitive party systems. The 
governing of cities is important for opposition parties because urban areas are electorally, 
financially, and symbolically consequential for the broader country. At the same time, these case 
studies highlight how opposition governance of cities is threatening to ruling parties. Many 
national governments in Africa are threatened by the genuine decentralization of power because 
it would allow opposition parties to build independent bases of support. Despite increasing 
pressure by international donors for African countries to devolve power to local governments, 
the case studies from Nigeria, Mozambique, and Zambia show that ruling parties find a way to 
subvert these efforts. Some of these strategies involve the removal of mayors, the withholding of 
municipal funding, and the central government’s lack of political cooperation on resolving urban 
service delivery issues. In fact, many ruling parties use decentralization as a means to further 
consolidate power at the local level (Riedl & Dickovick 2014). The broader implication from 
these cases is that in order for opposition parties to use subnational office as a spring-board for 
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national governance, central governments have to be committed to fiscal decentralization. In the 
absence of political structures that allow opposition parties to seek fiscal autonomy from the 
center, opposition parties have to rely on contesting power at the national level.  
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